Objectives and models of the planetary quarantine program by Werber, M.
NASA SP - 344 
I (WAS&-SP-3 44) 
' P ~ ~ ~ ~ T ~ ~ Y  Q o A R  
I 
Hvlp $2.25; SOD 
- '. 
s a  
U nti r 
B7 5-2566 4 
ATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19750017532 2020-03-22T21:44:18+00:00Z
Objectives and Models 
of the Planetary 
Quarantine Program 

NASA SP-344 
Objectives and Models 
of the Planetary 
Quarantine Proqram 
Morton Werber 
Scient2Jic and Technical Information Ofice I975 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRRTION 
Washington, D.C. 
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 
Price $2.10 Stock Number 3300-00588 
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 74-600023 
FOREWORD 
This is one of two reports dealing with the events leading to the estab- 
lishment of a Planetary Quarantine Program in the United States, the 
development of this program, and its status as of the summer of 1973. 
The reports partially fulfill the National Aeronautics and Space Ad- 
ministration’s (NASA’s) requirement that the program be recorded fully 
so that research and development need not be repeated in the future. 
Both were prepared for the NASA Planetary Quarantine Office by the 
Science Communication Division of the George Washington University 
Medical Center, under Contract NSR OP-010-027. The other report, 
written by Charles R. Phillips and entitled The Planetary Quarantine 
Program, 1956-1 973: Origins and Achievements (NASA SP4902), 
has been published in the NASA historical series. 
Now that the Apollo Lunar Exploration Program has come to a halt, 
at least temporarily, and the expIoration of the planets is proceeding on 
an established, although not accelerated, basis, it is time to take stock of 
where we stand today. 
One of the most exciting possible discoveries in space exploration 
wouId be the detection of extraterrestrial life. The Planetary Quarantine 
Program, both national and international, is an outgrowth of great scien- 
tific concern that the search for such life might be compromised by 
terrestrial microbial contamination during early space exploration proj- 
ects before effective life detection systems can be added to the space 
program. 
The very term “planetary quarantine” shows how the program has 
expanded. The first discussions and efforts used the term “sterilization.” 
Then sterilization, an absolute term, was gradually replaced by “proba- 
bility of contamination.” The consideration that in cases where micro- 
organisms could not be killed they could possibly be confined led to the 
concept of “quarantine.” When trajectory control came into use, flybys 
could be kept at sufficient distance from celestial bodies to avoid transfer 
of contaminants, while getting close enough to gain significant scientific 
information. 
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The Phillips report outlines United States effort in planetary quaran- 
tine, beginning with the expressions of alarm by biologists, then dis- 
cussing how a program was put together and implemented, and finally 
indicating the academic, governmental, institutional, and industrial 
agencies and people involved. It ends with a brief summary of the 
accomplishments and present status of the Planetary Quarantine 
Program. 
The present report by Morton Werber goes more deeply into the 
statements of objectives or goals, general at first, and then deals with the 
development of sophisticated models which furnished the basis for 
establishing national and international policies. It will, we trust, serve as 
a partial explanation of how the planetary quarantine effort evolved and 
reached its present position. 
LAWRENCE B. HALL 
NASA Planetary Quarantine Officer 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
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- BEGINNINGS 
One of the earliest attempts to establish and implement a program to 
prevent contamination of the Moon and planets by terrestrial micro- 
organisms occurred at the VIIth International Congress of the Interna- 
tional Astronautical Federation (IAF) held in Rome in September 1956 
‘(Haley, 1963). The IAJ? attempted to coordinate international efforts to 
prevent interplanetary contamination when the first space flight was 
made in 1957. This led to formation of the International Institute of 
Space Law, an IAF subsidiary with 11 working groups, each concerned 
with a different aspect of space law. 
Some of the initial attempts to deal with contamination and sterilization 
problems, in addition to those of the IAF, were carried out by the United 
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). 
The committee included representatives from governments and from 
the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) of the International 
Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). UNCOPUOS was an outgrowth of 
an ad hoc committee on the peaceful uses of outer space (formed 
December 13, 1958), that was boycotted by several governments. 
A report published by the committee on July 18, 1959, expressed 
apprehensions that (Haley, 1963, p. 289) 
. . . activities in outer space might bring to those regions, by inadvertence, living or other 
matter from the earth capable of interfering with orderly scientific research. It was agreed 
that further study should be encouraged under appropriate auspices to specify the types of 
risks, the gravity of dangers, and the technical possibilities, as well as the cost of preventive 
measures. Such a study should also cover safeguards against similar contamination as well 
as protection against other hazards to health and safety that might be created by the carrying 
out of programmes to explore outer space. 
A subsequent statement proposing the possible formation of inter- 
national standards was added on June 11,1959. But, as Haley observed, 
because the latter was stated weakly, considered a legal problem not 
requiring priority treatment, and lacking in support by some governments 
the report was of limited value. 
In 1957, the U S .  National Academy of Sciences (NAS) expressed 
its concern with the problems of interplanetary contamination resulting 
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from space exploration. The necessity for international cooperation 
to prevent alteration or destruction of extraterrestrial life forms was 
recognized. The possibility that “initial space explorations might com- 
promise and make forever impossible certain scientific investigations 
on the chemistry and biology of the planets” (Bruch, 1968, p. 686) led 
Dr. Detlev W. Bronk, president of NAS, to recommend in late 1957 the 
formation of a Satellite-Life Sciences Symposium. He recommended 
further that the chairman of the Earth Satellite Panel of the U S .  National 
Committee/International Geophysical Year serve as chairman of the 
planning committee. 
On February 8, 1958, the Council of the NAS adopted the following 
resolutions (Science, 1958, p. 887): 
The launching of IGY satellites has opened space to exploration. Accordingly, attempts 
to reach the moon and planets can be anticipated, with reasonable confidence, within the 
foreseeable future. 
The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America urges that scientists 
plan lunar and planetary studies with great care and deep concern so that initial operations 
do not compromise and make impossible forever after critical scientific experiments. For 
example, biological or radioactive contamination of extraterrestrial objects could easily 
occur unless initial space activities be carefully planned and conducted with extreme care. 
The National Academy of Sciences will endeavor to plan lunar or planetary experiments 
in which the Academy participates so as to prevent contamination of celestial objects in a 
way that would impair the unique and powerful scientific opportunities that might be 
realized in subsequent scientific exploration. 
The Council of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America urges 
the International Council of Scientific Unions to encourage and assist the evaluation of 
possibilities of such contamination and the development of means for its prevention. The 
Council of the Academy also requests the International Council of Scientific Unions to do 
whatever else it may to preserve and foster the unaffected potentialities of space research. 
These resolutions were communicated to the ICSU Bureau by Lloyd V. 
Berkner, ICSU President, during its meeting on March 3-5, 1958. 
As a result, an ad hoc Committee on Contamination by Extraterrestrial 
Exploration (CETEX), with Marcel Florkin as president, was established 
by the ICSU, which met at The Hague, May 12-13,1958. The committee 
presented its report urging the acceptance of a code of conduct that would 
provide some compromise between maximum efforts toward lunar and 
planetary exploration and constraints to protect celestial bodies for 
future research. 
The committee also discussed problems dealing with the Moon’s 
, atmosphere, Moon dust, cosmic dust, the panspermia hypothesis, con- 
tamination of the Moon by living cells, development of complex mole- 
cules, and contamination of Mars and Venus. The report proposed that 
ICSU members prepare papers on these problems by the end of 1958. 
These papers would then be available for the second CETEX meeting, 
where additional recommendations would be made. In discussing con- 
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tamination, it was stated that the absence of water on the Moon caused 
by high vacuum precluded the possibility of cells such as spores or bac- 
teria giving rise to life of the same kind on the Moon. Hcwever, it was 
recognized that a greater probability of s m h  growth on Mars, and hossi- 
bly on Venus, necessitated adequate measures to prevent contamination. 
The Satellite-Life Sciences Symposium was held in Washington, D.C., 
May 14-17, 1958, under the sponsorship of the NAS, the American 
Institute of Biological Sciences (AIBS), and the National Science 
Foundation (NSF). At the meeting on “Possible Uses of Earth Satellites 
in Life Science Experiments,” Joshua Lederberg delivered a paper on 
the dangers of lunar contamination (Lederberg and Cowie, 1958). 
Lederberg pointed out that the Moon may be covered by a very old layer 
of dust captured by its gravitational field. “For the biologist, this 
dust may furnish two striking opportunities: (i) to assess the prebiotic 
synthesis of organic compounds and (ii) to make an empirical test of 
cosmic dissemination of biospores [Arrhenius’ pun-spermia hypothesis]” 
(Lederberg and Cowie, 1958, p. 1473). However, the potential benefits 
of such opportunities require considerable care in planning space probes. 
He cautioned that if contaminants were introduced to the Moon by 
spacecraft, an interpretation of a test of Arrhenius’ hypothesis would 
be very difficult. Lederberg noted that the surface area of the Moon 
is 4 X 1013m2, and that in contaminated material microbial populations 
can readily reach a level of 1013 micro-organisms per kilogram. 
The Space Science Board (SSB), formed in June 1958 by the president 
of NAS, was one of the recipients of the first CETEX report, circulated 
in July 1958, with a request for comments. The SSB had been formed 
to “serve as the focal point for the interests and responsibilities of the 
Academy-Research Council in space science” (Derbyshire, 1962, 
p. 10:13). A meeting was held in December 1958, under the sponsorship 
of the SSB, to consider various problems concerned with the detection 
of extraterrestrial life and the prevention of contamination of extra- 
terrestrial bodies by terrestrial organisms. This group, composed of 
representatives of the biological, astronautical, physical, and engineering 
sciences, became EASTEX. A comparable west coast group, WESTEX, 
was later established by Joshua Lederberg. WESTEX held several 
meetings during 1959, recognizing as the primary problem, the formula- 
tion of requirements for space probe sterilization from the standpoint 
of biology. On May 7-9, 1959, the SSB requested that an ad hoc com- 
mittee be formed to work toward this objective. The committee later 
found that sterilization was feasible and that effective methods could 
be developed. The SSB adopted the findings of the committee and sent 
them to the appropriate Federal agencies on September 15,1959. 
The first instance of these recommendations being put into effect is 
reported in a letter dated October 13, 1959, from T. Keith Glennan, 
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Administrator of NASA, to Hugh Odishaw. Glennan agreed with the SSB 
recommendations, and NASA gave instructions for the Space Technology 
Laboratories to sterilize the Atlas-Able 4 lunar orbiter payload; for 
the Goddard Space Flight Center to sterilize the lunar miss payload 
Delta P-14; and for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to develop 
sterilization procedures for all lunar Vega probes. 
The SSB, together with those Federal agencies responsible for various 
aspects of the space program, also reviewed and endorsed the CETEX 
report and assured NAS and launching agency support for the CETEX 
recommendations. 
FORMATION OF COSPAR 
In October 1958, ICSU accepted the CETEX recommendation for the 
establishment of a code of conduct for space missions and research. 
A second meeting (CETEX 11) was called for March %lo, 1959. The 
committee believed that immediate action was necessary in order to 
deal effectively with the contamination problem (Trauth, 1968, p. 135). 
In its lifetime (1958-59), this Committee recognized two principles which have had 
considerable influence upon the international approach being taken to planetary quarantine. 
The first was that certain knowledge that a planet is not contaminated was, in all likelihood, 
possible only if that planet was avoided by space vehicles. The second was that exploration 
of the planets would take place, and that the nations involved in such exploration would 
determine their own time schedules for this exploration. 
The CETEX I1 meeting was held at The Hague, with Marcel Florkin 
as convenor. In October 1958, between the first and second CETEX 
meetings, the ICSU had formed a Committee on Space Research 
(COSPAR) to coordinate worldwide space research. The formation of 
COSPAR was a continuation of the cooperative efforts in space research 
begun during the International Geophysical Year by the Comite Special 
de l’Ann6e Gophysique Internationale. The SSB, through the NAS, 
gave full support to COSPAR, and W. Albert Noyes, Jr., Chairman of 
the SSB Committee on International Relations, was appointed US. 
delegate to COSPAR. He was later succeeded by Richard W. Porter. 
COSPAR had the support of both the US. and U.S.S.R. Academies, 
and CETEX recommended that COSPAR assume responsibility for the 
contamination problem. Thus, the problem was referred to COSPAR, 
a permanent ICSU committee. 
CETEX also reviewed its earlier report concerning such problems as 
the panspermia hypothesis and the biological contamination of the 
Moon, Mars, and Venus and suggested that COSPAR initiate an imme- 
diate study of methods for sterilizing the interior of a spacecraft without 
harming its delicate instruments. The committee’s report also stated 
that there was no need to sterilize the outer surface of space vehicles, 
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since micro-organisms on the ship's shell would be exposed to un- 
filtered solar radiation during flight. Furthermore, it was felt that the 
need for sterilization was only temporary, and the requirement that 
Mars and Venus remain uncontaminated was necessary only until a 
study could be made with manned spacecraft. 
At its meeting on March 12-14, 1959, COSPAR acknowledged the 
CETEX I1 report and recommendations and assumed responsibility for 
this area of concern. At the same time, COSPAR requested that the 
US. and U.S.S.R. consider ways of avoiding contamination. The request 
was communicated to the SSB by the U.S. delegate to COSPAR. 
During the period immediately following the COSPAR meeting, several 
reports presenting analyses of various aspects of contamination and 
sterilization were written. For example, Davies and Comuntzis (1960) 
acknowledged the possibility of indigenous life on Mars arid Venus and 
that the environments of those planets might support rapid proliferation 
of terrestrial micro-organisms. They warned that the introduction of 
terrestrial organisms might result in an irreversible scientific catastrophe, 
noting that if the Earth were sterile, it would require only a matter of 
months or years to populate it with the decendants of a single cell. 
E. coli, with a mass of grams and a fission interval of 30 minutes 
would, under ideal conditions, require 66 hours to equal the Earth's 
mass. This illustrates the exponential growth rate of bacteria and 
emphasizes the urgency of the problem. 
BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION 
Davies and Comuntzis defined two types of biological contamination: 
pollution and infection (Davies and Comuntzis, 1960, p. 498). 
Biological pollution is meant to be a deposit of a large enough number of micro-organisms 
to be scientifically significant, as such, without further growth. Infection is meant to 
describe the growth of one or more viable organisms. Likewise, pollution can be divided 
into two categories: viable pollution, which does not grow by nature of its environment, 
and nonviable pollution. 
Ppllution is that form of contamination that could occur on the Moon, 
Mars, and Venus if, for example, an animal were involved in the crash 
of a spaceship on their surfaces. Davies and Comuntzis estimated that 
a mammal's intestines can contain 10l2 micro-organisms per kilogram, 
and perhaps 1013, if it died during flight. Since the Moon's area is 4 X 10'3 
square meters, and with 1960 improvements in methods permitting 
detection of one micro-organism to perhaps better than one per square 
meter, a residue of from 109 to 10'O dead terrestrial bacteria could inter- 
fere with future research. The authors suggested that infection is least 
probable on the Moon because of the lack of water; that Mars is more 
promising in terms of both infection and basic biological research; and 
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that any theorizing about Venus would be premature. Abelson (1961; 
cited in Bruch, 1968, and in Haley, 1963) went even further by proposing 
that it was almost impossible to biologically contaminate or infect the 
Moon, Venus, or Mars. Abelson, who was a consultant to NASA from 
the Geophysical Laboratory of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, 
agreed that adopting a new set of sterility restraints would cost $10 
million and impede the American space program to a significant degree. 
Davies and Comuntzis maintain, however, that probe sterilization 
might be mistakenly regarded as unnecessary by those who stress the 
effects of the Sun’s ultraviolet radiation, space vacuum, the Moon’s 
high surface temperatures, the heat of impact or impact explosion, and 
the heat of entry into a planetary atmosphere. They also point out that 
the cracks and fissures on the surfaces of the Moon and planets would 
serve to protect terrestrial micro-organisms from high temperatures or 
ultraviolet radiation and that laboratory vacuum can help preserve 
these organisms. In addition, they suggest that some areas of the probe 
will never be exposed to sunlight, and ultraviolet radiation will not de- 
stroy micro-organisms unless they are nakedly exposed. Further, an 
organism can survive if surrounded by a small number of dead ones. 
Finally, as for the heat of impact or impact explosion, a hard landing 
on the Moon would have an impact velocity of 3 kilometers per second, 
which is not sufficient to melt or vaporize the probe. 
The authors therefore conclude that the problems of contamination 
and probe sterility should be viewed within the context of probabilities, 
and the exponential death rate of micro-organisms subjected to lethal 
treatment (Davies and Comuntzis, 1960, p. 503). 
For Mars and Venus, the consensus [of biologists in the United States] is that the probability 
of landing one viable organism should be. less than one in a million. This means that, if the 
probability of successfully impacting a probe were judged a priori to be one in a hundred, 
it would be necessary to sterilize the payload to a tolerance of one chance in ten thousand 
that it have a live organism. 
In regard to the Moon, they tentatively recommend an infection toler- 
ance of one chance in 10 or possibly in 100. of a viable micro-organism 
remaining on the probe. They also believe that pollution should be kept 
to less than 108 dead organisms per probe for both the Moon and the 
planets. 
Several other papers having important implications for the develop- 
ment of contamination control guidelines appeared at the same time. 
For example, Lederberg stated (Lederberg, 1960, p. 398): 
The introduction of microbial life to a previously barren planet or to one occupied by a less 
well-adapted form of life, could result in the explosive growth of the implant, with conse- 
quences of geochemical scope. With a generation time of 30 minutes and easy dissemina- 
tion by winds and currents, common bacteria could occupy a nutrient medium the size of 
the earth in a few days or weeks, being limited only by the exhaustion of available nutrients. 
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It follows that we must rigorously exclude terrestrial contaminants from our spacecraft. 
According to Lederberg, the ubiquitous nature of bacterial spores and 
their durability under adverse conditions, such as high vacuums and 
low temperatures, must be fully appreciated in order to prevent 
contamination. 
Sagan (1960) emphasized that biological contamination of the Moon 
would be an unparalleled scientific disaster, severely affecting efforts 
to study the early history of the solar system, the origin of life on Earth, 
extraterrestrial life, and the chemical composition of matter in the re- 
mote past. In his study, Sagan considers three primary factors in regard 
to the survival of terrestrial life on the Moon: temperature, corpuscular 
radiation, and solar electromagnetic radiation. He does not believe that 
the absence of oxygen, water, and other substances from the Moon's 
surface would prohibit survival, especially of dormant anaerobic 
micro-organisms; however, he thinks that this would preclude their 
reproduction. 
MICROBIAL SURVIVAL 
Insofar as the effect of temperature on the survival of micro-organisms is 
concerned, Sagan hypothesizes that it would have no debilitating effect, 
since most of the organisms would be deposited just beneath the Moon's 
surface, where the temperature would range between 0" and -70" C 
at a depth of less than half a meter. 
Sagan estimates that a 1 kg. instrumented lunar package could con- 
tain 1Olo micro-organisms, with little likelihood of this figure's being 1W0 
organisms for packages in the immediate future. With these limits, he 
presents the following equation: 
where ( p / p )  is the mass absorption coefficient of the organism in cm.2 
gm.-l and p is its density in gm. ~ m . - ~ .  The time t (in seconds), in which 
a population of No organisms with a mean lethal dose D for a given 
radiation and the diameter, a (in centimeters) is reduced to N organisms 
by radiation of intensity 1 erg cm-2 s-l. Sagan states the following 
(Sagan, 1960, p. 398): 
For ionizing radiation, the high value of D =  lo' rep was chosen. For ultraviolet radiation, 
a mean value D= 10' erg cm-2 was selected for 2000 A =S A C 3000 A: for X C 2000 A, 
D < lo6 erg cm-2. 
It should be emphasized that these mean lethal doses are purposely high to allow for 
anaerobiosis and drying. The resulting lifetimes should be upper limits, except, perhaps, 
where pIp  *pa for ionizing radiation. 
Thus, with these limits on N,/N, all of the deposited micro-organisms 
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exposed to the Sun would be killed by ultraviolet radiation within a few 
hours. But those organisms deposited in a lunar crevasse or depression, 
so as to be shielded from solar radiation, would be killed only by cosmic 
rays and natural radioactivity. At the high value of D, micro-organisms 
just below the lunar surface and shielded from the Sun would survive 
for a few hundred million years. Therefore, with what was known about 
the Moon's surface in 1960, it could easily be assumed that dormant 
anaerobic micro-organisms could be deposited in a way so as to protect 
them from the Sun's rays at all angles of incidence and ensure survival 
of at least some for very long periods of time. 
Davis and Fulton (1960) were, perhaps, the first to report on the validity 
of the assumption that possible Martian life was similar to certain types 
of simple terrestrial life. Interest in such work increased during this 
period, as the possibility of extended space flight became more feasible. 
The authors employed the environmental conditions outlined in Table 1 
in their experiments, even though these limits were not identical to those 
believed to exist on Mars. They were, however, thought to be similar 
enough to provide meaningful data regarding the contamination of 
Mars by simple forms of terrestrial life such as those which would be 
deposited by contaminated space probes. 
Table 1 Simulated Martian Environment (after Davis and Fulton, 1960). 
Factors Simulated by 
Atmospheric pressure 
Moisture content 
Atmospheric composition 
Soil type 
Temperature range 
65 mm. Hg. 
Approx. 1% 
Commercial nitrogen gas 
Red sandstone, lava soil 
4-25' to -25" C 
Diurnal Nocturnal 
The results of the Davis and Fulton experiments showed: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Soil bacteria, selectively adapted to a simulated Martian environ- 
ment, survive and multiply. 
Sporeforming bacteria appear to have a higher rate of cell multi- 
plication than strictly vegetative cells. 
A simulated Martian environment, including temperature cycling, 
an environmental characteristic on Mars, appears to yield greater 
numbers of viable cells than a simulated Martian environment 
under room temperature conditions. 
Somewhat later, Hawrylewicz et al. (1962) reported that an encap- 
sulated anaerobic organism such as K. pneumoniae, the spores of 
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anaerobic organisms such as Cl. botulinum, and possibly the tetanus 
and gangrene organisms could survive simulated Martian conditions. 
Packer et al. (1963) also demonstrated that terrestrial micro-organisms 
collected in soil samples from a variety of environments (e.&, regions 
of high alkalinity, low temperatures, and scant rainfall) survive under 
conditions simulating those on Mars. 
STERILIZATION OF SPACE VEHICLES 
An article by Phillips and Hoffman (1960) is of special interest. It con- 
cerns the need for sterilizing interplanetary vehicles, the resistance of 
life forms in space, and techniques of sterilizing space vehicles without 
restricting the mission or interfering with operation of the vehicle. The 
authors describe experiments carried out at Fort Detrick to determine 
whether various components of a vehicle were contaminated with living 
micro-organisms when received from the manufacturer, and whether 
assembly techniques would further entrap such organisms. It appeared 
that such contamination was present, leading to the assumption that all 
components of the spacecraft contained internal bacterial contamination. 
The ability of the components to function satisfactorily after being 
subjected to various sterilization procedures was also investigated. 
On the basis of the available data, the authors concluded that a space 
vehicle could be sterilized only with sufficient attention to the sterili- 
zation requirements at all stages of design and construction. 
Some of these problems were more fully explored in a conference, 
Problems and Techniques Associated with the Decontamination and 
Sterilization of Spacecraft, sponsored by NASA and held June 29,1960. 
During the discussions, participants recommended that (Posner, 1961, 
P. 39) 
1. A body of information relating to sterilization techniques and pro- 
cedures be built up and made available to all interested parties 
currently working in this area or who may be involved in the future. 
A standard operating procedure be established for each scheduled 
launch at a stage early enough to include decontamination or 
sterilization as an environmental factor for design considerations. 
Studies be made relating to the sterilization of explosive squibs. 
Work be done in the area of determining the probabilities of in- 
advertent impact, coupled with the statistical limitations of 
implanting live micro-organisms on celestial bodies. 
NASA further clarify its policy and intent with respect to decon- 
tamination and sterilization. 
An increased effort be put on the development of new and better 
sterilizing agents that will more closely meet engineering require- 
ments. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
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7. Efforts be extended at the same time towards developing struc- 
tures and component parts that are compatible with sterilizing 
agents. 
The manufacturing process be studied to determine the feasibility 
of producing materials and components that are internally sterile. 
A group at the working level be established to discuss details 
and problems of implementing sterilization techniques. 
At another conference on spacecraft sterilization held July 9, 1962, 
under the auspices of the NASA Biosciences Programs (Quimby, 1962), 
George Hobby of JPL, who was cochairman of the conference with Orr 
Reynolds (NASA Headquarters), discussed tolerance levels. The 
probability that a single viable micro-organism remained after a space- 
craft or one of its components had been subjected to a sterilization 
procedure was considered. Hobby pointed out that the original probabili- 
ties derived by the WESTEX committee were as low as but that 
this was reduced to which was considered a safe level. In effect, 
as Reynolds noted, this meant that only one out of 10000 landings or 
impacts on Mars, for example, would contain a micro-organism. In the 
discussion of this probability level, Richard Price stated (Quimby, 
1962, p. 16): 
8. 
9. 
People who would like to see the limits slided to one side or the other have interpreted 
it [lo-*] to mean out of 10000 organisms per capsule, per vehicle, one of them would be 
alive. 
However, Hobby’s interpretation is different; he observes that there 
would be more than 10,000 organisms per spacecraft (Quimby, 1962, 
p. 16). 
It is really what the probability is that no matter how many you have, after applying the 
sterilization technique you will have one remaining. 
Many comments at this conference centered around a report by L. D. 
Jaffe of JPL, who was on temporary assignment with the NASA Lunar 
and Planetary Office during 1962. The report was sent to those attending 
the conference and aroused considerable interest. For example, Charles 
Phillips stated that Jaffe, on the basis of the best sterilization methods 
available, had set the current (1962) probability level that could be 
achieved at rather than Phillips commented that Jaffe’s 
paper was an excellent document in which the value was shown 
to be a feasible criterion and that the various steps by which that figure 
was derived were outlined. However, Hobby felt that the low4 tolerance 
had little meaning, and that sterilization should proceed on the basis of 
utilizing the best available methods and designing them as carefully 
as possible. He considered it impractical to establish a particular 
tolerance number for a particular figure. Nevertheless, the level 
CONTAMINATION PREVENTION - BEGINNINGS 1 1  
was reviewed as a goal and was regarded as desirable in that sense. 
CONTAMINATION RISKS 
~ At this point, it is necessary to review Jaffe’s position, outlined in a 
1963 paper in Astronautics and Aerospace Engineering. Jaffe considered 
that on the basis of tests made with terrestrial organisms under simulated 
Martian conditions, the chance of growth of some micro-organisms, if 
released on Mars, appeared to be essentially unity. He outlined two 
methods by which an acceptable risk of contaminating Mars could be 
established. First, it could be assumed that this risk should be kept as 
low as the chance that no useful biological data would be obtained for 
other reasons. He estimated that for each attempt at reaching Mars, the 
probability of failure was 50 percent. Similarly, if a space vehicle suc- 
ceeded in reaching the planet, the probability that no useful data would 
be returned because of some failure in instrumentation or equipment was 
possibly 50 percent. Therefore, he estimated that the probability that no 
useful data on life would be returned on any one space probe was 314. 
Furthermore, the probability that no useful biological data would be 
obtained in a series of 28 flights (based on two attempted flights by the 
US. and the U.S.S.R. during each of seven oppositions of Mars before 
1980) was estimated to be 314, or 10-3.5. 
A second method of estimating the chance of contaminating Mars dur- 
ing unmanned flights would be to state that the probability should be kept 
low relative to the chance of contamination during the first manned land- 
ing. The probability of terrestrial micro-organisms being released during 
a manned flight through such factors as incomplete sterilization or de- 
fects in equipment (leaks, fractures, etc.) was estimated by most engi- 
neers at lo-’ or higher. Thus, Jaffe believed that would be a low 
enough number representing the permissible probability of contaminating 
Mars during the unmanned flight (Jaffe, 1963, p. 22). 
The numbers IO-3.5 and 10-2 for a program in which 14 flights reach Mars lead to and 
10-3.1 for the permissible probability of contamination on each flight. Perhaps an intermedi- 
ate value of about IO-* is reasonable. 
This figure was also suggested by an SSB study ( A  Review ofspace 
Research, 1962) for flyby trajectories as an alternative to sterilization. 
Jaffe also considered the required degree of assurance against con- 
tamination of Venus by terrestrial micro-organisms, noting that the prob- 
ability was modified by the chance that Venus does not have an environ- 
ment suitable for the growth of Earth organisms. He estimated that there 
was a 10-3 chance of terrestrial micro-organisms finding a suitable en- 
vironment on Venus, since the surface of the planet is very hot and the 
only regions appropriate for this growth are in the planet’s upper at- 
mosphere. Since terrestrial micro-organisms do not seem to multiply 
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in their own atmosphere, he assumed that there was little chance they 
would do so in that of Venus (JafTe, 1963, p. 23). 
The chance of some Earth micro-organism finding suitable environment for growth on Venus 
is therefore estimated at Dividing the value of for assurance against planetary 
contamination by this gives IO-' as the suggested assurance against releasing viable 
micro-organisms into the upper atmosphere of Venus. 
Jaffe believed that spacecraft sterility probably was not essential for 
missions to the Moon, since Sagan (1960) and Imshenetsky (1962), as cited 
in Jaffe, hypothesized that there was only a remote chance that terrestrial 
micro-organisms could grow and reproduce on or near its surface. How- 
ever, Lederberg and Cowie (1958) maintained that it would be desirable 
not to contaminate the Moon, so that any organic substances found there 
would not be confused with those brought from Earth. Consequently, 
Jaffe suggested that the probability of an Earth micro-organism being 
found on the lunar surface should be held to 10-6/sq. cm. of surface, 
which would mean that all unmanned flights to the Moon should deposit 
no more than 4 X 10" organisms. Instead of sterilization for such lunar 
flights, he thought that cleanliness procedures should be used, assuring 
the deposit of no more than 0.01 gram of living matter per flight. 
Jaffe's guidelines were revised at the 1962 NASA Conference on 
Spacecraft Sterilization. These revisions were, in turn, modified by the 
Iowa City OSSA Space Science Summer Study. The final standards 
included (Quimby, 1962, pp. 80-81) 
1. For mariner buses and booster last stages, either sterilization 
must be used or trajectories must be controlled to ensure a 
possibility of hitting Mars of not over and a probability of 
hitting Venus of not over 
A mariner entry capsule for Mars should be given recognized 
and accepted (official) sterilization treatment and handled asepti- 
cally thereafter. The goal of these activities should be that there is 
less than probability that a single living organism is released 
on the planet's surface. This figure takes into account the prob- 
abilities of sterilization during Mars entry and impact and of 
releasing organisms from the capsule at the planet. 
2. 
As early as 1959, the SSB considered the possible contamination of 
the Moon and planets by the impact of space probes. It adopted recom- 
mendations urging study of the contamination problem and sterilization 
standards and establishment of procedures to ensure a complete in- 
ventory of all space probe components. These suggestions comprised 
the basis for NASA's study of space vehicle sterilization and its policy 
requiring some degree of sterilization for all space probes passing near, 
or impacting on, the Moon or planets. The results of this work were 
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reviewed at the 1962 Space Science Summer Study, and the SSB 
restated its previous policy with regard to lunar and Martian probes. 
The SSB regarded the Moon's surface as highly unfavorable for the 
growth and survival of terrestrial micro-organisms. However, to avoid 
possible distortion of chemical evidence by microbial action and con- 
tamination of the Moon's deeper layers, it recommended the following 
(SSB, 1963, p. 2): 
1. Minimize contamination to the extent technically feasible. By 
appropriate selection of components (favoring those that are 
inherently sterile internally) and the use of surface sterilants, it 
should be possible to achieve a cleaniness level to approximate 
that which prevails in most hospital surgery rooms. 
Inventory all organic chemical constituents. This will permit the 
interpretation of analytical results from future collections of lunar 
material. 
Accord a low priority to life detection experiments by remote 
devices on the lunar surface. A high priority should be attached to 
sampling the subsurface at points removed from the immediate 
vicinity of any landing site. 
Undertake the development of a sterile drilling system to ac- 
company an early Apollo mission to return an uncontaminated 
sample of the lunar subsoil. Samples aseptically collected from this 
subsoil will be of both biological and geochemical interest. Should 
life exist on the Moon, it might be expected at some depth 
below the surface where temperatures never exceed 100" C 
and below the zone of ultraviolet radiation. Every effort should be 
made to keep this level free of contaminants until it can be sampled 
by drilling. 
On the planet Mars, on the other hand, there is by far the greatest 
probability of extraterrestrial life. Since terrestrial micro-organisms have 
been known to survive in simulated Martian environments,' contamination 
and pollution of that planet should be avoided, even if initial indications 
from remote detectors suggest no biota on the planet. As such, the 
SSB recommended the following (SSB, 1963, p. 3): 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Scher et al. (1964) suggest that if a random sample of terrestrial soil micro-organisms 
is deposited on Mars, a significant fraction of their number will survive. Thus, to avoid 
contamination, entry vehicles should be thoroughly sterilized prior to launch. Hawrylewicz 
et al. (1965) report that a number of micro-organisms are able to survive conditions simu- 
lating those on Mars, but show no substantial growth. In a subsequent study (Hawrylewicz 
et aL, 1966), it was demonstrated that soil microbes can proliferate under very severe 
conditions; i.e., their vegetative cell growth and spordation were normal in a simulated 
Martian environment. 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
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Accord the highest priority to the prevention of the biological 
contamination of Mars until sufficient information has been obtained 
about possible life forms so that further scientific studies will 
not be jeopardized. Recognition of this priority on the part of 
launching nations is in accord with their main scientific objectives, 
in contrast to a competition to be first, in which these objectives 
might be forever sacrificed. 
Establish and provide adequate support for an augmented research 
program to develop agents, methods, and techniques for the 
sterilization of Martian probes. Such a research program should 
mobilize both biologists and engineers to ensure successful 
development of practical sterilization procedures. 
Inventory all organic chemical constituents. This is a precautionary 
measure, but the lack of an inventory might make impossible the 
interpretation of analytical results from future collections of 
Martian material. 
Cooperate fully with all other nations in the protection of Mars 
against premature biological contamination. The exchange of 
information and the possibility of a joint research project between 
scientists of the U.S.S.R. and the US. should be explored. 
Strengthen the current research program for the development of 
the best possible life detection experiments to ensure the 
incorporation of a life detection experiment i n  the first Mars 
lander. This is of extreme importance, for otherwise we may 
succeed in the sterilization of Mars probes but fail to accomplish 
our true objective. 
In a letter to Science in 1963, Oran W. Nicks and Orr E. Reynolds 
discussed NASA’s policy regarding decontamination and sterilization. 
Although CETEX and Carl Sagan calculated a low contamination 
probability for lunar missions, NASA modified its requirements for lunar 
spacecraft. NASA intended to reduce the microbial load to a minimum 
through the use of assembly and checkout in bacteriologically clean 
iooms ,and the application of surface sterilants after final assembly and 
checkout (Nicks and Reynolds, 1963, p. 540). 
In this way, contamination, if any, will be localized to very small areas on the Moon; 
there will be very low probability of microbial proliferation. 
As for Mars, it was planned that initial flights be directed so that there 
would be less than a probability of encountering the planet. In 
addition, the landing capsules would be sterilized after complete assembly . 
and checkout, using appropriate procedures and sealed units that would 
not be opened. 
In 1961, ICSU adopted Resolution 10, “Space Experiments with Un- 
desirable Effects.” It suggested that COSPAR examine and study any 
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proposed experiments in space or other activities that might have po- 
tentially undesirable effects and make the results of these studies avail- 
able to those engaging in such experiments. The resolution further 
recommended that all governments planning to launch space experi- 
ments that could have an adverse effect on other scientific research 
should provide the ICSU with the information necessary to make the 
studies mentioned. 
Harmful Effects of Space Experiments In response to Resolution 10, 
at its Fifth Plenary Meeting in Washington in 1962, COSPAR organized 
a Consultative Group on Potentially Harmful Effects of Space Experi- 
ments. The group was comprised of six broadly competent scientists 
from the disciplines of astronomy, radiation physics, atmospheric phys- 
ics and chemistry, communications, meteorite penetration, and micro- 
biology. The group was to be responsible for studying the potentially 
harmful effects of proposed space experiments and making appropriate 
recommendations to the COSPAR Executive Council for further action. 
The group met in Paris in March 1963 and in Warsaw in June 1963. 
A preliminary report submitted to COSPAR at the Warsaw meeting 
affirmed that the group was concerned with contamination of the Moon 
and planets, pollution of the upper atmosphere, and orbiting dipoles. 
Hed6n (1964) wrote that at that time all of the organizations belonging 
to the International Association of Microbiological Societies and various 
individuals were asked to consider the contamination problem. The 
consultative group was endeavoring to collect pertinent data on the phys- 
ical and chemical environments of Mars, Jupiter, Venus, and the Moon, 
in order to evaluate their biological implications. Replies to this request 
tended to emphasize the importance of using extreme caution when 
direct contacts were to be made with the planets, particularly Mars. 
Furthermore, it was thought that the maximum limit of contamination 
for Mars) should be regularly reviewed and, if necessary, revised 
as additional information became available. However, the following 
was pointed out (HedCn, 1964, p. 10): 
The uncertainty factors involved [were] obviously so enormously great that the value of 
mathematical expressions becomes small or even negative because it might tend to lend an 
air of exactness to interpretations which can hardly be more than educated guesses. 
With the background of their discussions concerned with the Warsaw 
meeting in 1963, a working document for the consultative group was 
considered. The document recommended that the subcommittee of 
UNCOPUOS take immediate legal action to have the General Assembly 
declare Mars a temporary biological preserve, to be approached only 
by spacecraft subjected to appropriate certified sterilization procedures. 
Another recommendation was that Venus and Moon probes be sterilized 
to keep contamination to a feasible minimum. In order to qualify as 
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certified, sterilization procedures (HedGn, 1964, Appendix 4, p. 1) 
. . . must be proven effective both in surface sterilization and in destroying or removing 
viable, resistant spores entrapped in or between solids or semisolids or contained in 
liquids which have no inherent sterilizing capacity. 
It was also suggested that the revised Jaffe guidelines be accepted as a 
provisional international code providing, among other things, the follow- 
ing (HedBn, 1964, Appendix 4, p. 3): 
1. Either sterilization must be used, or trajectories must be con- 
trolled to ensure a probability of not over of hitting Mars 
and a probability of not over 
An entry capsule for Mars should be given recognized and ac- 
cepted (official) sterilization treatment and handled aseptically 
thereafter. The goal of these activities should be that there is 
less than probability that a single living organism is released 
on the planet’s surface. This figure takes into account the prob- 
abilities of sterilization during Mars entry and impact and of 
releasing organisms from the capsule at the planet. 
Wright (1967b) observed that the recommendations made at Warsaw 
in 1963 were to become a part of NASA’s Planetary Quarantine Program. 
He referred specifically to the suggestions that Venus and Mars landers 
should be sterilized before launch, that Venus and Mars flybys should 
have a trajectory so that the probes and all ejecta would miss the planets, 
and that decontamination of lunar landers would be acceptable in place 
of sterilization, in view of the hostile nature of the lunar environment 
for terrestrial micro-organisms. 
At the COSPAR meeting in Florence in May 1968, HedGn convened a 
study goup on sterilization standards for space probes in response to a 
request of the Consultative Group on Potentially Harmful Effects of 
Space Experiments. The basis for discussion at the meeting was a report 
by Sagan and Coleman (1965), which attempted to analyze the probability 
of contamination and to suggest sterilization standards. The authors’ 
purpose was to provide a means whereby the level of spacecraft sterility 
would be calculated as a function of an acceptable level of risk of plane- 
tary contamination. They noted that in 1960, Davies and Comuntzis 
had arbitrarily suggested that the probability of landing one viable 
micro-organism on Mars should be less than 10-6 for each mission, and 
that Jaffe, in 1963, revised this to read u -- 10-4.6, with u representing 
the mean number of viable micro-organisms. They pointed out, however, 
that Jaffe did not consider the desirability of having a great number of 
biological experiments on Mars before a significant contamination risk 
could be allowed, and that not every terrestrial organism deposited on 
Mars would be capable of contaminating a sizable fraction of the planet. 
of hitting Venus. 
2. 
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Contamination Probabilities Sagan and Coleman (1965) demanded a 
probability very close to unity that N biological experiments be suc- 
cessfully completed on Mars before biological contamination occurred. 
They considered the probabilities of scientific success and biological 
contamination per mission as independent events. They specified N 
as the desired number of experiments for a thorough survey of Martian 
biology. This value was necessarily large because of the time and effort 
required to systematically study any Martian organisms. 
Initially, they assumed that there would be one experiment for each 
landing capsule. In P+ = P P I ,  P+ is the mean probability that a landing 
capsule on Mars will successfully perform its biological experiment; 
Pt is the probability of complete engineering success; and PI is the proba- 
bility that some form of life susceptible to study by the experiment will 
be discovered on an accessible area of the Martian surface. 
P- represents the mean probability that Mars will be contaminated 
by a specific landing capsule. The mean number of organisms deposited 
is IT, and the chance that a specific organism deposited on Mars’ surface 
will multiply and contaminate a large fraction of the planet is given as 
Pm. Thus, 
Sagan and Coleman believe that there is little chance that life will 
be found on every Mars mission and that there will be M > N number of 
missions before one will be successful. They consider the ( N  + j )  th 
mission, and assume that it is the final in the series of N experiments. 
Thus, the (N+ j ) t h  experiment must be successful because, by 
hypothesis, they were content to risk a probability, p, that biological 
contamination of Mars would occur after N +  j missions. The remaining 
m i s s i s  can be arranged in any order, allowing ( N +  j -  1) ! permutations 
of them. Of these, N -  1 will be experimentally successful, where again 
the order, for which there are ( N  - 1) ! possibilities, is immaterial. At 
the same time, j missions will be failures, and once again the ordering 
of the failures is unimportant. Further, they stated that there must be 
no contamination events in N +  j missions. The total number of ways of 
obtaining such scenarios of successful experimentation before con- 
tamination will be 
Here, p is the probability that biological contamination does not occur 
until N experiments are performed. From the power series expansion 
18 PLANETARY QUARANTINE/OBJECTIVES AND MODELS 
for ( I  - Y ) - ~ ,  they derive: 
1" P = [ l - ( l - P + )  ( 1 - P - )  P ( 1  - P - )  
Thus far, the total number of biological experiments (N) was identical 
to the total number of missions. However, if there were more than one 
experiment per mission, one must distinguish between failure of a 
specific experiment as part of the total mission and failure of the whole 
mission. In place of equation (2), they used 
P+ ( 1 - P - )  
1 - ( 1 - P + )  ( 1 - P - )  
= p x N  = 1 + (xlnp)/N (3) 
Here, x is the mean number of experiments per mission and P+ is the 
probability of a successful landing. 
PI is the probability that a specific experiment will be successful, 
based on the assumption that the mission lands successfully. They 
assumed that all of the experiments in the mission would succeed or 
fail together (PI= 1 ) .  Then, NIX is the number of successfully landed 
missions. (x In p ) / N  is negative and small, with P -  of the same magni- 
tude. Keeping the terms of the first order, they arrived at 
X 
N P -  = P+ - In p-1 
By substituting from the definition of P+ and P -  , 
(4) 
A more direct manner of obtaining equation (S), according to Sagan 
and Coleman, is to calculate the average probability p of the success 
of N experiments before contamination occurs. P -  is small, and thus 
p varies slowly as a fraction of the number of successful landings on 
Mars. In addition, the probability distribution of landed missions tends 
to cluster about its mean value, N / P + - x ,  since N is rather large. The 
average probability of success prior to contamination may be replaced 
by its value at the mean, so that 
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Taking the logarithm of both sides, they arrived at the equivalent of 
equation (5): 
N P-N lnp=--- In (1-P-) =- 
p+ X P + X  (7) 
Then they generalized this equation to the case of P e  # 1, with N/P+Pex 
the mean number of missions landed. Equation (5) is then replaced with 
The probabilities discussed thus far by Sagan and Coleman apply to 
landing vehicles and not to spacecraft intended for flyby or orbit. In the 
latter case, accidental landing on the planet's surface may constitute a 
contamination hazard, particularly if the vehicles are not sterilized. The 
authors suggest that there may be - 1 O 1 O  micro-organisms on such ve- 
hicles, and a sizable number (f) would be deposited on the surface 
following impact. They concluded that since the conditions of impact 
would not kill all of the organisms, there would be a good chance that the 
planet would be contaminated on the basis thatfPm % Therefore, 
they calculated that the probability of contamination by a flyby or orbiter 
would be Pi (the chance of an accidental impact on the planet). 
The authors assumed that the biological contributions made by landers 
would be significantly greater than those made by flybys and orbiters. 
With n as the number of flybys and orbiters landed during the same 
period as landers, they extended equation (6) as 
p= (l-P_)"IP+"(l -Pi)" (9) 
Therefore, 
By arbitrarily assuming that the contamination risk for flybys and 
orbiters is the same as that for landers, Sagan and Coleman were able to 
determine the numerical constraints on u and Pi. The result is the re- 
quirement for landers (equation 11) and for unsterilized flybys and 
orbiters (equation 12). 
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1np-l  Pi < -
211 
Sagan and Coleman further assumed the mean number of experiments 
per mission for the complete program to be x = 20, and 1 -Pt = 0.1 
to be the mean probability of spacecraft failure during the program, so 
that no significant biological data are obtained from an entire mission. 
Thus, the mean probability of a given experiment’s scientific success is 
2~ 10 - or Pep,. 
Since not all Martian areas are equally likely to have detectable life 
forms, they noted that estimating the value of Pep1 requires trajectory 
information and the adequacy of the design of the experimental packages. 
Some representative numerical values of u as a function of N and p are 
presented in Figure 1. 
Parameters assumed: 
X =  20; L = 0.9; E = 10- ; 
10-12 10-10 108 lo4 lo8 0.5 
Figure 1 Acceptable Risk of Planetary Contamination (after 
Sagan and Coleman, 1965, p .  24). 
The authors adopted 10-1 as a preliminary value of the organisms 
surviving Martian conditions. However, they cautioned that the uncer- 
tainty involved is at least one order of magnitude. Therefore, they used 
Pm- lo-*. For these parameters, Figure 1 provides the minimum values 
of u. By using equation (11) and Figure 1, u can be redetermined with 
other parameters. 
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Sagan and Coleman suggested that there may be 60 possible Mars mis- 
sions by the U S .  and U.S.S.R. before 19%, based on an average of three 
launches at each opportunity. Consequently, with x 5 20, there would 
be N = 1200 possible experiments. They also assumed a number n 5 30 
launches of flybys and orbiters as an upper limit. Within this context, 
the authors stated the following (Sagan and Coleman, 1965, p. 25): 
The existing sterilization requirements for Mars landing vehicles may be somewhat relaxed. 
For example, if we desire 99.9 percent probability that 1200 biological experiments can be 
performed before contamination, the mean number of viable micro-organisms deposited 
on the planet by each spacecraft may be as high as 5 = 2 X IOT4. When considering the con- 
servative nature of the value of P,, in particular, a value for the sterilization parameter u in 
the range between would seem quite adequate for an extensive program of 
biological exploration of Mars. 
Similar values were proposed for the landing packages used for life 
detection. 
It was also maintained by Sagan and Coleman that if a 99.9 percent 
probability of the landing program’s being successfully completed prior 
to contamination by the accidental impact of a flyby or orbiter were de- 
sired, then the probability of accidental impact, based on equation (12b 
must be P < 4 X Sagan and Coleman published a slightly revised 
version of this model in 1966, based on 100 missions rather than the 1000 
used in the original work. 
and 

QUARANTINE STANDARDS 
COSPAR Resolution 26.5, setting forth contamination probability stand- 
ards and sterility requirements, was adopted at the 1964 COSPAR meet- 
ing in Florence, where the Sagan-Coleman paper was presented. Also 
known as the COSPAR Resolution of 1964, it was a response to the Sagan- 
Coleman study and to the report of the Consultative Group on Potentially 
Harmful Effects of Space Experiments, following the latter’s 1964 Geneva 
meeting. At the meeting, it was suggested that only flyby missions be at- 
tempted in the exploration of Mars, at least at that time. 
The Life Sciences Committee of the SSB held a conference on July 28, 
1964, on the Hazard of Planetary Contamination Due to Microbiological 
Contamination in the Interior of Spacecraft Components. At this meeting, 
the COSPAR contamination probability standards set forth in Resolution 
26.5 were fully endorsed. In addition, it was concluded that these stand- 
ards should apply equally to the interiors of components. 
According to Resolution 26.5, COSPAR accepted (COSPAR Informa- 
tion Bulletin No. 20, 1964, pp. 25-26) 
. . . as tentatively recommended interim objectives, a sterilization level such that the prob- 
ability of a single viable organism aboard any spacecraft intended for planetary landing or 
atmospheric penetration would be less than 1 X and a probability limit for accidental 
planetary impact by unsterilized flyby or orbiting spacecraft of 3 X or less. 
Resolution 26.5 was a significant development, particularly in terms 
of NASA policy regarding sterility requirements. Hall and Lyle observed 
that the COSPAR Resolution of 1964 was (Hall and Lyle, 1971, p. 6) a 
. . . milestone in that for the first time, there was international agreement on quantitative 
objectives in terms of probabilities of events which characterize planetary contamination. 
An analytical rationale thus was provided for the recommended standards and the quaran- 
tine problem as it was understood at that time. Although particulars of the COSPAR Reso- 
lution of 1964 have been reconsidered in the light of increasing knowledge, it provided a 
framework which continues to serve in the development of quarantine standards. The essen- 
tial elements of the framework are: (1) a model of the principal parameters and their inter- 
relations: (2) agreements as to which parameters should serve as basic standards; and 
(3) assignment of quantitative values to the chosen parameters. 
F 
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PROBABILITIES OF CONTAMINATION HAZARDS 
In a critique of spacecraft sterilization standards, Schalkowsky (1966a) 
reviewed the Sagan and Coleman model and compared it with the 
COSPAR values. COSPAR used the analytical framework suggested 
by Sagan and Coleman, but adapted slightly different numerical values. 
Schalkowsky observed that Sagan and Coleman used u to refer to the 
probability of an organism’s being released on the surface of Mars, 
whereas the COSPAR value referred to the chance of a single organism’s 
being aboard the lander. Schalkowsky correlated the relationship of 
the two as 
where PN is probability of one viable micro-organism aboard the lander 
and PR is the mean probability that one micro-organism, if present, 
will be released from the lander and deposited on the Martian surface. 
He pointed out that the COSPAR and Sagan-Coleman definitions would 
be identical if PR were assumed to be unity and showed that there is little 
numerical difference between the two: 
COSPAR 
u 
1 x 10-4 
Pi 
3.5 x 10-5 
Sagan and Coleman 
Schalkowsky corrected the numbers in parentheses, with the difference 
due to the use by Sagan and Coleman of logarithms to the base ‘10 rather 
than what was called for by his own calculations. 
Although he was not aware of an explicit statement from COSPAR 
regarding the values used for p, N, x, P,, P,, Pt, Pt and n in arriving at 
the recommended values for u and Pi, it can be inferred from the 
closeness to the Sagan and Coleman values of CT and Pi that approximately 
the same estimates were used., 
Schalkowsky summarized the Sagan-Coleman analysis in the equation 
2 X 10-4(0.75 X 4 X lO-5(2 X 10-5) 
where 
p 
u 
N 
the probability that Mars will not be contaminated before N 
experiments are successfully completed 
the probability of one viable micro-organism on the surface of 
Mars due to a single lander 
the desired number of successfully completed experiments in the 
unmanned Mars exploration program 
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P, the probability that one organism deposited on the surface of 
Mars will survive, grow, and spread, thus leading to planetary 
contamination 
x the mean number of experiments per lander 
Pe the mean probability that an experiment will work as designed 
Pt the probability that the lander vehicle will perform its engineering 
functions after it is landed on the planetary surface 
PI the probability of finding experimental conditions on Mars (e.g., 
kind of life) compatible with experiment design 
n the number of flybys and orbiters 
Pi the probability of accidental impact by a flyby or orbiter 
He rearranged this equation by replacing In p-' with pc , the latter 
referring to the probability that the planet will be contaminated before 
N experiments are successfully completed. Schalkowsky continued 
the analysis with 
Pc=l-P 
1 1 1  
1-Pc 2 3  and lnp-1=ln-=-ln (l-pe)=pc+-Pf+-PE+ - 
For small values of pc, e.g., pc= 
lnp-l  =pc (3) 
Then M L  denotes the number of lander launches required to provide 
N successful experiments and R the mean probability that a launch will 
produce a successful Mars landing. Thus, 
By using equations (2), (3), and (4), equation (1) becomes 
Schalkowsky stated (Schalkowsky, 1966a, p. 5): 
If the analysis of probabilities of contamination is to have any practical significance, it is 
essential that PN,  the probability of a single viable micro-organism aboard alander, be given 
a realistic meaning. To date, spacecraft sterilization practice has been based on the extrap- 
olation of logarithmic kill rates due to dry heat, assuming a single species. 
PN is then derived from 
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where 
No initial population of micro-organisms on the lander (prior to 
the application of dry heat) 
t length of time dry heat is applied at a particular fixed 
temperature 
D time it takes to reduce a single-species population by a 
factor of 10 at a fixed temperature 
He arrived at equation (7), the basis for evaluating contamination 
hazards, by combining equations (5) and (6), subject to the constraint 
imposed by N o  * 10-ND < 1 
Schalkowsky defined his approach to planetary contamination in 
terms of allocating risks between two independent events: (1) contami- 
nation as a result of a sterilized lander, pc(L), and (2) accidental impact 
by an unsterilized orbiter or flyby,pc (B). Therefore, 
With the parameters used by Sagan and Coleman, equation (8, 
which denotes the number of Mars launches required for the desired 
number of successful experiments, leads to the following: 
Then, if RL=0.9 is used as an average reliability value for successfully 
landing a spacecraft on Mars, the following result can be obtained: 
Schalkowsky considered this an unrealistic figure for the number of 
lander missions, i.e., it is too high for the 1-decade time period stated 
by COSPAR. Furthermore, it is not consistent with the Sagan and Cole- 
man n = 30 figure for orbiters and flybys during the same period. He sug- 
gested that, as a first approximation, the number of orbiters and flybys 
should equal the number of landers. In other words, every lander will 
require a bus to bring it to the planet, and there is the possibility that the 
bus, which is unsterilized, will have an accidental impact on the planet. 
This difference, according to Schalkowsky, “casts some doubt as to 
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whether contamination hazards are suitably apportioned between p e  (L) 
and p,(B) ” (Schalkowsky, 1966a, p. 7). 
Using COSPAR values ( P N =  Pi=3 X and equation (5), 
Schalkowsky calculated values similar to those above. He made no 
assumptions as to the desired number of successful experiments, but 
attempted to infer the values of M L  and n which would result ifpe = 
p r  = 1, and P ,  = The second and third estimates are those used 
by Sagan and Coleman; they assume an equal distribution of hazards 
between pc(L) and pc(B): 
With R L  - 0.9, the following is obtained: 
and 
ML = 
(0.5)10-3 
n= = 17 
3 x 10-5 
Schalkowsky suggested that the inconsistency in the Sagan-Coleman 
analysis was carried over into the COSPAR values for P N  and Pi.  In 
order to achieve better agreement between ML and n, he assumed that 
ML = n = 30 for the time period of one decade. More conservatively, 
R = 1, and the resulting values of P N  and Pi are 
(0.5) 10-3 P -  -2x10-3 
N- (30) 
- 2 x 10-5 (0.5)10-3 
30 
Pi= 
He concluded (Schalkowsky, 1966a, p. 8): 
The above calculations are intended to indicate that current standards may well have been 
based upon unrealistic estimates of the extent and nature of the Mars exploration program 
in the immediate future. It is, however, not intended to suggest that presently accepted 
standards be modified on the basis of the above alone. Indeed, it is the principal contention 
of this author that insofar as spacecraft sterilization is concerned, the formal adoption of 
any number for PN without regard as to how it will be implemented, is of little practical 
value and should therefore not be done. 
Sagan-Coleman Modd A report prepared by the Sandia Corporation 
(1966) reviews some of the drawbacks in the Sagan-Coleman position. 
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It is noted that within the context of program development, the Sagan 
and Coleman paper was an effort to relate total planetary mission objec- 
tives to hardware requirements for planetary quarantine. Several objec- 
tions to the model are described, such as the misunderstanding of the 
parameters used and the assumption that an infinite number of missions 
can be flown to achieve the overall objective of planetary exploration 
(Sandia Corporation, 1966, p. 7). 
This latter assumption allows one to derive a requirement on u, the expected number of 
micro-organisms per spacecraft upon impact with the planet, regardless of the probability 
of success of each of the flights, P,. That is, while u is a function of P, ,  for any given P,, 
it is possible to determine a value of u which will allow the total exploration program’s 
objectives to be met. This is not the case when some maximum, finite, number of flights is 
contemplated. 
The Sagan-Coleman model has been modified to consider a finite 
number of flights and thereby remedy the last objection. Nevertheless, 
the Sandia report observes that without an additional analysis of the 
number of flights selected, the model is concerned only with sterilization 
objectives and not with exploration objectives. This is thought to be 
unreasonable because of the relationship between sterility requirements 
and reliability requirements when a finite number of missions is flown. 
It is this relationship which has not yet been thoroughly analyzed. 
Ungar et al. (1966) consider the Sagan-Coleman model very compre- 
hensive because it assumes values for a great number of eventualities. 
They found two of the parameters of special interest: “p,” the probability 
that contamination with terrestrial micro-organisms does not occur 
until N experiments are performed;’ and “P-,” the probability that a 
specific lander will contaminate Mars. The model states that P- 3 UP,, 
with u the mean number of micro-organisms deposited in a landing and 
P, the probability that a specific organism deposited on the planet will 
multiply and contaminate a large fraction of its surface. The example 
used assumes that P,=O.Ol, and with 1200 experiments, the value of 
u = 2 X 
The formula is in error, according to Ungar et al., in that the 1200 
experiments should be 1200 successful experiments and, thus, 12 000 
flown experiments. Sagan and Coleman, in turn, acknowledged the error, 
but maintained that a compensating error left their final results 
unchanged. 
and, therefore, P -  = 2 X 
Ungar et al. state (Ungar et al., 1966, p. 5): 
The Sagan-Coleman model may not be used to compare the consequences of various 
potential Mars exploration profiles since the number of missions to be flown is not a param- 
eter of the model. The number of biologically successful experiments is a parameter 
‘This is a large number and is assumed to be 0.999. 
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of the model. It was a confusion of these two parameters that lead to the erroneous sub- 
stitution referred to above. 
Two approaches by Sagan and Coleman to the contamination of Mars 
are discussed by Ungar et af. First, the model formulates the contamina- 
tion probability for a series of experiments that are carried out until the 
desired data about Martian biology are obtained. Second, it provides an 
illustrative computation of the overall contamination probability neces- 
sary for such experiments by stating the equation in a way that includes 
an assumed value representing each parameter. However, since this is 
only one example, there is no demonstration of how the result would 
vary if other values were assumed. The authors present a new model 
based on an entirely different approach. The model and this new approach 
will be described later. 
Cornell (1966a) considers the Sagan-Coleman analysis important, in 
that it provides a method of dealing quantitatively with the problems of 
spacecraft sterilization and probability levels for missions to Mars. 
Nevertheless, all mathematical models simplify reality, and he believes 
that this one does so, particularly in the light of the current state of knowl- 
edge. In other words, since little is known about the Martian surface or 
our engineering ability to solve many of the problems associated with 
missions to that planet, a complex model would not be practical (Cornell, 
1966a, p. 3). 
For instance, instead of dealing with mean probabilities such as P+ and P-, it would be 
better if enough was known so that underlying probability distribution could be incorporated 
into the model. Sagan and Coleman’s model holds both P+ P -  constant throughout the 
period of unmanned exploration of Mars. But P +  is a function of our engineering ability 
and of selecting landing sites where profitable experimentation can be performed. 
Cornell presents three reasons against taking a constant value for 
P-. First, P- represents the mean probability that a given lander will 
contaminate the Martian surface and, thus, P -  should be considerably 
greater for hard landings than for soft ones. The former would probably 
release more contaminants from fractured materials and the interior 
of the spacecraft. This risk can, of course, be reduced by lowering the 
chance of a hard landing and by decontaminating the interior of the ship. 
By modifying the Sagan-Coleman model to distinguish between the two 
types of landings, Cornell is able to show corresponding differences in 
the results. The modified model will be discussed below. His second point 
concerns the assumption by Sagan and Coleman of a constant proba- 
bility that a spacecraft will be contaminated. The third factor relative 
to the constant value of P -  concerns the implication of a constant 
probability that a large area of Mars would be contaminated by a viable 
organism deposited on its surface. This probability would, however, 
change as the impact area changes. 
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Proposed Alterations to Standards A paper by Hall (1964) was one of 
those dealing with contamination risk and probability considered in the 
formulation of NASA policy. Hall describes a mathematical model which 
suggests that the standards stated in COSPAR Resolution 26.5 could be 
lowered by one or two orders of magnitude. The basic premise of this 
model is that the “level of commitment” will be about 99.9 percent; i.e., 
that there will be 99.9 percent confidence that a planet will not be con- 
taminated with terrestrial micro-organisms in this period (1966-1985) 
during which 100 missions might be launched and biological experiments 
performed. 
The model uses the following designations (Hall, 1964, Appendix A): 
where 
P the probability of contamination in the total program 
Q the probability of no contamination in the total program 
Pi the probability of contamination on the nth flight 
n the number of missions 
P ,  the probability of the release of a viable organism on the planet 
P,, the probability of the survival, growth, and spreading of a single 
Pa the probability of an accidental impact of an unsterile vehicle 
Within the total program, the contamination probability is then given as 
organism on the planetary surface 
Where the Pi are quite small, their products are negligible, and 
n 
i = l  p = -  Pi 
If all of the Pi are equal, then 
P =  nPi 
With a 99.9 percent confidence standard that a planet will not be con- 
taminated by unmanned missions, P is defined as equal to 1.0 X 
Thus, after solving for Pi,  Pi=-= 1 X 10-5, there is, for 
n 100 
each mission, a 1 X 
trial micro-organism. 
survive, grow, and spread, it is assumed that there is a 
probability of contamination of a single terres- 
Since not every micro-organism deposited on a planet’s surface will 
probability 
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for such an event. Therefore, the chance that a single viable micro- 
organism will be released is 
P,=P* 1x10-5 
P ~ . ~ .  10-3 
-=-- - 1 x 10-2 
Consequently, there is less than a 1 X chance that a viable micro- 
organism will be released among those modes of contamination in which 
this might occur. That is, the mean number of viable organisms released 
by each vehicle should be 1 x 
probability does not apply to all modes, however. For 
example, an unsterile vehicle with a large population of heterogeneous 
organisms requires a different approach. It is assumed that the contam- 
ination probability for such a vehicle would not be greater than 1 x 
the value for other sources in a given mission. A conservative estimate of 
the chance of contamination after an accidental impact is given as 10-1, 
and solving for the probability of accidental impact: 
The 1 X 
1 x 10-5 
Pa = = 1 x 10-4 10-1 

PLANETARY CONTAMINATION MODELS 
The Sixth International Space Symposium held in Mar del Plata, Argen- 
tina, May 11-19, 1965, was sponsored in part by COSPAR and the 
ICSU. Prior to the meeting, an unsuccessful attempt was made to 
organize an international conference on biological exploration steriliza- 
tion and techniques. Nevertheless, a Panel on Standards for Space Probe 
Sterilization had been established by the Consultative Group on Po- 
tentially Harmful Effects of Space Experiments, and a special session 
was held. Two of the papers presented concerned new developments 
and implementation of sterilization techniques (Davis and Horowitz, 
1966; Nicks and Miles, 1966). 
At about the same time, Geiger et al. (1965) published a paper dis- 
cussing sterilization probabilities in relation to Mars, Venus, the Moon, 
Mercury, and the Jovian planets. In it, the authors suggest one way to 
provide reasonable assurance that contamination not occur on Mars: 
keep the probability of contaminating the planet to a level equal to the 
chance that no significant biological evidence would be acquired for 
all other reasons combined. They assume that seven oppositions to 
Mars would permit 14 to 28 flights, with a 1 to 2 chance of reaching the 
planet each time. The probability of failure due to engineering or techni- 
cal problems is estimated at 3 to 4, thus making the chance of not 
obtaining data concerning the presence of life on any one attempt 7 to 
8. In a series of 28 attempts, the probability of not acquiring such data 
would then be 7 to 8 or Therefore, they recommend that the chance 
of contaminating the planet during the entire program be kept as low as 
In contrast, Sagan and Coleman “would require all these missions 
to be successful before the planet is considered to be contaminated with 
the above degree of confidence” (Geiger et al., 1965, p. 311). 
An alternative estimate of the chance of contaminating Mars would 
be to keep the probability low during unmanned missions relative to the 
probability during the first manned landing. During a manned mission, 
contamination to some degree would be likely, with a chance of 10 - or 
higher. Therefore, is suggested as a reasonably small probability 
for contamination for all of the unmanned fights. 
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Geiger et al. believe that for the number of flights (14) that actually 
reach Mars indicates a maximum contamination probability on each of 
the flights of 10-3, with 10-4 per flight a reasonable and conservative 
level. This is the same value suggested by Hobby (cited in Geiger et al., 
1%5), by the SSB, and at the 1964 COSPAR meeting in Florence. 
Venus does not require the same contamination probability, according 
to Geiger et aL, because of the hostility of the environment to terrestrial 
organisms. In other words, its surface temperature is much too high, 
although there are cool regions in its upper atmosphere. However, these 
authors point out that micro-organisms apparently would not multiply 
under such conditions, and the chance for the growth of terrestrial orga- 
nisms on Venus is estimated at lom3. Therefore, by dividing per 
flight by low3, 10-1 is obtained as the assurance against the release of 
terrestrial organisms into Venus' upper atmosphere. 
The sterility of spacecraft in missions to the Moon is not considered 
essential by the authors. They note that although Sagan and Imshenetsky 
believe there is a remote chance for growth, this view is not accepted by 
others. Nevertheless, Geiger et al. agree that it would be highly desirable 
to prevent contamination of the Moon. With a surface area of 4 X 107 
cm2 (Geiger et al., 1965, p. 313), 
. . . the chances of picking up terrestrial organisms within this area should be low, com- 
pared to the other chances of contamination or error in a single experiment, approximately 
Accordingly, the probability that an Earth organism is found on the lunar surface 
should be held to per cm2.  For the entire Moon, then, it should be undesirable to put 
down more than 4 X 10" organisms from all unmanned flights. For a 40-flight, unmanned 
program, this would mean an average of less than 1O1O organisms per flight. 
Mercury does not present the same contamination problems because 
it has very high temperatures on one face and low temperatures on the 
opposite face. Although there might be a narrow bond between the 
bright and dark regions more hospitable to terrestrial organisms, the 
lack of moisture and a suitable atmosphere leads to the conclusion that 
it is not necessary to consider Mercury as a contamination problem. 
Geiger et al. maintain that exploration of the Jovian planets might 
be carried out initially under the same restrictions discussed for Mars. 
Clemedson (1964) suggests that Jupiter is the next logical target after 
Mars, but he does not believe that there is much chance that terrestrial 
organisms could survive and multiply on Jupiter or the other outer 
planets. He does observe that R. L. Forward (1962; cited in Clemedson, 
1964) reported the results of experiments in which a simulated Jovian 
atmosphere was exposed to ultraviolet radiation, resulting in the forma- 
tion of a number of simple organic compounds. 
During 1966, a number of papers and reports appeared outlining new 
planetary contamination models and positions on various aspects of 
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the problem. Some of these works have already been discussed. At the 
COSPAR meeting in Vienna in 1966, the chairman of the Consultative 
Group on the Potentially Harmful Effects of Space Experiments, with 
the advice of the Panel of Standards of Space Probe Sterilization, made 
a number of recommendations. COSPAR Resolution 26.5 was reviewed, 
and it was suggested that the probability of a single viable organism 
aboard a spacecraft should be less than 1 X and that the chance 
for accidental impact by unsterilized flyby or orbiting space ships should 
be 3 x probability 
(i.e., one chance in a thousand) of Contaminating a planet during the 
entire period of biological explpration, which was the basis for the 
mathematical model used for the COSPAR objectives stated in Reso- 
lution 26.5, was still a reasonable overall objective. 
However, because of errors and hazards not considered in the original 
model, many problems were encountered when attempts were made to 
reduce this objective to specific categories of contamination probabilities 
for landers and unsterilized flybys. In addition, spacecraft design and 
operations were unnecessarily restricted when specific parts of the 
probability objective were applied to each of the hazards. Nevertheless, 
it was proposed that the 1 X probability of contaminating a planet 
be continued as the criterion for the exploration of Mars and other 
planets. It was also stated that the mathematical model to be used in the 
combination of probabilities for individual factors should be conserva- 
tive, and that there should be a probability of not less than that 
micro-organisms subjected to a sterilization procedure would grow and 
spread after landing on a planet’s surface. The latter value was changed 
from the probability inferred from the 1964 COSPAR model, but 
it was not designed to be adopted into the overall probability until there 
was agreement about the general formation. The comparable standard 
for organisms not exposed to sterilization procedures was to be taken as 
unity. 
or less. The chairman stated that the 1 X 
DETERMINATION OF PARAMETERS 
Ungar et al. (1966) of the ITT Research Institute, formulated a contami- 
nation model which is regarded as an alternative to, but not a replacement 
for, the Sagan-Coleman model. It is based on an assumed mission profile 
of a Mars flight, with a range of probabilities calculated for each event 
in the mission and a parametrically derived contamination probability 
for the entire mission. The authors make it clear that if the spaceship is 
properly sterilized the probability that a specific event will result in the 
contamination of Mars will not be a function of the values that were 
used in the model’s definition of contamination. Instead, these event 
probabilities are seen as dependent on engineering, physical, and 
biological factors. 
/ 
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A sensitivity analysis on each of the parameters was carried out by 
the authors; the contamination probability for each mission was used to 
obtain the overall probability for a series of N missions. The assumptions 
underlying the approach were as follows: 
1. Rather than taking into account the success or failure of the mis: 
sion, two values were assumed for the number of missions in the 
program (10 and 25). 
The mission profile was adapted from a Saturn V Voyager mission 
described by Craven et aL (1966). 
Rather than define the term ‘bcontamination,” a range of values 
was assumed for each model parameter, with the expectation that 
those values which will eventually be thought to constitute con- 
tamination will be found in this range. 
Each possible event in the mission is listed in Table 2, and is repre- 
sented by a symbol in the left-hand column. A symbol with a bar above it 
denotes a negative, i.e., T is the probability of a successful transit tra- 
jectory, where ? is the probability of failure. 
The symbol q stands for the probability that a single launch will pro- 
duce no contamination and, on the basis of the events in the mission, the 
authors derive the following equation: 
2. 
3. 
Where there is a total of N missions, the overall probability of no resulting 
contamination is thus Q = qN, and the overall probability of contamination 
produced by N missions is P =  (1 - Q ) .  
To compute the values of P, the overall probability of contamination 
in N launches, 576 sets of parametric values were used. These sets were 
obtained with the use of the following parameters and values (the ranges 
were obtained from JPL): 
Parameter: T M L R S (E39 F4) 4 N 
Numberofvalues: 2 X 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 X X X 2=576 
Ungar et al. state (Ungar et al., 1966, p. 12): 
The results were examined with ‘particular attention to N, the number of launches, and 
4, the probability of no contamination associated with the events “recontamination of 
the capsule and a hard landing.” 
It is obvious that the higher the probability of landing a capsule, all other facts being 
equal, the higher the probability of contamination. This effect involves the parameters T,  
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M, and L (among those for which more than one value was used). Given a landing, both 
recontamination (R)  and a hard landing (s) increase the probability of contamination. 
With these gross effects in mind, for fixed N and re ,  the least chance of contamination 
occurs when T, M, L, and R are at their smaller values, and S, E3 and 4 are at their smallest 
values. 
Table 2 Definition of Events in Mission Profile (after Ungar et al., 1 9 6 6 , ~ .  10). 
Symbol Description 
Achievement of transit trajectory 
Injection stage impacts 
Impact on Mars of ejecta and efflux cloud and/or micrometeorite spalling from 
spacecraft in Mars orbit. Includes both vehicles 
Successful Mars orbit of it* vehicle(') 
Separation and impact of i'h capsule on Mars(') 
Soft landing of ith capsule[on Mars](') 
Recontamination occurring when biological barrier on ith sterilized capsule 
separated') 
Decay of orbit of it* spacecraft resulting in impact on Mars(') 
Contamination from ejecta flux 
Contamination from impact of injection stage 
Contamination from soft landing of capsule 
Contamination from hard landing of capsule 
Contamination from soft landing of recontaminated capsule 
Contamination from hard landing of recontaminated capsule 
Contamination from orbital decay of spacecraft 
Contamination from failure to achieve orbit 
(')The subscripts are dropped in the contamination equation because identical event 
probabilities are assumed for each spacecraft. 
Table 3 shows the range of values for each parameter and the sensitiv- 
ity of the contamination equation variations within these ranges. The 
authors then present the effects of four combinations of values for N and 
E& For Case l,N=10, &=0.5; Case 2,N=10, &=0.99; Case3,N=25, 
Fg=0.90; CaSe4,N=25, E15~0.99. 
Case 1: N=10, &=0.5 
1.1 Favorable conditions (T, M ,  L, R small; S ,  C3, E4 large). The 
and is insensi- 
a. P increases from 4 X to 7.8 X as R (recontamination 
b. P increases from 4 x 10-4 to 7 x 10-4, as S (soft landing prob- 
C. P increases from 4 x lop4 to 2.9 X as c3 and c4 decrease 
overall probability of contamination, P, equals 4 X 
tive to changes in T, M, or L. The following points are pertinent: 
probability) increases from to 
ability) is decreased over the range 0.9 to 0.75. 
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from 0.99999 to 0.9999 and 0.9999 to 0.999, respectively. 
1.2 Unfavorable conditions (T,  M ,  L ,  R large; S, E3, E4 small). The 
overall probability of contamination, P, equals 2.6 x low2 and is 
insensitive to changes in T, M, L, ~ 3 ,  or ~ 4 .  The following points are 
pertinent: 
to 5.6 X 10-3, as R (recon- 
as S (soft landing 
a. P decreases from 2.6 X 
b. P decreases from 2.6 X 
tamination probability) decreases from to 
to 1.3 X 
probability) increases from 0.75 to 0.9. 
Table 3 Range of Probability Values for Each Parameter and the Sensitivity of the 
Contamination Equation to Them (a fer  Ungar et al., 1966, p .  14.). 
Parameter Probability Values Used Relative Sensitivity 
in Computation 
T 
M 
L 
R 
S 
N 
I 
E 
D 
E3 
E4 
El 
E2 
E3 
E7 
e6 
e8 
~ 
0.90; 0.95 
0.80; 0.90 
0.950; 0.975 
1 x 10-4; 1 x 10-2  
0.75; 0.90 
10; 25 
5 x 10-3 
1 x 10-3 
5 x  1 0 - 4  
0.999; 0.9999; 0.99999 
0.999; 0.999; 0.9999 
0.50; 0.90; 0.99 
0.999999 
0.999999 
0.999 
0.999999 
0.99999 
~~ ~ 
Insensitive 
Insensitive 
Insensitive 
Sensitive 
Fairly sensitive 
Fairly sensitive 
- 
Sensitive 
Insensitive 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Case 2: N = 10, E6 E 0.99 
2.1 Favorable conditions. The overall probability of contamination, 
and all effects are approximately as in 1.1 above. 
2.2 Unfavorable conditions. The overall probability of contamina- 
and is insensitive to changes in T, M, L, or 
a. P decreases from 5.9 X as S (soft landing 
b. P decreases from 5.9 X lop3 to 1.1 X lop3, as e3 and 4 in- 
P, equals 3 X 
tion, P, equals 5.9 X 
R. The following points are pertinent: 
to 3.5 X 
probability) increases from 0.75 to 0.9. 
crease by an order of magnitude. 
Case 3: N=25, i's=0.90 
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3.1 Favorable conditions. The overall probability of contamination, 
and all effects are approximately as in 1.1 above. P, equals 3 X 
following points are pertinent: 
a. 
b. 
C. 
P increases from 8 X to 4.5 X 
P increases from 8 X 10-4 to 1.3 X 
0.9 to 0.75. 
P increases from 8 X to 6.6 X 
by an order of magnitude. 
as R increases from 
as S decreases from 
as E3 and e4 decrease 
10-4 to 10-2. 
3.2 Unfavorable conditions. The overall probability of contamina- 
and is insensitive to changes in T, M, or L. 
as R decreases and S and 
tion, P, equals 2.4 X 
P decreases from 2.4 X 
E4 increase over their respective ranges. 
to 1.2 X 
Case 4: N = 25, E6 = 0.99 
4.1 Favorable conditions. The overall probability of contamination, 
and all effects are approximately as in 3.1 above. 
4.2 Unfavorable conditions. The overall probability of contamina- 
and is insensitive to changes in T, M, L, 
as S increases 
as E3 and E4 in- 
P, equals 7 X 
tion, P, equals 1.47 X 
or R. The following points are pertinent: 
a. P decreases from 1.47 X 10-2 to 8.6 X 
from 0.75 to 0.9. 
b. P decreases from 1.47 X 10-2 to 2.7 X 
crease by an order of magnitude. 
Table 4 presents the ranges of the described values of the overall con- 
tamination probability (P) for the four cases shown above. Table 5 indi- 
cates the contamination probability per launch (1 - q). 
Table 4 Range of Values for Overall Contamination Probability (afer  Ungar et al., 
1966, p .  18). 
Number of 
Missions 
Derived Values of P 
N Favorable Unfavorable 
Conditions Conditions 
2.6 X 
10 0.99 3 x 10-4 5.9 x 10-8 
25 0.90 8 X 2.4 X 
25 0.99 7 x 10-4 1.5 X 
10 0.50 4 x 10-4 
Cornell (1966a) presents a model unlike that of Sagan and Coleman, in 
that it differentiates between hard and soft landings and the probability of 
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each one’s leading to contamination. He defines several mean probabili- 
ties which are considered constants. Cornell designates P, as the 
probability of a soft landing, pi as the probability of event Ei ; E1 as a soft 
landing followed by successful biological experiments; Ez as a soft 
landing without successful experiments; and E3 as a hard landing with 
either no experiments or unsuccessful experiments. 
Table 5 Range of Values for Contamination Probabilityper Launch (after Ungar et al., 
1966, p.  18). 
Derived Values of 1 - q 
e6 
Favorable Unfavorable 
Conditions Conditions 
6 X 10-4 0.99 3 x 10-5 
0.90 3 x 10-5 1 x 10-3 
0.50 4 x 10-5 2.6 x 10-3 
He assumes that p 1 + pz +p3 = 1, i.e., no hard landing will be followed 
by a successful experiment, and states that pI=P+ P , ,  p z=  (1- P + ) P , ,  
andp3 = 1 - P, .  
Within the context of the Sagan-Coleman analysis, Cornell assumes 
further that all of the missions are independent of the others in terms of 
their results, so that the probability of N successful missions on (N+ m) 
attempts can be written as 
where 
N + m - 1  ( N + m - l ) !  
( N-1 >= (N-l)!m! 
When there are no failures, Cornell states the probability that j of 
these occur after soft landings and that (m - j) as the result of hard 
landings is 
According to Cornell, mean probabilities are those which will change during a period of 
time. 
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He assumes that the probability that event Ei contaminates Mars is 
for i = 1 , 2 ,  or 3. Then, the probability of NE1 events, jEz events, and 
(m - j) E3 events with no contamination is 
- Cornell then simplifies and sums over the complete j and m ranges, so 
that the probability of completing N successful biological missions with 
no contamination of Mars is 
where 
qi = p i ( 1 -  U t ) ,  i I= 1 , 2 ,  or 3 
with K 2 1. Cornell points out that Sagan and Coleman considered an 
example in which K =  1 ,  giving u= P - .  He substitutes the values from 
equation (2) in equation (1) and, since p1 + p2 + p3 = 1, he obtains the 
following: 
p ( 1 - U )  
(3) 
p 1 l N  = 1 
1 -  ( l w p 1 ) ( 1 - U )  + P 3 ( K - l ) U  
Like Sagan and Coleman, Cornell disregards second order and higher 
terms in ( l B P ) / N  and p, designatingpllN= 1+ ( l B p ) / N  and substituting 
in equation (2) to get 
In p - ’ = N u [ l + p 3 ( K - - l ) ] / p 1  (4) 
However, when P - ( K )  is the probability that a lander will contaminate 
Mars under equation (2),  
When K = l ,  this equals u = P - .  Taking equation (5), Cornell is able to 
solve (4), giving 
P - ( K )  = p l  In p - l / N  (6) 
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If p ,  N ,  and p l  are all specified in Cornell's model, then P - ( K )  has to 
be less than the constant obtained by substituting p ,  N ,  and p l  in equa- 
tion (6) to meet sterilization requirements. However, he states that in 
equation (5) P - ( K )  is a monotonic increasing function of K. 
If it is agreed that K should be taken to be greater than 1 ,  rather than 
equal to 1 as in the Sagan-Coleman studies, then in order for P - ( K )  to 
meet decontamination requirements for given p3, the permissible upper 
bound on u would have to be reduced accordingly. For instance, if C 
equals the upper bound allowable for P - ( K )  determined by substitution 
in (6),  then an upper bound on u,  derived from (5) is 
Cornell discusses an example of his approach by using p1=0.09, 
N=  60, and p = 0.999, the values proposed by Sagan and Coleman, with 
N as the number of successful flights rather than the number of success- 
ful experiments. They estimated that the latter would be approximately 
20 times as great, assuming that all experiments in a given flight would 
be equally successful. Using equation (5), and substituting, &es C= 
(0.09) (0.001)/60= 1.5 X Therefore, when K =  1, u= P -  would 
have to be less than 1.5 X and the corresponding figure for u would 
be 1.5 X 
The parameters described above are those which Sagan and Coleman 
used to arrive at their probability that a spacecraft for a Mars land- 
ing is nonsterile (u). The model Cornell suggests has somewhat higher 
standards, but he also presents a model that is not as stringent as that 
of Sagan and Coleman. He notes that the Sagan-Coleman analysis 
derived the expression 
when Pm is 0.01. 
from the equation 
I" p =  [ 1 -  ( l - - P + ) ( l  - P - )  P ,  (1 - P - )  (9) 
This is equivalent to Cornell's equation (6), since K =  1.  Then, P - ( K )  = 
P-=uPm,  and p l = P + .  It was stated earlier that when P+=O.O9, 
N=60 ,  ~ ~ 0 . 9 9 9 ,  and Pm=O.Ol. Then, ~ = 1 . 5 X  
Cornell discusses the parameters on the right side of equation (8), 
in which Pm=O.Ol was used. Pm is the probability of a single terrestrial 
organism's contaminating a large area of the Martian surface. Thus, the 
value selected for Pm would depend on the size of the area and the ability 
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of the organisms to survive in the Martian environment. As more evi- 
dence is obtained from Martian explorations, the values of P ,  will have a 
more objective basis, and will probably decrease slowly. Cornell con- 
siders P+, the probability of success for a lander, within the same 
context because of the lack of precise information. He expects P +  to 
increase as more is learned about the Martian surface. 
Cornell observes that sincep is the probability ofN biologically success- 
ful missions, the two parameters (p and N )  are closely related, although 
the strength of the relationship (the specification of p) is arbitrary. Sagan 
and Coleman designatedp= 0.999, making lnp-l=O.OO1. They also took 
N (or NIX as they stated) as 60, whereas Jaffe designated it as 28. How- 
ever, Cornell does not believe it is reasonable for them to have taken N 
as the total number of missions anticipated prior to manned missions to 
the planet, since it would be expected that the parameters would change. 
In addition, using the maximum value of N does not allow for unsuccess- 
ful missions. Cornell believes that it would be better to take a small value 
for N, giving a high probability of noncontamination while the first few 
successful biological missions are completed (Cornell, 1966a, p. 11). 
In other words, the presently low value of lo-* required for cr is to some extent low be- 
cause a large value ofN is considered. Thus the decontamination standards are somewhat 
based on the number of missions which are possible from an engineering viewpoint, not 
the number which are desirable based on current biological knowledge. The approach sug- 
gested here would correct this. 
Using equation (8), Cornell adopts N = 5, keeping P ,  = 0.01 and 
P+ = 0.09. Without regard to flybys, u becomes equal to 1.8 X 12 
times larger than the probability calculated with the parameters used by 
Sagan and Coleman. 
NOMENCLATURE OF SYMBOLS 
Cornell (1966b) has also developed A Nomenclature of Symbols Relevant 
to the Probability of Contamination of Mars. It is similar to one developed 
earlier by Schalkowsky and Cooley (1966), which presented an analyt- 
ical model detailing the relationship between planetary quarantine 
requirements and estimated probabilities of contamination. The nomen- 
clature and symbol categories were defined as 
P the probability of planetary contamination 
p the event probability which is a component of a 
planetary contamination probability (P) 
Prime superscripts probabilities relating to unsterilized organisms; the 
absence of a prime thus denotes probabilities relat- 
ing to organisms that have undergone sterilization 
the number of lander vehicles launched over the 
time period under consideration. These landers will 
n L  
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nu 
P 
P’ 
P G  
P N  
P R  
N 
NO 
t 
D 
be sterilized in their entirety prior to their launch 
the number of unsterilized buses, orbiters, and 
flybys launched over the time period under 
consideration 
the probability that any one landing vehicle, i.e., 
any one of the m’s, will contaminate the planet or 
its atmosphere 
the probability that any one of the unsterilized 
buses, orbiters, or flybys, i.e., any one of the nu’s 
will contaminate the planet or its atmosphere 
the probability that the planet will be contaminated 
during the time period under consideration 
the probability that one viable organism in a lander 
previously subjected to heat sterilization will be 
present on the planet’s surface or in its atmosphere 
the probability that one or more viable organisms 
not previously heat sterilized will be present on the 
planet’s surface or in its atmosphere 
the probability that a viable, but previously heat 
sterilized, organism present on the planet’s surface 
will grow and spread so as to contaminate the planet 
or its atmosphere 
the probability that the one or more viable organ- 
isms that have not been previously heat sterilized 
and are present on the planet’s surface or in its 
atmosphere will grow and spread and contaminate 
the planet or its atmosphere 
the probability that one organism in a lander vehi- 
cle will remain viable after heat sterilization and 
transit to the planet 
the probability that a viable organism if present in 
a sterilized lander will be released onto the planet’s 
surface 
the number of viable organisms in a lander after 
heat sterilization 
the number of viable organisms in a lander prior to 
heat sterilization 
the heat sterilization time 
the time to reduce population of viable organisms 
by a factor of 10 at the selected sterilization 
temperature 
the number of viable organisms on an unsterilized 
spacecraft, or portions thereof, at the time it 
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reaches a position to become a contamination 
hazard 
the number of viable organisms from an unsteri- 
lized spacecraft which are deposited on the planet's 
surface or in its atmosphere 
the probability that one or more viable, but previ- 
ously unsterilized, organisms will be transferred 
from a bus, orbiter, or flyby to the planet or its 
atmosphere 
the probability that viable, but previously unsteri- 
lized, organisms transferred to the planet will be 
released onto the planet's surface or into its 
atmosphere 
the probability of one viable organism not previ- 
ously heat sterilized on that planet's surface or in 
its atmosphere 
Note: N and p N  refer to organisms on a lander prior to release (with 
probability p R )  onto the planet's surface or its atmosphere. However, 
N' and pi\: refer to organisms after release (with probability p i )  onto 
the planet's surface or into its atmosphere. 
The authors base their analysis on the following propositions: (1) 
planetary contamination probabilities resulting from a given spaceship 
will be considerably less than 1 and (2) during the period of time involved, 
these will be constant probabilities for all cases in any one category. 
They state further that 
P and P' are defined as 
They write equation (3) as the sum of i terms in order to take into 
account the different sources of contamination such as accidental impact 
of an unsterilized ship, ejecta and emissions from such a craft, and 
recontamination of a sterilized lander. 
After specific values for P,,  nl,, nu, pc ,  and pk are accepted, pp and 
p;, become the design criteria for landers and unsterilized ships. These 
criteria are defined as consisting of the following probabilities: 
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These are operational equations, with the terms on the right side repre- 
senting, for example, best cycle specifications (pN). 
CALCULATIONS OF CONTAMINATION PROBABILITIES 
Schalkowsky and Cooley (1966) believe that perhaps all of the analyses 
of planetary contamination probabilities calculated prior to this one, 
including that of Sagan and Coleman, can be reduced to the terms out- 
lined above without any loss of accuracy. 
They define the complete equation for planetary contamination prob- 
ability as 
i 
(6) 
probability of growth and spreading 
robability of release on planet 
probability of transfer to planet 
number of unsterilized vehicles 
-probability of growth and spreading 
probability of release from lander 
-number of landers 
With reference to equation (l), the authors use the following values 
for P,, nL, and nu in establishing a standard for preventing contamination 
of Mars: 
P ,  < 10-3; nL= 70; nu= 30 
Thus, there would be less than 111 000 probability of contamination for 
100 Mars launchings (Schalkowsky and Cooley, 1966, p. 6). 
The division of the total number of vehicles into 70 landers and 30 unsterilized buses, 
orbiters, and flybys does not define a unique division of the total allowable contamination 
probability of P, < between P and P'. Specific choices of P and P' are properly left 
as system tradeoff parameters. However, the selection of RL and nu places an upper limit 
on P and P'. For, clearly, P or P' cannot be chosen to be less than zero. Therefore, P' < 
3.33 X 10-5 andP < 1.43 X 10-5. 
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They also give specific values to pc andp); :pc = 10-3, which shows 
the probability of growth and spreading due to one viable terrestrial 
micro-organism previously subjected to heat sterilization. 
When unsterilized vehicles are considered, pb is defined as the 
probability of "one or more" micro-organisms on the Martian surface, 
in order to take into account the different sources of contamination. As 
a result, the authors consider it necessary to also relate pb to the number 
of viable but unsterilized micro-organisms released on the planet or in 
its atmosphere in any of the i events. The values used are 
. 
when N ' a  100, pt;= 1 
when N' < 1, pi; =pN 1 0 - 2  
when 1 < N' < 100, pb=N' * 10-2 
In the case of a calculation producing N' < 1, N is taken to be equal 
to the chance of having a single viable surviving micro-organism. 
The chance of growth and spreading is considered unity when 100 or 
more viable micro-organisms are considered; whereas, when small 
numbers are involved, the approach is in terms of one survivor. There- 
fore, when N' = 1, the authors adopt a value of pk= which is greater 
than pc by one order of magnitude. 
The values of pp and pb are restricted by the choice of parameters. 
The probabilities of release, pR and pg, would initially be taken to be 
unity, although it might be shown that they are less than unity. They 
are regarded in part of the implementation process with pN and pk. 
With these values described above, Schalkowsky and Cooley define 
planetary contamination requirements in the following equations. 
1. Planetary contamination probabilities - equation (1): 
70P + 30P' G 
0.7P-f 0.3P' G (7) 
2. Sterilized landers - equation (2): 
P = 10-3pp 
or 
pp = 1 0 3 ~  
48 PLANETARY QUARANTINE/OBJECTIVES AND MODELS 
They state that P cannot be greater than 1.43 X regardless 
of the value assigned to P and PI-2. The value will depend on 
various mission design considerations. 
3. Unsterilized vehicles - equation (3): A simple statement re- 
garding unsterilized organisms cannot be given, because it is 
necessary to take into account the various modes of contamina- 
tion. It must be stated in the form of equation (3) and its values 
of p'. However, P' will be less than 3.33 x depending on 
P and P'. 
COMPARISON OF MODELS 
The Schalkowsky and Cooley comparison of planetary quarantine 
models is presented in Table 6. It shows (Schalkowsky and Cooley, 
1966, p. 9) 
. . . resulting values of the various parameters for two cases using the present model. 
Case (a) (item 4 of Table 6) assumes the same distributions between P and P' that were 
used in items 1, 2, and 3. Case (b) (item 5) shows a distribution which favors unsterilized 
vehicles by a factor of 31. Data for the Sagan and Coleman analysis (item 1) have been 
taken from the article published in the May 1965 issue of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
(p. 22). Item (2) of Table 6 represents a correction in the Sagan and Coleman data stemming 
from a minor error in their numerical calculations. Regarding the COSPAR values, only 
pN and p J T  are formally provided in COSPAR resolutions. The other values in item 3 are 
therefore inferred on the assrrmption that they have been derived from the Sagan-Coleman 
analysis. 
Sherry and Trauth developed a model (Sherry and Trauth, 1966, p. 1) 
. . . which relates general planetary exploration objectives to spacecraft-oriented planetary 
quarantine requirements (sterility levels). This model is somewhat more realistic than (some) 
previous models in that it considers only a finite number of missions. When only finitely 
many missions are envisioned, the probability that a mission contaminates the planet is 
highly dependent upon the probability of mission success. So much so, in fact, that for 
certain (not unreasonable) parameter values, it is impossible to obtain a sterility level. In 
many other cases, even when a level can be obtained, it is impracticably severe. This 
suggests that further investigation wil l  he needed before agreement is reached ahout 
spacecraft sterility levels. 
Mission Probabilities -Success or Failure The probability ( P )  that 
a Martian program will be successfully completed is presented by Sherry 
and Trauth in the following equation: 
(1) p -  (1 -p,,s z (1 - P F )  (1 - P o )  7 (1 - P v )  
where 
P the probability of successfully completing the Martian 
exploration program with the risk of contaminating Mars of 
(1 -PI 
PLANETARY CONTAMINATION MODELS 49 
50 PLANETARY QUARANTINE/OBJECTIVES AND MODELS 
(1  -PL) 
NL 
(1 - PF) 
NF 
(1 -Po) 
No 
(1-P,) 
the probability that a lander capsule does not contaminate 
Mars 
the minimum number of lander missions needed to success- 
fully complete the lander phase of experimentation 
the probability that a flyby capsule does not contaminate 
Mars 
the minimum number of flyby missions needed to success- 
fully complete the flyby phase of experimentation 
the probability that an orbiter capsule does not contaminate 
Mars 
the minimum number of orbiter missions needed to success- 
fully complete the orbiter phase of experimentation 
the probability that a bus vehicle from a lander mission 
does not contaminate Mars 
' 
becomes 
By taking the natural logarithms of both sides of equation (l), it 
The authors then break equation (2) into these components: 
K ,  lnP=N, In (l-PI,) (3L ) 
K,lnP=N,ln (1-P,) 
K O  lnP=No In (1 -Po) 
K,lnP=N,ln (1-Pv) 
where 
O S & ,  K,, K,, K O <  1, andK,+KF+Ko+Kv=l 
They then write equation (3) as 
P K v =  (l-P,)NL 
The equations above (5) represent the authors' attempt to assign the 
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requirements for a completely successful program to its constituent 
parts. As an example, they state that if the lander phase makes up 
48 percent of the Mars contamination threat, the flyby phase 24 percent, 
the orbiter phase 16 percent, and the bus vehicles 12 percent, then the 
K's can be determined because of the linearity of equation (2) as follows: 
KL=.l,  K,=.2,  Ko=.3,  and K,=.4. These values are regarded as 
parameters, since the actual percentages are unknown. 
When they consider only the lander phase of a successful program, 
they find that N, is the minimum number of missions required to satisfy 
the inequality: 
where 
E, the total number of experiments intended to be performed in 
the lander phase 
N, the minimum number of successful lander missions needed to 
perform E, experiments 
Z,, the percentage of experiments on board the i th lander that must 
work in order to have the mission considered successful 
X , ,  the number of experiments on board the i th lander mission 
Z L , i X L , i  assumes only integer values. Thus, the number N L  depends 
on EL, Z L , i ,  X L , i .  In the actual calculations, N L  was treated simply as a 
parameter of the model and its relationship to E L ,  Z,,i, and X , , i  was 
neglected. 
Sherry and Trauth state (Sherry and Trauth, 1966, p. 12): 
The decision to simplify NL in this manner was made for practical reasons. At this stage, 
E L ,  A L . , ,  and X L , ~  are themselves still parameters which will be influenced by time and 
technique. If, however, one treats the number of lander missions as a parameter, one can 
neglect the undetermined values of E L ,  ZI., t ,  andXL, i ,  and still obtain valuable information. 
Thus, values have been chosen for NL, and no concern has been given to its precise relation 
to E L ,  X L , ~ .  and Z L , ~ ,  other than that it does satisfy inequality (6). (The same approach 
holds for NF, and No.) 
The authors also take into account the probability of a mission failure 
by modifying equation (1) in terms of a truncated negative binomial 
distribution. They use the lander phase of the program as an example, 
given the following: 
1. ( N L -  1) lander missions have been successfully completed with- 
out contaminating Mars 
2. J L  lander missions have failed without contaminating Mars 
3. The (N,+J,)N" lander mission will be successful and not con- 
taminate Mars 
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Then, they designate 
(NLJL -1 + J L )  
PL,S 
( 1  -pL,s) 
( 1  -PL) 
N L  
ML 
Therefore, P K ~  in equation (5L)  becomes the probability that N L  
lander missions in NL+ ML landed missions are successfully accom- 
plished with no contamination of Mars. Equation (5L) then becomes 
the number of ways JL failures can occur in NL - 1 + 
JL lander missions 
the probability of a successful lander mission 
the probability of an unsuccessful lander mission 
the probability that a lander mission does not con- 
taminate Mars 
the total number of successful lander missions 
the total number of unsuccessful lander missions 
ML 
PKL= 2 ( ~ - P L ) N L + J L ( N L ~ ~ +  J L - ~ )  ( P L , s ) ~ L  ( ~ - P L , s ) ~ L  (7L)  
J L = O  
Sherry and Trauth emphasize the point that P K ~  is a combined proba- 
bility of both mission success and no contamination, based on a finite 
number of missions (NL+ML). 
By defining PF,s as the probability of a successful flyby mission and 
 PO,^ as the probability of a successful orbiter mission, equations ( 5 F ) ,  
(50), and (5Y) become 
PKv= ( ~ - P " ) N L + M L  (7v) 
To get the needed generalization of equation (1) and the expression 
for a successful completion of the Martian program with lander, flyby, 
and orbiter missions without contaminating the planet, the authors 
multiply equations (7L) ,  ( 7 F ) ,  (70) ,  and ( 7 V )  : 
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( 1  - p " ) N L + M L  
Probabilities of Contaminating Mars Sherry and +Trauth are par- 
ticularly concerned with the probability that a given lander will con- 
taminate Mars (PL), which is seen as a function of the following: 
1. k 0, the number of viable non-Martian micro-organisms present 
on the lander capsule 
2. P ( k ) ,  the probability that there are exactly k viable non-Martian 
micro-organisms present on the lander capsule as it impacts 
Mars 
The position of these micro-organisms (exterior or interior) 
P R ( T {  k) , the probability that exactly T viable non-Martian micro- 
organisms, given exactly k on board, are released on the Martian 
surface 
PB(T),  the probability that, given the release of T viable non- 
Martian micro-organisms on the Martian surface, future scientific 
exploration of the planet is biased 
3. 
4. 
5. 
PL is then expressed as 
P ( k )  represents the probability that there are k viable terrestrial 
organisms on the lander capsule as it impacts the Martian surface. The 
value is a function of the final sterilization cycle and the chance of the 
capsule's becoming contaminated during the period- between steriliza- 
tion and impact. In previous models, P ( k )  was only the probability that 
k organisms would survive the dry heat sterilization cycle. In the Sherry 
and Trauth case, it depends on the type of organism (a), initial popula- 
tion ( n o ) ,  exposure time ( t ) ,  and sterilization temperature (2'). Thus, 
the probability of a micro-organism's surviving would be p (a, t, T). 
They assume that the organisms die independently of one another, 
so that a binomial distribution can be used for P ( x ) ,  leading to 
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that is, the probability that from a population of n, type a organisms, k 
numbers will survive the sterilization cycle of t time and T temperature. 
Sherry and Trauth propose that, given k organisms on the vehicle, the 
conditional probability that T viable terrestrial micro-organisms will be 
released on the Martian surface is PR (T/k),  which depends on whether 
the organisms are on the interior or exterior of the capsule. They go 
on to define the following: 
the probability of kl viable non-Martian micro-organisms 
on the exterior of the lander capsule, given a total of k 
on the lander 
the probability of kz viable non-Martian micro-organisms 
in the interior of the lander capsule, given a total of k 
on the lander 
PR (E171 I kl)  the probability of release of 7 1  viable non-Martian 
micro-organisms from the exterior, given that there are 
kl on the exterior of the lander capsule 
the probability of release of 7 2  viable non-Martian micro- 
organisms from the interior, given that there are kz on 
the interior of the lander capsule 
the probability of release of 7 1  viable non-Martian micro- 
organisms from the exterior of the lander capsule, given 
a total of k on the lander 
the probability of release of TZ viable non-Martian micro- 
organisms from the interior of the lander capsule given 
a total of k on the lander 
the probability of release of T I  exterior and T Z  interior 
viable non-Martian micro-organisms given a total of k 
on the lander 
PE ( k l l k )  
PI  (&)k)  
A 
&(zlTzlkz) 
PR(EIT11k) 
PR(11Tz1k) 
P ( n ,  Tz1k) 
They then represent PR (T/k) by 
PR(T1k) = 2 p ~ ( T 1 ,  TzIk)  (11) 
r1+7*=7 
where 
where 
PR(TI, TzIk) = P R ( E ~ T I ( ~ )  * PR(11Tzlk) (114 
PR(E1nlk) = 9 & ( E I n l k l ) h ( k l \ k )  (W 
PR(11FzIk) = &(z1Tzlkz)pi(kz(k) (W 
I 
kl=r,  
and where 
k2=72 
The authors then analyze equation (9) in greater detail. First, they 
consider 
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and set 
k 
P D ( ~ )  = P R ( T I ~ ) P B ( T )  (124 
-1 
The value of PD ( k ) ,  the probability of contaminating Mars when there 
are k organisms on a capsule, cannot be precisely determined, and 
is therefore considered a parameter of the model. PD (k) is assumed to 
be equal to PD for all k. "This . . . does not distort reality too much, 
because PD ( k )  is a non-negative and bounded by 1 for all k" (Sherry and 
Trauth, 1966, p. 19). Equation (12) then becomes 
PL=PD 2 P ( k )  
k = l  
Summing the above equation gives 
or 
PF and PO can be treated similarly, and a comparable equation developed: 
and 
pO=pI, 0 2 PD ( k ) @ ( k )  ( 130 1 
k = O  
where 
P I  
F ( k )  
the probability that a flyby (orbiter) capsule impacts the planet 
P ( k )  of equation (lo),  with p ( a ,  t, T )  based on (perhaps) 
different values oft, and/or T 
Non-contamination Probability Regarcling the lander phase, N L ,  
M L ,  K L ,  and PL,  s are given as parametsrs with the inequality P 3 fi. 
In this case, F is 0.999, the least acceptable value for P and the non- 
contamination probability accepted by COSPAR. 
Sherry and Trauth believe that the object, then, is to solve the following 
inequality for PL: 
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This is done to obtain a number PL such that for all P L  d PL the inequality 
obtains. They state that if one solves 
A 
the solution, if it exists, will be PL. The objective, then, is to solve the 
(NL+ML)"-degree polynomial in PL for PL. They further believe that 
because NL+ML is relatively large, the solution must be obtained 
numerically, and some attention must be paid to the accuracy of the 
solution. 
Consequently, the calculations produce an upper bound P L  (U.B.), 
and a lower bound, P L  (L.B.) , for the maximum acceptable value of PL. 
The inequalities below (14) are solved numerically for PL (U.B.) and 
PL (L.B.), when P=& 
NL+JL ( N L - l + J L  JL ) (PL,s)NL(l -PL,s )  J L  (144 - 3 (1-PPL) 
J L = O  
This then produces 
or 
or 
P (U. B. ) < p <  PL (L.B.) 
P D  P D  
Sherry and Trauth maintain that these calculations have demonstrated 
that this approach provides an excellent bound on the maximum ac- 
ceptable value of p for small E. Similar maximum values can be obtained 
for P F  and PO, particularly 
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But the maximum value they give for P V  is 
Kv P v = l - P  5 
6 (20)  where 
D = N L + M L  and P = P  
The authors also point out some of the conceptual difficulties in the 
contamination models developed by Sagan and Coleman, Schalkowsky, 
and Cornell. The latter two based their models on the Sagan-Coleman 
approximation below: 
Sherry and Trauth suggest that there is considerable confusion regarding 
the definition of cr in the approximation. Sagan and Coleman refer to it 
as “the mean number of organisms deposited” and as “the probability 
that a single viable micro-organism be deposited” on the surface of 
Mars. In contrast, Cornell defines (+ as “the mean number of organisms 
per capsule,” but also says that (+ may be defined as “the probability 
that a spacecraft landing on Mars will be contaminated” by using the 
relation P -  = UP,. When cr is treated as such a probability, however, 
P L  = VPm is an incorrect mathematical relation, since PL is a plural con- 
cept, while Pm, the “probability that a given micro-organism landed on 
the surface of Mars will be able to multiply and contaminate a sizable 
fraction of the planet,” is a singular concept (Sherry and Trauth, 1966, 
p. 25). 
In his summary of the Sagan and Coleman model, Schalkowsky also 
confuses mean number and probability, according to Sherry and Trauth. 
He defines cr as the “probability of one viable micro-organism on the 
surface of Mars due to a single lander,” and then as 
( + = P N ’ P R  (22 a) 
where 
PN the probability of one viable micro-organism aboard the lander 
PR the mean probability that one micro-organism, if present, will be 
released from the lander and deposited on the Martian surface 
Thus, PN, a sterilization criterion, is used as a “probability of one viable 
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micro-organism aboard the lander” (Sherry and Trauth, 1966). But 
Schalkowsky’s equation states that 
PN = No ‘ (22b) 
with 
No as the initial population of micro-organisms on the lander (prior 
to the application of dry heat) 
t as the length of time dry heat is applied at a particular fixed 
temperature 
D as the time it takes to reduce a single-species population by a 
factor of 10 at a fixed temperature 
Sherry and Trauth suggest that although the PN used above in equation 
(22a) is referred to as a “probability,” it is an expected number, i.e., u 
and PN are expected numbers of organisms rather than “the probability 
of a single viable micro-organism aboard a lander.” However, they 
admit that Schalkowsky later considered this problem and showed that, 
when P N e 1 ,  PN is a good numerical approximation of the probability 
of a single organism’s being aboard a lander. Consequently, Sherry and 
Trauth replace 
. 
with 
because it eliminates the confusion about the definition of a; p provides 
more information than a, since the former is a probability and the latter 
an expected number; and the derivation of k‘D is more realistic. 
The authors caution against confusing P,,,s, the probability that a 
lander mission is successful, with P+. The latter term was originally 
used by Sagan and Coleman as the mean probability that a lander on the 
Martian surface will succeed in its biological experiment. Subsequently, 
P+ referred to the probability of a successful landing, with no reference to 
experimental success. 
The last major conceptual problem the authors find in the Sagan- 
Coleman model, later seen in the work of Schalkowsky and Cornell, 
is that they considerj ( J L = ~ )  to run from 0 to 03: 
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or 
P (in closed form) is solved by summing JL from 0 to a: 
1 N L  P =  [ P L d 1  --PL) 1 -  ( 1 - P L s )  ( l - P L )  
But they view this as a (Sherry and Trauth, 1966, p. 29) 
. . . distortion from the reality of the Martian Exploration Program, since equations (25) 
and (26) demand that we continue to send unmanned lander capsules to Mars until we have 
N L  successful missions (apparently without regard for the limitations of time or finances). 
Martian Exploration Program Sherry and Trauth contend that sending 
an unlimited number of missions to Mars is unrealistic and not the in- 
tention of the space program. Instead, the Martian Exploration Program 
should be formulated in terms of the finite aims and constraints that 
follow: 
1. 
2.  
3. 
To successfully complete N ( N = N L  + N F  + NO) missions 
To keep the risk of contamination of Mars small 
To accomplish ( 1 )  and (2) by attempting no more than N' (N'=  
NL + ML + NF ~ M F  +NO + Mo) space missions 
They go on to state the following (Sherry and Trauth, 1966, p. 29): 
When NI,, MI,, P, K L ,  and PLS (in the case of the lander phase of the program) are specified, 
one attempts to solve equation (7L) for PI, .  Since ML is a fixed finite number, two very 
interesting difficulties come to light. The first difficulty is that for certain values of the 
parameters (for example, N ~ = 4 0 ,  M L =  10, P=0.999, K ~ = 0 . 5 ,  P1,5=0.85) no acceptable 
(between 0 and 1) value of PI, can be found that satisfies equation (7L) .  
However, this does not occur if the Sagan and Coleman equation is 
used in the closed form. That is, when equation (26) is solved, the 
result is 
Here, 0 P L , ~  6 1, and P L  falls between zero and one, regardless of the 
value of PL,s. 
The second difficulty concerns the sensitivity of PL,s in equation (14). 
As an example, if N ~ = 8 0 ,  M ~ = 2 0 ,  P=0.999,  and K L = l ,  PL ,S  can be 
varied so as to make PL as small as desired (see Table 7 below): 
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Table 7 Making P, as Small as Desired (after Sherry and Trauth, 1966, p .  30). 
PL, s P L  
0.95 1.18 x 10-5 
0.90 2.17 X 
0.89832 6.39 X 
0.8983 185 7.49 x 10-12 
In this table, the relationship between P L  and  PI,,^ is very sensitive in 
the area of PL,S=O.90. When P L , S  changes only slightly, this is re- 
flected by a very great change in PI,, in the same direction, with a 
comparable change in p (PL = p P D ) .  Thus, severe sterilization methods 
would be required, and there would be difficult engineering problems. 
The authors emphasize that this sensitivity cannot be seen if the closed 
form of equation (26) is used. 
CONTAMINATION FROM EJECTA AND 
EMISSIONS 
Planetary contamination with terrestrial micro-organisms can occur as 
a result of ejecta and emissions from vehicles during flyby or orbit, as 
well as from the spacecraft’s impacting the planet’s surface. 
Czarnecki et al. (1966) show the potential contaminating events of a 
flyby or orbiter in Figure 2. The authors developed the following equation 
to describe the probability of contamination from ejecta or emissions: 
P,=P,  [I-exp (-2 r j ~ l j ~ . ) ]  
j=l 
the probability of planetary contamination 
the probability of all operational events occurring successfully 
up to the propulsion, reaction control system, or meteoroid 
impact events under consideration 
the number of expected viable micro-organisms on or in the 
subsystem under consideration which are subject to possible 
release at the time of a propulsion, reaction control, or meteoroid 
impact event 
the probability of live escape of the micro-organisms as a result 
of a propulsion, reaction control system, or meteoroid impact 
event 
the conditional probability of spore survival following ejection 
from the spacecraft, including survival from radiation exposure 
and planetary entry conditions and survival and propagation 
under the planet’s surface environmental conditions 
The specific sources of potential contamination are shown in the equa- 
tion by the j subscripts in the r and P I  terms. 
An analysis of the terms in equation (1) suggests two critical questions. 
First, will terrestrial organisms survive planetary atmospheric entry? 
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FLIGHT CAPSULE 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
IN-TRAI 
EJECTA 
FLIGHT 
IMPACT AT ENCOUNTER h .  
ATTITUDE CONTROL 
SYSTEM EMISSIONS 
ORBIT TRIM PROP. 
SYSTEM EMISSIONS 
FLIGHT SPACECRAFT IMPACT 
FROM ORBIT DECAY 
PLANET ORBITING MISSION 
PROP. AND ATTITUDE CONTROL 
SYSTEM EMISSIONS DURING FLYBY 
PLANET FLYBY MISSION 
Figure 2 Potential Sources of Contamination for Orbiters and Flybys (after 
Czarnecki et al., 1 9 6 6 , ~ .  531). 
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Second, if they do survive, will they grow and propagate in this environ- 
ment? These matters are regarded as critical problems because of the 
sensitivity of the value of P ,  in the equation to the values of P,. When 
P ,  is small, equation (1) is approximated by 
However, since Ps = PSA PSUVPG, 
The authors feel that if the P, terms are small enough, the P,  appor- 
tioned to the contaminating events might be achieved without “establish- 
ing any design requirements relative to sterilization or decontamination 
of the spacecraft” (Czarnecki et al., 1966, p. 529). 
Korenstein (1966) also studied the possible effects of contaminated 
particles being ejected from a Voyager spacecraft on the way to, or in, 
orbit around Mars. He discusses the distance by which the particles miss 
Mars as a function of their size, point of ejection, ejection velocity and 
direction, transfer trajectory, and aim point bias. For the orbiting phase, 
he computed the orbit lifetimes and defined the conditions under which 
the particles enter the lower Martian atmosphere. Korenstein concludes 
that the orbiting phase of the mission poses a significantly greater threat 
to the quarantine constraint than does the transit phase. 
VENUS CONTAMINATION PROBABILITIES 
There was some concern that Venus might have been contaminated by 
the flight of the U.S.S.R. V e n u  3 in 1965. Consequently, Schalkowsky 
(1966~) attempted to determine the planetary contamination proba- 
bilities of Venus 3 and the effect of this flight on future quarantine re- 
quirements for the planet. He believes that there is a consensus that the 
polar caps and some parts of the atmosphere are the only areas in 
which terrestrial organisms might survive (e.g., Sagan, 1968). 
Schalkowsky does not think that there was much chance that V e n u  3 
contaminated the planet, thus making future quarantine restrictions 
unnecessary. However, he raises the question of the effect of the flight 
of Venus 3 on the probability of planetary contamination occurring 
during the time period considered (Pc 6 and whether such a 
value is meaningful for determining standards for future Venus flights. 
On the basis of his own estimates, he concludes that an increase in PC 
above to 5 x or even is justified. At any rate, restrictions 
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on missions to Venus probably will not be as severe as those for Mars. 
Brown (1966a) maintains that the surface temperature of Venus is 
probably high enough to prevent contamination with terrestrial micro- 
organisms, making sterilization requirements unnecessary. However, 
there is some doubt about the high temperature estimate. If, on the basis 
of future evidence, the estimate should be lowered, Brown feels that 
Venus would become an exobiologically significant target. If this should 
be so, then Venus would require more stringent sterility criteria. How- 
ever, as long as there is some doubt about its surface temperature, 
Brown suggests that no lander should be sent to Venus without under- 
going sterilization procedures, and that any flyby should have at least 
the same trajectory control as those used with Martian flybys. 
In a Preliminary Report to COSPAR on the Prelaunch Probability of 
Contaminating Venus by  the Mariner 1967 Mission (undated and un- 
signed), it was stated that NASA policy established 3 x as the maxi- 
mum probability of accidentally contaminating Venus by the Mariner 
Venus 1967 mission. Haynes (1967) distinguishes two ways in which 
Venus could be contaminated by this mission: (1) the accidental impact 
of the spacecraft or of the Agena stage of the boost vehicle or (2) the 
release of viable organisms from the spacecraft, which would be de- 
posited on the planet without the impact of the vehicle. Haynes points 
out that, since neither the Agena nor the spacecraft will be sterilized, 
their injection trajectories will have to be biased away from Venus; 
the Agena will carry a retrorocket to further deflect its trajectory. In 
the second case, with current spacecraft design, “the probability of 
ejecta . . . reaching the planet and subsequently growing and spreading 
is estimated to be less than 1 x hence negligible relative to satis- 
fying the 3 X 10-5 constraint” (Haynes, 1967, p. 1). 
Haynes reviewed NASA policy regarding the planetary quarantine 
requirements established for the Mariner Venus 67 Project and de- 
veloped a prelaunch mathematical model for predicting the probability 
of contaminating Venus with terrestrial organisms. The NASA require- 
ment is expressed as 
the probability of impact 
the probability that a viable organism from the spacecraft will be 
released onto the planet’s surface or into its atmosphere 
the probability that a viable organism, present on the planet’s 
surface or in the atmosphere and not previously heat sterilized, 
will grow and spread, contaminating the planet or its atmosphere 
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The summation is taken over the “i,” i.e., the possible sources of con- 
tamination. 
It is further stated that if the value of Pfi is taken to be less than 
unity and if there is an impact of the vehicle on the planet, some justi- 
fication must be given. Haynes believes it is possible to justify such a 
reduction in the probability that the impact of a vehicle will release viable 
micro-organisms; he does not think that the change would be significant 
and assumes that PA 
The value for Pb is set at not less than 0.10, based on the hostile 
surface environment of Venus. The Planetary Atmospheres Subcom- 
mittee of the NASA Office of Space Sciences and Applications reported 
less than one chance in 10 that a random point of impact on the surface 
of Venus would have a temperature below 400 Kelvin; it was assumed 
that the probablity of the growth of terrestrial organisms would be at 
most 0.10. The SSB agreed with this analysis and, thus, equation (1) 
could be written as 
1.0, which is a conservative estimate. 
P‘ = C, Pf Pfi (O.1O)i 
i 
In view of the two possible sources of contamination described above, 
equation (2) can be written as follows: 
P ’ = Pf,Pfi,(O.lO) + Pf, Pfi,(O.lO) + C, [P;,Pk,(O.lO)i] (3) 
i 
where 
Subscript A the Agena impact 
Subscript S the spacecraft impact 
Subscript E the ejecta (the third item indicates the summation over 
the potential sources of ejecta contamination) 
Pfi, and PA,, which are assumed to be 1.0, are then substituted into 
equation (3): 
P ‘ = P f ,  (0.10) + P i ,  (0.10) +C, [Pf,Pfi, ( O . l O ) ] i  
i 
(4) 
Haynes uses this form of the equation in his analysis. He examines each 
of the sources of ejecta (midcourse motor exhaust products, micromete- 
orite ejecta, and altitude control gas jets) in terms of their contribution 
to the probability of contaminating Venus. 
The probability of contaminating Venus with terrestrial organisms 
carried by midcourse motor exhaust products is summarized by Haynes 
as follows: 
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where 
PE the probability of ejecting a viable organism 
PI the probability of achieving an impact trajectory 
PUV the probability of surviving the UV environment 
P ~ E  the probability of surviving the entry heating load 
Pgs the probability of growing and spreading on the surface of or 
in the atmosphere of Venus 
By substituting estimated probabilities for each of these terms into 
the equation, the following result is obtained: 
Pc= (0.1) (0.00001) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
Thus, Pc= is the estimated probability of contaminating Venus with 
organisms from midcourse motor ejecta. 
Micrometeorite Possibilities A second potential source of contaminants 
is the possibility that micrometeorites would strike the spacecraft, 
dislodging micro-organisms which would then contaminate Venus. 
Haynes maintains that there is a less than probability that the 
organisms, which would be dislodged in random directions, would be 
within the required 1" cone. Furthermore, there is less than a 0.01 proba- 
bility of the ejecta's being within a band of a few meters per second so 
that the chance of an impact trajectory is considered to be or less. 
The probability that the organisms will survive ultraviolet radiation and 
entry heating is 0.10; the probability of growth and spreading is estimated 
at 0.1. Thus, Haynes concludes 
Pc= (1.0) (0.00001) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) = 10-8 
where 1.0 is the assumed probability of ejecting viable micro-organisms 
by this means. 
The same approach is used by Haynes to determine the probability 
of contaminants coming from the altitude control gas jets. The probability 
of organisms escaping the altitude control system when an impact 
trajectory is achieved is 
n=5 x 10-6N 
when 
n the number of viable organisms that achieve an impact trajectory 
., 
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N the total number of viable organisms in the spacecraft control 
system 
Since all altitude control nitrogen must pass through two filters, and 
assuming that there are only about four viable organisms in the spacecraft 
tanks (Haynes, 1967, p. 8), 
. . . the probability of ejecting a single viable micro-organism times the probability of 
failure of the filters is 4 X  Substituting this value for N in the preceding equation 
yields a probability of roughly of contaminating Venus with gas from the altitude 
control system. 
With these analyses in mind, Haynes believes there is less than a 
probability of contaminating Venus with ejecta. That is consider- 
ably less than the quarantine constraint of 3 x lop5 and the probability 
Haynes describes four ways in which there can be an accidental 
The spacecraft is injected into an impact trajectory that cannot 
be corrected with a maneuver because of a spacecraft malfunction. 
Following the first maneuver, the spacecraft is on an impact 
trajectory that cannot be corrected with a second maneuver 
because of a malfunction in the spacecraft. 
The spacecraft performs a first maneuver that misses the planet 
but also misses the desired target zone. A second maneuver is 
performed, resulting in a planet impact trajectory. 
The spacecraft is on an impact trajectory following the first 
maneuver, and a second maneuver that also results in a planet 
impact trajectory is performed. 
The probability of impact by the spacecraft is also described by the 
following equation: 
of contamination from the impact of a vehicle. I 
impact trajectory: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
where 
p bs 
PI/i 
P1 
91 
P2 
92 
PI11 
the probability of spacecraft impact at Venus 
the probability of achieving an impact trajectory at injection 
the probability of the spacecraft’s being able to perform a first 
maneuver 
l -PI=the  probability of the spacecraft’s not being able to 
perform a first maneuver 
the probability of the spacecraft’s being able to perform a second 
maneuver, given a successful first maneuver 
1 - P2 = the probability of the spacecraft’s being unable to 
perform a second maneuver, given a successful first maneuver 
the probability of impact following the first maneuver 
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P ~ / z  
Pzll 
Pi 
the probability of impact following the second maneuver 
the probability of requiring a second maneuver even though the 
first maneuver did not result in an impact trajectory 
the probability of the spacecraft’s being injected on a Venus 
trajectory during the 1967 opportunity 
Impact by Launch Vehicle Haynes then determines the probability 
of the spacecraft’s impacting Venus by making the following assump- 
tions and using equation (6): 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
PI,  the probability of the spacecraft’s being able to perform an 
initial maneuver is taken to be 0.98. 
P z ,  the probability of the spacecraft’s being able to perform a 
second maneuver, given a successful first maneuver performance 
is taken to be 0.98. This reduction from 1.0 is basically the esti- 
mate of the small probability that the spacecraft would fail after 
the first maneuver but before a second maneuver, and also that 
a second maneuver uses a different set of valves in the propulsion 
system than was used in the successful first maneuver. 
P ~ i i ,  the probability of achieving an impact trajectory at injection 
is left as a variable, since it can be adjusted downward by biasing 
the launch trajectories away from the planet and vice versa. This 
number is computed by mapping the injection dispersions given 
by the covariance matrix of injection errors to the aiming point 
at the planet and integrating over the capture radius of the 
planet. For unbiased trajectories, this number varies from about 
0.08 on the June 12 launch date to about 0.02 on the June 27 
launch date. 
Pill, the Probability of achieving an impact trajectory following the 
first maneuver is computed by mapping the dispersions from the 
execution of the midcourse maneuver to the planet and integrating 
over the capture radius. This quantity is a function of the errors 
in the maneuver and the location of the target aiming point. For 
the Mariner Venus 67 mission, the aiming point will be selected 
in an a priori probability of impact following the first maneuver of 
3 X or less. 
P z l l ,  the probability of performing a second maneuver even if the 
first maneuver does not result in an impacting trajectory, is com- 
puted by finding statistically the size of the execution errors result- 
ing from the first maneuver, mapping these to the planet, and 
integrating over the region of acceptable encounter. For Mariner 
Venus 67 this number is assumed to be 0.50. 
P1/2, the probability of impact following the second maneuver, is 
determined by finding the statistical size of the execution errors 
resulting from the second maneuver, including orbit determination 
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uncertainties, mapping these to encounter, and integrating over 
the planet capture area. Since a second maneuver is normally 
correcting errors from the first maneuver, it is expected to be very 
small and, hence, the errors associated with it should be small 
For the Mariner Venus 67 mission, the second maneuver target 
aiming point will be selected so that an a priori probability of 
achieving an impact trajectory will be less than 1 0 ~ ~ .  
Haynes derives a similar equation for the probability of impact by the 
launch vehicle: 
Thus, 
where 
qr 
PI/, 
the probability of the Agena retrorocket’s not firing 
the probability of achieving an impact trajectory after retrofire 
given that trajectory was nonimpacting prior to retrofire (Haynes 
assumes that if the Agena attains an impact trajectory and the 
retrorocket fires, there would be a zero probability of an impact 
trajectory) 
In order to calculate the probability of the Agena’s cttaining an impact 
Pr,  the probability of a successful retromaneuver, given success- 
ful injection, is 0.99. 
PI/r, the probability of impact following a retromaneuver, is cal- 
culated by integrating the mapped injection errors over the cap- 
ture area of the planet from an aim point biased away from the 
planet by the amount the retromaneuver moves the Agena tra- 
jectory. For the Mariner Venus 67 trajectories, this number is 
always less than 
He then substitutes these figures into equation (6), pointing out that the 
second term in the equation is at least two orders of magnitude smaller 
than the first and of the order 
Pr 1 - q r  
trajectory, Haynes makes two assumptions: 
1. 
2. 
Therefore, 
By substituting analogous numbers into equation (5), it becomes evident 
that the last two terms are of the order and Haynes thinks that they 
can be neglected. Thus, 
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He then substitutes equations (7) and (8) into equation (4) and, keeping in 
mind that the third term of equation (4) due to ejecta is negligible com- 
pared to the 3 x  10v5 constraint, he arrives at 
Since P' S 3 X 
q1=2 X This results in 
he rearranges equation (9) using qr= and 
However, Haynes cautions that Prli for unbiased trajectories is between 
0.08 and 0.02 depending on the launch date. In order to reduce Pili to an 
acceptable level, the trajectories must be biased away from Venus 
(Haynes, 1967, p. 15). 
The Mariner Venus 67 trajectories have been biased so that on each day of the launch 
period the probability of obtaining an impact trajectory at injection is less than 0.01. 
Haynes' analysis, therefore, shows that the probability of the Mariner 
Venus 67 mission's contaminating the planet Venus is less than 3 x 10-5. 
Craven et al. (1968) reported on A Preliminary Quarantine Analysis 
of a Possible Mariner Venus 1972 Mission, in which planetary quarantine 
requirements were derived from previous constraints established for 
other missions. The Mariner Venus 67 mission, similar to the 19M 
Mariner Mars mission, was constrained to a contamination probability 
no greater than 3 X In contrast, the Voyager Mars 1973 mission 
(postponed until 1975), which was to be a more complex operation 
because two capsules (for landing) and two spacecraft (for long-term 
orbit) were to be launched on a single vehicle, was to have the following 
constraints: 
1. Probability of contamination due to each sterilized capsule, no 
2. probability of contamination due to each spacecraft and its ejecta, 
no greater than 3 X low5 (for two spacecraft: 6 X 
3. For unsterilized items common to both spacecraft, such as launch 
vehicle stages and adapters, probability of contamination to be 
included in the probability allocation for the two spacecraft 
Summing these values gives a total allowable contamination probability 
for the mission of 6.2 x 
Individual Missions The probability of contamination for individual 
missions, P,,, requires an upper bound for the number of missions flown, 
nM. Craven et al. consider 30 missions to be a reasonable estimate, so 
' beater than 1 x (for two capsules: 2 x 
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that the following equation represents the policy directive applied to one 
mission: 
The authors continue (Craven et al., 1968, p. 5): 
Substituting the value 30 for n ~ ,  one finds that if the probability of contamination per mis- 
sion, P c M ,  is kept less than or equal to 3.3 x 10-5, the NASA Policy Directive is satisfied. 
Thus, in the following analysis for aMariner Venus 1972 mission, the probability of contami- 
nation for the mission, PCM,* ,  will be taken as less than or equal to 3.3 X The value for 
PCM agrees with the value used for the Mariner series. It appears, however, to conflict with 
PCM 6.2 X for the Voyager Mars 1973 mission, but it agrees if it is taken into account 
that the Voyager Mars 1973 mission is, in reality, two missions using one launch vehicle. 
Craven et al. (1968) adapted a quarantine equation from Light et al. 
(1967) that was used for the Mariner Venus 67 analysis: 
P c M 7 2 =  P(Pv)+P(Lv)  (2) 
where 
P [ P V )  
P ( L v )  
the probability of planetary contamination due to the planetary 
vehicle (PV) 
the probability of planetary contamination due to the launch 
vehicle (LV) 
They then expanded the contamination probability resulting from the 
planetary vehicle, isolated from equation (l), as follows: 
where 
P 
P' 
the probability of contamination due to the lander(s) 
the probability of contamination due to sources other than the 
lander(s) (the form of this expression depends on the particular 
mission profile) 
the number of landers per mission 
the probability of a lander's impacting the planet 
the probability of at least one viable micro-organism on a lander 
as it impacts the planet 
nL 
PI 
P s  
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the probability of an organism on a lander which has under- 
gone a terminal sterilization cycle (TSC) being released onto 
the planetary surface 
the probability of a released organism's growing on the plane- 
tary surface and biasing future experiments 
the summation taken over the i sources of possible nonlander 
contamination, such as the bRoster, spacecraft, biobarrier, 
spacecraft ejecta, etc. 
the probability of impact of one of these sources 
the probability of at least one viable micro-organism on one of 
these sources upon impact 
the probability of a viable organism from the impacting item 
being released onto the surface of the planet or into its 
atmosphere 
The authors note that before equation (3) can be used, the growth 
and release factors must be defined. The probability of growth was esti- 
mated to be 1 X lower than that for other missions. In regard to the 
probability of release of a viable micro-organism from a capsule, they set 
this as near unity. The probability that a viable micro-organism will be 
released from an unsterilized spacecraft, launch vehicle, or debris is 
thought to be similar to the probability that the object will be contami- 
nated at impact. The probability of release is said to be near unity except 
for the spacecraft and biobarrier, which are subject to high entry 
temperatures. 
Craven et al. suballocate the allowable contamination probability 
(33 X for the 1972 Venus mission by assigning 2 X to the 
launch vehicle and 31 X to the planetary vehicle. They believe that 
the relatively low value used for the launch vehicle (Craven et al., 1968, 
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. . . can be met by following a predetermined guidance policy that provides for aimpoint bias- 
ing. Previous operational experiences with Manner Mars 196rE and Mariner Venus 67 have 
proved the adequacy of the biasing technique. The relatively higher value allocated to the 
planetary vehicle has been chosen to allow for possible accidental impact of the intact 
planetary vehicle in case of no separation and for possible accidental impact of the space- 
craft, capsule, bio-barrier, and debris in case of separation. 
TREATY AND MEETINGS ON 
AFT STERILIZATION 
A multilateral “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies” was signed on January 27,1967, in Washington, D.C., 
London, and Moscow, in behalf of the US., the United Kingdom, the 
U.S.S.R., and a number of other countries. Article IX of the treaty states, 
in part: “States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration 
of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination” (“Treaty,” 1967, 
p. 2416). The treaty provides that any of its parties can request consulta- 
tion with any other party concerning the latter’s activities or experiments 
which might be harmful to the use of outer space. 
The COSPAR Consultative Group on Potentially Harmful Effects of 
Space Experiments met in London on July 22,1967. A report by Hed6n 
and Imshenetsky on the meeting of the Panel on Standards for Space 
Probe Sterilization and the Symposium on Sterilization Techniques for 
Instruments and Materials as Applied to Space Research (London, July 
18-22, 1967) was received. Six working parties were formed at the 
COSPAR Symposium to consider the areas of (1) a contamination log, 
(2) the probability of release and growth of micro-organisms, (3) the prob- 
ability of contamination of Mars by unsterilized flyby or orbiting space- 
craft, (4) gaseous sterilization, (5) special problems and difficulties in 
spacecraft sterilization, and (6) monitoring techniques. 
The working party concerned with the contamination log affirmed its 
support for (1) the 1966 COSPAR (Vienna) resolution that suggested a 
basic or maximum probability of 1 x that a planet will be contami- 
nated during the period of biological exploration and (2) the application 
of this criterion to the Mars missions and the exploration of the other 
planets. It particularly emphasized the recommendation that, within 3 
months after launch, the computations and sterilization procedures used 
by members to prevent contamination should be made available to 
COSPAR. A guideline for the preparation of such reports was described. 
The working party also agreed at that time that it was generally held that 
the probability that random types of viable micro-organisms deposited on 
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random areas of Mars would grow and spread was less than 1.0, but 
greater than low3. In view of the uncertainty of these estimates, they sug- 
gested that this recommendation be replaced by a more general sugges- 
tion that the value assigned to this probability be carefully and con- 
servatively established, taking into account all pertinent information. 
The report of the working party on the probability of release and growth 
concluded that the probability of growth of viable terrestrial micro- 
organisms and the release of single organisms from the interiors of 
solids, which have been considered in terms of the worst case (unity), 
should be revised. The growth probability is between 1 X and 1 X 
lo-*, and, taking a conservative approach, member nations were advised 
to use values for Pr; of not less than 1 X 10-3. The working party also 
urged members to conduct experiments to better define the release 
probability, in order to justify a value of unity or less. 
The Mathematical Models Subcommittee of the American Institute 
of Biological Sciences Spacecraft Sterilization Advisory Committee met 
at Florida State University, February 8-9, 1967. An effort was made to 
arrive at some agreement on the planetary quarantine program in terms 
of international commitments, and various aspects of specific quarantine 
models were discussed. 
Separate groups within the subcommittee drafted summary state- 
ments expressing their position on various aspects of planetary quaran- 
tine policy and efforts. For example, Wolfson, Dillon, and Craven wrote, 
“It has been and will continue to be a policy of the United States Govern- 
ment, that will be implemented by NASA, to maintain the possibility 
of accidentally contaminating Mars at a very low level” (Mathematical 
Models Subcommittee, 1967, p. 10). However, they felt that no inter- 
national organization would be able to clearly define a contamination 
constraint, specify the parameters, or reach some agreement on this 
definition within the decade of primary interest. They attributed this 
situation to the lack of data for establishing mathematical probability 
expressions, suggesting that NASA set the guidelines and criteria for 
each U S .  project and continue to make public the steps taken to imple- 
ment this policy. 
INTERNATIQNAL PLANETARY QUARANTINE STANDARDS 
A statement on the formulation of international planetary quarantine 
standards was presented by Schalkowsky, who recommended that inter- 
national standards be established in terms of “(a) the probability P ( n )  
that a single landing vehicle will contaminate the planet and (b) the 
probability P ( n ’ )  that a single non-landing vehicle will lead to the con- 
tamination of the planet” (Mathematical Models Subcommittee, 1967, 
p. 11). He includes the following parameters in the basic framework for 
these standards: 
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n the number of landers during the period 
of unmanned exploration 
nr the number of non-landers during the 
period of unmanned exploration, P(ni), 
which is the same as P(n) in (a) above, 
except that the i indicates it may vary from 
mission to mission, e n > ) ,  which is 
similarly related to P(n ’ ) 
n nt 
P A  P ( n i )  + P(n; ) the probability of contaminating a planet 
i =  1 j= 1 during the entire period of biological 
exploration 
Schalkowsky points out that simplifying assumptions can be made to 
reflect the uncertainties in the parameters of the equation for P ,  until a 
broader base for their selection can be attained. These assumptions are 
1. 
2. 
All the P ( n i )  are the same for the n flights to be considered, i.e., 
All the P(nj’) are the same for the n’ flights to be considered, i.e., 
P (  ni) = P ( n )  
P(n,’)  = P ( n ‘ )  
In view of the fact that P ( n )  and P ( n ‘ )  will be considerably less than 
unity, 
P = n P ( n )  + n r P ( n r )  
Schalkowsky suggests that the quarantine criteria obtainable from 
equation (1) should be stated in the following form: 
P 
n 
P ( n ’ )  < 7 (3) 
Berger, Brown, and Trauth provide an illustrative model for P ( n )  as 
defined by Schalkowsky: 
P ( n )  = P ( N  2 1)=  3 p ( N )  
N= 1 
Where N = number of viable organisms reaching the planet and biasing 
experiments, 
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p ( N )  = CPi(ri)pi(z lr)p(Nilz)= the density 
where 
2 
ri 
Pi( , )  
pi(2lr) 
p (Ni lz )  
function of viable organisms reaching the planet 
the number of viable organisms reaching the planet 
the event of release from the ith source 
the probability of being released by source i 
the density of viable organisms reaching the planet given 
release from source i 
the conditional density of Ni viable organisms biasing the 
experiment, given z of them reached the planet 
= (;) P(b)Ni[ l -P(b)]"-Ni 
where P ( b )  is the probability of one viable organism's 
biasing an experiment 
Cornel1 summarized the statements drafted by the various small 
groups at the meeting and concluded that COSPAR should only assume 
responsibility for specifying P and for determining the anticipated 
number of missions launched by each member to a particular planet 
during periods of unmanned explqation. On the basis of the data 
described above, each member should also determine P ( C i ) ,  P ( 5 )  
and P(C,") for flights by means of a conservative approximation similar 
to that in equation (2). 
Just prior to the CQSPAR meeting, Horowitz et al. (1967) published 
an article in Science criticizing the 1964 CQSPAR resolution and its 
underlying assumptions as they apply to Mars. The authors stated that 
the COSPAR constraints were unnecessarily severe, not because of any 
deficiencies in the mathematical model (Sagan and Colemaa), but rather 
as a consequence of unrealistic physical and biological assumptions 
(Science, 1967, 155:lSM). 
Specifically, the belief that eolian erosion on Mars can effect the release of spores trapped 
in the interior of solids in periods of time that are short compared with the time scale of 
the unmanned space program is unsupported by either observation or theory. On the con- 
trary, the analysis suggests that rates of eolian erosion on Mars are very low. Similarly, 
present knowledge of the Martian environment opposes the view that terrestrial micro- 
organisms would readily contaminate the planet. The combination of dryness, lack of 
oxygen, and high ultraviolet flux makes the surface of Mars peculiarly unsuitable for the 
multiplication of terrestrial organisms. Recent studies give little support to the proposal 
that significant areas of geothermal activity exist on Mars. 
On the basis of this evidence, Horowitz et al. suggested a substantial 
relaxation of the COSPAR standards; they did not think that such change 
would compromise the biological state of Mars to any significant degree. 
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They emphasized the necessity of making a distinction between terres- 
trial organisms trapped in solids and those on the exposed surfaces of 
a landed spacecraft. The authors pointed out that surface sterility is an 
unconditional requirement, i.e., its rationale does not depend on the 
Martian environment. On the other hand, sterilization of the interior of 
solids, at the stringent COSPAR-recommended level, stems from the 
assumption that trapped organisms constitute a contamination hazard. 
Horowitz et al. felt this to be an unjustified position, and considered the 
need for a high degree of interior sterility doubtful. 
In a subsequent issue of Science, Bond et aL (1967) criticized a number 
of points made by Horowitz et al. They stated that the American Institute 
of Biological Sciences Spacecraft Sterilization Advisory Committee of 
NASA had considered many of the questions raised by Horowitz et al. 
during the previous year and a half and, as a result, had developed a 
dry heat sterilization cycle which met COSPAR requirements and was 
compatible with current spacecraft engineering and design. They indi- 
cated (Science, 1967, Vol. 156, p. 1436): 
Horowitz’s call to lower the standards is not based on any more specific data than was 
used for the COSPAR premise. The prime difference is that the COSPAR recommenda- 
tions have taken a quantitative form in a simple model, while Horowitz’s suppositions are 
less clearly formulated. 
Bond et al. also suggested that it is more important to achieve a better 
understanding of sterilization procedures than to relax COSPAR stand- 
ards. They advocated more precise sterilization criteria in terms of time 
and temperature in order to minimize the spacecraft’s reliability degrada- 
tion while, at the same time, meeting the sterility probability standard. 
The AIBS committee, in the authors’ opinion, had already made progress 
toward this goal. 
The authors were also critical of Horowitz because he did not specify 
a criterion to be met, nor provide a more workable probability. They 
believed that he should define such problems as the microbial parameter 
to be permitted, the cleanliness standards for his experiments, and the 
thermal tolerance of his equipment. 
Horowitz (1967) replied to these criticisms in the same issue of Science. 
He stated that the conclusions reached in his earlier article were based 
on evidence not available when the COSPAR resolution and constraints 
were adopted in 1964. He restated the questionable validity of the 
assumptions underlying sterilization policy in light of more recently 
acquired knowledge of Mars. Thus, he felt that the AIBS committee’s 
statement that his “conclusions were not based on any more specific 
data than (were) used for the COSPAR premise” was incomprehensible, 
as was their declaration that “reduction of COSPAR probability re- 
straints is of lesser importance than a better understanding of sterilizing 
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procedures” (Science, 1967, Vol. 156, p. 1436). He felt establishment of 
a sound policy to be as important as the pursuit of technology for im- 
plementing that policy. Horowitz emphasized that, contrary to the com- 
mittee’s assertion, he did not reject the probability. He accepted 
the value, but contended that it could be met without resorting to ex- 
treme sterilization procedures. 
In the same issue of Science carrying the original Horowitz et al. 
article, a comparison report by Murray et al. (1967) examined the same 
problem from a different point of view. These authors were concerned 
with the similarity between U S .  and Soviet policies and practices with 
regard to planetary contamination and the possibility that viable terres- 
trial organisms had already contaminated Venus and Mars because of 
these practices. Murray et al. indicated the wide differences between 
US. and Soviet policies toward the COSPAR constraints. Regardless 
of the resulting difficulties and cost, the U S .  adopted a policy of strict 
interpretation of the COSPAR agreement, whereas the U.S.S.R. took a 
more lenient position of partial sterilization procedures and a modest 
risk of unintentional impact on the planets by various elements of the 
spacecraft system. According to the authors (Science, 1967, Vol. 156, 
p. 1505), 
Soviet practice has already led to the transfer to Venus, and probably to Mars, of a con- 
siderable number of viable terrestrial micro-organisms. Thus, both the COSPAR recom- 
mendations and current U S .  planetary quarantine policy should be reviewed and modified 
to reflect the probability of such transfer. 
COSPAR RESOLUTION AND SUBSEQUENT CRITERIA 
The criteria adopted by COSPAR in the 1964 resolution were adequate 
during the initial phases of the planetary quarantine program, but a 
number of problems became apparent when attempts were made to use 
these constraints with later interplanetary missions (Light et al., 1967). 
The more current space efforts have become increasingly complex, 
with a comparable multiplication of contamination sources. 
Light et al. (1967) attempted to formulate a general set of standards 
for unmanned Martian missions based upon simple but conservative 
assumptions. They accepted the 1964 COSPAR resolution as a basic 
measure of commitment (Light et al., 1967, p. 13). 
The planetary quarantine policy shall require 99.9% confidence that the unmanned ex- 
ploration of Mars will not contaminate the planet with terrestrial organisms. In other 
terms, the allowable probability of contamination from the entire unmanned exploratory 
program shall be no greater than 10-3. 
With this as a basic premise, they derived constraints for each unmanned 
mission and its sources of contamination using the following definitions: 
P the probability of contamination in the total program 
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Q 
Nz 
N u  Pli 
Pui 
PI 
P u  
P u a  
P U O  
GsubseriPt 
the probability of no contamination in the total program 
the number of landers in the total program. For the pur- 
poses of this paper, a lander is defined as a vehicle de- 
signed for landing on the planetary surface or penetrating 
the planetary atmosphere and is assumed to have under- 
gone a sterilization process 
the number of unsterile spacecraft in the total program 
the probability of contamination originating from the ith 
lander 
the probability of contamination originating from the ith 
unsterile spacecraft 
the probability of contamination originating from a lander 
(assumed equal for all landers) 
the probability of contamination originating from an un- 
sterile spacecraft (assumed equal for all unsterile space- 
craft) 
the probability of contamination originating from the acci- 
dental impact of an unsterile (highly contaminated) vehicle 
or any highly contaminated part thereof 
the probability of contamination originating from all other 
sources of contamination associated with an unsterile 
vehicle (that is, other than an accidental impact) 
the probability of the release of one or more viable organisms 
on the planet by the source of contamination described by 
the subscript (“Y or “uu” or “uo” will be the subscripts) 
the conditional probability that organisms released by the 
contamination source (described by the subscript) will 
survive, grow, and spread such that the planet is biologically 
infected 
The following equation is designated as the probability of contamina- 
tion in the total program of unmanned missions: 
Inasmuch as the more recent constraints require that Pli and Pui be 
very small, the products of the two are negligible. Therefore: 
i=  1 i =  1 
Light et al. assume that all the Pli are equal, and all the Pui are equal, 
and then drop the summation sign and i subscripts, giving 
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The term in equation (3) that indicates the probability of contamination 
from unsterile spacecraft is expanded to include the distinction between 
two general classes of contamination sources: (a) those caused by 
accidental impact of a highly contaminated vehicle or any of its parts 
and (b) all other contamination sources from an unsterile vehicle. The 
authors then obtain the expression 
The contamination probability from any of the sources outlined above 
can represent the probability that one or more terrestrial micro-organisms 
will be released on the planet and the conditional probability that they 
will survive, grow, and spread, contaminating the planet. Thus, for the 
contamination source, Light et al. express 
Pj = RjGj (5) 
Substituting into equation (4), they arrive at 
Since the planetary quarantine policy requires a 99.9 percent level of 
confidence that the total unmanned Martian exploration program will 
not contaminate the planet, the primary equation on which such policy 
should be based is 
The acceptable ranges of probabilities of the release of viable micro- 
organisms on Mars are given by the evaluation of the N and G constants. 
Finally, an acceptable planetary quarantine policy will consist of the 
satisfaction of equation (7) with specific values of the R 's within these 
ranges 
In a Policy Directive dated September 6, 1967, NASA affirmed its 
Policy (NASA, 1967b, p. 1): 
The basic probability of one in a thousand (1 X 10-3) that the planets of interest will be 
contaminated shall be used as the guiding criterion during the period of biological explora- 
tion of Mars, Venus, Mercury, Jupiter, and other planets or thTir satellites that are deemed 
important for the exploration of life, life precursors, or remnants thereof. 
At approximately the same time, NASA r'evised its planetary quaran- 
tine plan for the Voyager Project. Until more detailed quarantine criteria 
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could be established for Mars, NASA outlined the contamination 
allocation (NASA, 1967, p. 5): 
(a) For each sterilized capsule, lo-*. (b) For each unsterilized spacecraft . . . 3 X 
(c) For viable organisms released on Mars, the probability of survival and growth shall be 
considered on 10-3. 

PLANETARY QU 
REQUIREME 
Wiederkehr (1967) outlined “Ap Operational Model, for Planetary 
Quarantine Requirements” for the 1965-1985 period of unmanned 
Martian exploration. During the interval, N number of launches from the 
US. and U.S.S.R. were planned, using different types of vehicles and 
thus presenting different contamination probabilities. Wiederkehr num- 
bers these launches chronologically from 1 to N, with pi representing 
the probability that Mars will be contaminated by the i th launch, and 
P, the probability that the planet will be contaminated with terrestrial 
organisms by at least one of these launches. Assumin. that the con- 
tamination events (launches) are independent, he states the following 
relationship: 
This is based on the theory that in order to not contaminate Mars, every 
individual launch must not contaminate the planet. 
The aim of the sterilization program, according to Wiederkehr, is to 
make the pi’s small enough so that P, stays under a stated small value 
such as 0.001, or that 1 - P ,  exceeds a value close to unity (0.999). He 
points out that, following equation (l), pi < P ,  and, thus, P ,  and all of 
the pi’s are small relative to unity. He then reduces equation (1) to a 
simple expression. From the logarithms of this equation, be obtains 
By using Taylor’s formula (with remainder) for log (1 - pi) expanded 
about thpgoint pi = 0, Wiederkehr arrives at 
”’6 *6\ e .  
log (l-pi)=-pi+Rli (3) 
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where 
0 < 4 J i  -= pi R l i = - T ,  4Ji2
In the same way, Taylor's formula is used for log (1 - Pc)  : 
(4) 
Wiederkehr then substitutes equations (3), (4), (5), and (6) into (2), 
to produce 
where 
He then summarizes the inequalities outlined above: 
Substituting equations (9) and (10) into (8), he obtains 
When N=20 and Pc= 10-3, then, following equation (ll), E < 
Thus, the error produced by ignoring E in equation (7) is negligible, and 
the author uses equation (12) below as an approximation of equations (7) 
and (8). 
N 
Pc= pi 
I =  1 
Wiederkehr affirms that by utilizing an average pi, one can evaluate 
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the relative error in specifying pi. The former is termed pi, and if Api is 
the error, then 
The author then states the following (Wiederkehr, 1967, p. A-3): 
. . . in the previous example, for P ,  = 10-8 and letting N = 20, there would be at most a 1% 
error in specifying pi  due to the approximation. If the number of launches were to be in- 
creased to N= 100, the error would be less than 5%, e.g., the specified pi would be 1 X 10-5 
while the “exact” value would fall between 1 X 10-5 and 1.05 X 10-3. This is clearly an 
insignificant difference in relation to the basis for choosing P ,  = 10-3. 
Thus far, Wiederkehr has treated each launch as separate from all of 
the others. However, in order to categorize them by such things as nation- 
ality and type of vehicle and then arrive at aggregate probabilities for 
each category, he divides N launches into k categories, with pij the 
probability of contaminating Mars by the ith launch of the j th  category 
and nj the number of launches in the j th category. Equation (12) is then 
rewritten as 
or 
where 
In equation (15), the average probability of each launch in category j 
contaminating Mars is pj. As an example, Wiederkehr uses the four 
categories in Table 8. 
Applying equation (14) then gives 
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Table 8 Contamination Probabilities of Launches by Category and Number (after 
Wiederkehr, 1967, p .  A-5). 
i Categories Average Probability Number of 
of Contamination Launches 
1 U.S. landers P I  121 
2 U.S. non-landers ,152 n2 
3 Russian landers P 3  n3 
4 Russian non-landers P4 n4 
In the analysis above, it was assumed that the total number of launches 
(N) and the number in each category ( n j )  were known. However, since 
they are not known and must be predicted, Wiederkehr considers them 
random variables (Wiederkehr, 1967, p. A-5). 
P ,  as given by (14) is actually a conditional probability, the condition being that the number 
of launches in the jch category is n, for j =  1, 2, . . ., k. To remove this condition, it is nec- 
essary to average over all possible values of the nj’s. 
When the Pi)s are assumed to be independent of the nj’s and approxi- 
mately constant, and when equation (14) is averaged over all of the pos- 
sible values of the n j s ,  the following equation results: 
where 
P ,  the average (expected) value of P ,  
Pi the average (expected) value of p i ,  i =  1 ,2 ,  . . ., k. 
In order to arrive at the 1966 COSPAR model from equation (17), 
Wiederkehr outlines three additional steps. First, using only two cate- 
gories, landers and nonlanders (unsterilized vehicles), he expresses 
Pc = nLpL + nupu (18) 
where 
h~ the expected number of landers 
p~ the average probability that a lander contaminates Mars 
nu the expected number of unsterilized (nonlander) vehicles 
p u  the average probability that an unsterilized vehicle contaminates 
Mars 
The second step involves a lander that contaminates Mars. This 
necessitates the following: 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
At least one yiable organism survives the sterilization treatment 
and arrives at Mars on the lander. 
The viable organisms which survive the sterilization treatment 
and arrive at k a r s  are released. 
The viable organisms which survive the sterilization treatment, 
arrive at Mars\, and are released also grow and spread. 
The probabilities of these three events are symbolized by P N ,  p ~ ,  and 
p ~ ,  SO that 
Finally, the contamination of Mars by an unsterilized vehicle requires 
that none of the possible contamination sources from such a vehicle, 
e.g., accidental impact or ejecta from altitude control, comprise the 
contaminants. Wiederkehr's logic is similar to that used for equation (12), 
so that the contamination probability for independent sources of contami- 
nation is the sum of the probabilities of contamination for each of the 
sources. He goes on to state that for a specific source to contaminate the 
planet, the following are required: 
1. The viable organisms due to source i are transferred to the surface 
of Mars. - 
2. The viable organisms transferred to Mars from source i are 
released. 
3. The viable organisms transferred to'Mars from source i and re- 
leased also grow and spread. 
The probabilities of these three events are represented by ( p k ) i ,  
f 
( P A )  i, and (P;;)  i. Then, 
Wiederkehr concludes that by substituting equations (19) and (20) 
into equation (18), the 1966 COSPAR model can be derived: 
pc = nLPNpRpG +E'(& ) ib; ) i (21) 
i 
POLICIES ON CONTAMINATION CONTROL 
At the 1968 COSPAR meeting in Tokyo, the COSPAR Executive Council 
proposed a resolution later enacted by the plenary body as Resolution 21. 
The council expressed concern with the effectiveness of the measures 
being taken to prevent space probes from contaminating Mars and the 
88 PLANETARY QUARANTINE/OBJECTIVES AND MODELS 
other planets. It was observed in the resolution that the Panel on Stand- 
ards of Space Probe Sterilization had not been active recently, and 
COSPAR requested that the Consultative Group on Potentially Harmful 
Effects of Space Experiments convene to consider this problem, as well 
as the possibility of reactivating the Panel on Standards for Space Probe 
Sterilization as the Panel on Planetary Quarantine. 
In the March 15, 1968, issue of Science which carried an article by 
Sagan et al., the authors attempted to clarify their positions on planetary 
quarantine policy and the contamination of Mars. They were particu- 
larly concerned with the articles by Horowitz et al. (1967) and Murray 
et al. (1967), published earlier in Science. These two reports concluded 
that the COSPAR constraints could be significantly relaxed from the 
1 x 10-4 probability of a single viable organism’s being aboard any space- 
craft to be landed on Mars and the 3 X 10-5 probability of accidental 
impact by an unsterilized flyby or orbiter during the period of explora- 
tion. Sagan et al. are critical of this position and, on the basis of their 
belief that there is a significant chance of contaminating Mars, recom- 
mend that spacecraft be carefully sterilized. But Horowitz et al., citing 
evidence derived from Mariner 4 and Earth-bound observations, including 
data which they believe do not support the contention that all micro- 
organisms aboard a lander will have access to the Martian surface, sug- 
gest that it would be feasible to significantly increase the allowable 
microbial load per spacecraft. After examining this same evidence, 
Sagan et al. maintain that their position advocating the careful steriliza- 
tion of Mars-bound spacecraft is justified. 
One of the important points Sagan et al. raise (which they claim Horo- 
witz et al. appear to have missed) is the difference between the conclu- 
sions drawn by COSPAR and Sagan in regard to the parameter cr: “The 
COSPAR recommendations refer to the ‘probability that a single viable 
organism be aboard any vehicle intended for planetary landing.’” 
(Sagan et al., 1968, p. 1192). Sagan et al. define cr as “the mean number of 
viable micro-organisms per capsule which are distributed outside the 
capsule, on the Martian surface” (Sagan, et al., 1968, p. 1192). They 
point out that the difference refers to the mean probability of a contained 
micro-organism’s being released and that COSPAR decisions, as well 
as their own, were influenced by their lack of knowledge of release over 
a period of decades. Horowitz et al. think that surface sterilization pro- 
cedures are sufficient, since the probability of release is very small. 
Sagan et al. conclude that the primary difference between the two posi- 
tions is that they (Sagan et al.) are reluctant to “consider a compound 
risk that may be small by conventional standards-say, 10-2-as equiv- 
alent to zero when the stakes are very high” (Sagan et al., 1968, p. 1192). 
Sagan et al. go on to discuss some of the problems associated with 
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analyzing the release mechanisms of organisms following a crash landing 
or the successful landing of an intact spacecraft. Information on phenom- 
ena such as fragmentation at various velocities is greatly needed. Horo- 
witz has stated that if fragmentation tends to take place along identifiable 
fracture planes, then stirface sterilization of these planes will be quite 
effective. However, as Sagan et al. observe, “there are almost no data 
available on fracture modes for various scenarios of mission failure” 
(Sagan et al., 1968, p. 1192). 
Horowitz et al. also maintain that eolian erosion is minimal on Mars 
for long periods (decades), estimating that the maximum wind velocity 
required for rolling and saltation is 145 to 250 kilometers per hour. Since 
calculations by Leovy (cited in Sagan et al.) put the highest velocity as 
80 to 160 kilometers per hour, Horowitz et al. conclude that these are 
probably too low to induce grain movement. Nevertheless, Sagan et al. 
consider both estimates so uncertain that they may be considered identi- 
cal. They believe that dust devils with large vortex velocities are present 
on the Martian surface and that it is unlikely that all or most are pro- 
duced by meteorite impacts. 
Sagan et al. are also critical of the acceptance by Horowitz et al. of 
eolian erosion rates (less than 1 mm. every few decades) in lucite for 
terrestrial deserts. They are particularly critical of the extrapolation 
to the erosion of exterior components of a spacecraft on the Martian 
surface. Such an assumption is thought to be uncertain to several orders 
of magnitude when the present state of our knowledge about eolian 
erosion rates on Mars is so inadequate. Sagan et al. note that many 
components of a Mars landing vehicle have crevices some millimeters 
deep, requiring sterilization down to that depth. 
The authors also classify the values of the parameters selected in 
the Sagan-Coleman model as averages representing many missions. 
Their immediate concern is with the parameters for the first landing 
missions, with the probability of an accidental crash landing not less 
than 0-1, and possibly as small as 0.5. But, they state that even this 
number presented in arguments by Horowitz et al. fails to take into 
account the large range of possibilities between complete failure due 
to crash landing and eolian erosion down to a depth of some millimeters. 
Sagan et al. illustrate this point by showing that 1 - Pt is not the proba- 
bility of a catastrophic crash landing as stated by Horowitz et al. In- 
stead, it refers to the chance that some fraction of the experiments in 
the lander will not function as planned. Pt represents the probability of 
complete engineering and scientific success. The authors caution that 
the possibility must be considered that the lander may suffer partial 
damage, allowing micro-organisms from only some parts of the space- 
craft to reach Mars. A number of other potential spacecraft fractionation 
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mechanisms are discussed. The authors feel that until more information 
is available, the possibility of contamination due to such sources requires 
sterilization of spacecraft interiors. 
Possibility of Microbial Growth on Mars Another important issue in 
this controversy centers around the fact that Sagan et al. believe that the 
geothermal activity on Mars indicates the presence of water and local 
high temperatures which would facilitate the growth of terrestrial-type 
micro-organisms. On the other hand, Horowitz et al. do not accept such 
possibilities and maintain that the planet is undifferentiated and geologi- 
cally inactive. Sagan et al. state further that Mars probably has a sub- 
surface permafrost layer, with loosely bound or adsorbed water in the 
surface material, and that the water would be released to the surface by 
geothermal activity. It is also possible that the permafrost layer is some- 
times breached by the impact of meteorites. They also cite evidence 
suggesting that Mars is probably differentiated. 
The authors assert that lifetime of liquid water on Mars is a more 
serious question and that salt deposits will lower the eutectic point-in 
many cases by several lo’s of degrees. Sagan et al. also feel that there 
may be frequent briny pools on Mars. While Horowitz et al. imply that 
all halophiles are aerobes, Sagan et al. believe that this must be an 
artifact of the experimental conditions and that not much effort has been 
put into finding anaerobic halophiles. Sagan et al. conclude that the availa- 
ble evidence strongly suggests that some terrestrial micro-organisms 
will grow in the Martian environment. This leads to the suggestion 
that the 10-2 probability that an organism deposited on the surface of 
the planet will grow and contaminate it may mean that lop2 is too low 
rather than too high. 
Sagan et al. also comment on an article by Murray et al. printed in the 
same issue of Science as the one by Horowitz et al. (discussed above). 
Murray et al. held that the sterilization standards for American vehicles 
could be lowered considerably. They gave the following reasons. The 
U.S.S.R. program is not failsafe in the same way as that of the U S . ,  
since the latter’s flybys are deflected away from the planet during mid- 
course maneuvers; Zond 11 may have impacted Mars; and Soviet vehicles 
that will impact the planet during future missions will be subjected to 
sterilization methods not evaluated in the West. Horowitz et al. and Mur- 
ray et al. argue that there is little chance of Mars’ being contaminated, 
and that Zond II probably did not contaminate the planet. But Sagan et al. 
contend that there is a significant probability of contaminating Mars 
and ask, therefore, if the points made by Murray et al. then follow (Sagan 
et al., 1968, p. 1195). 
Each contention of Murray et al. has some associated uncertainty, and it is not clear that 
any micro-organisms have landed on the Martian surface as a result of the Zond ZZ mission. 
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The new data provided by Mariner ZV enabled Hawrylewicz et al. 
(1968) to test the probability of growth of viable terrestrial micro- 
organisms in an environment that simulated the Martian atmosphere 
much more accurately than had been possible previously. They con- 
cluded that on the basis of an intensive study of S. aureus, which is 
closely associated with man and can grow under anaerobic conditions, 
if moisture is present in the Martian environment, an organism such as 
this would survive and grow when released into the Martian soil. It 
could, then, pose a serious contamination hazard for the planet. 
Hall (196813, p. 25) points out that because of “our limited knowledge 
of planetary environments, the best analysis of probability of growth 
might be based on conservative judgment values of those factors that 
can be defined”. Assuming that there are microenvironments on Mars 
in which viable terrestrial organisms (VTO’s) can grow, he designates 
1 X 10-’ as the probability that a VTO on a spacecraft will manage to 
reach such a microenvironment. A similar probability (1 x 10-l) is 
postulated for a particular species (i.e., one that will reproduce) among 
the different VTO’s on the spacecraft reaching the microenvironment. If 
the trauma of transition from terrestrial to Martian conditions reduces 
the population by 90 percent, then (Hall, 1968, p. 25) 
, . . . the probability of organism survival during transition may be set at 1 X lo-’. Also, the 
probability that the organisms will survive the radiation and other hazards encountered 
in transit from the spacecraft to the microenvironment may be estimated at 1 x 10-1. 
Hall believes that several other probabilities regarding survival and 
growth, each less than unity, can be estimated. He concludes that the 
survival and growth of VTO’s on the planet is not unity, as had been 
thought by many, but somewhere in the range between 1 x and 
1 X or less. 
NASA Policies In a statement before the Subcommittee on Space 
Science and Applications of the House of Representatives in 1968, 
John E. Naugle, Associate Administrator for the Space Science and Ap- 
plications, NASA, reviewed some general aspects of NASA policy re- 
garding planetary quarantine. He defined the basic objectives of the 
NASA Planetary Quarantine Program as 
1. In the lunar exploration program, to keep contamination of space- 
craft by live terrestrial organisms to a low level and to locate and 
identify all contamination that does reach the Moon 
In the planetary exploration program, to prevent the transfer to 
the planets of terrestrial life that would change the existing plane- 
tary biota or interfere with the search for life 
3. In programs involving missions returning to Earth from the 
Moon or planets (a) to obtain uncontaminated samples for biologi- 
cal analysis upon the Earth and (b) to protect the Earth’s biota 
2. 
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from possibly disastrous effects of returned extraterrestrial life 
forms 
Levinthal et al. (1968), in their “Relationship of Planetary Quarantine 
to Biological Search Strategy,” attribute the COSPAR constraints to 
previous quantitative studies based on two propositions (Levinthal 
et al., 1968, p. 136). 
First, that the scientific issue of detection and characterization of life was the overriding 
value to be considered, and, secondly, that as many as 60 missions might be ultimately 
needed to settle this issue. 
Data from Mariner IV and other observations have, according to the 
authors, reduced the range of uncertainty of a number of the parameters 
involved and, as a result, there has been some controversy regarding 
planetary quarantine constraints for future missions. They visualize a 
dynamic relationship between planetary strategy and quarantine stand- 
ards, with both influenced by completed explorations, future technology, 
and changes in exploration goals. 
Levinthal et al. suggest that the most important factor bearing on the 
relationship between planetary quarantine and biological search strategy, 
insofar as the decision analysis is concerned, is the total utility of Mars. 
Scientific uses constitute only one aspect of this utility, but if a high 
value is placed on the planet’s utility, then a very stringent sterilization 
policy should be adopted. As an example, they consider the possibility 
of making Mars more habitable by revising its atmosphere. This feat 
might require the contrivance of certain planet forms which might not 
survive in the presence of terrestrial contaminants (Levinthal et al., 
1968, p. 142). 
Thus spores could be a hazard by persisting on Mars until reengineering the planet is 
attempted. To evaluate this utility a complex probability analysis is needed. (They do) not 
wish to incur the great increases in cost that might be involved in protecting this potential 
value without a better estimate of the possible gains. 
Two other variables that should be considered in this relationship are 
the probability of survival of terrestrial micro-organisms on Mars and 
their propagation. This is particularly important in view of recent evi- 
dence and suggestions that quarantine standards be relaxed. In addition, 
Levinthal et al. suggest that any decisions to be made on quarantine 
procedures should be preceded by an explicit statement concerning the 
probability of life on the planet. This, in turn, involves the question of 
the resemblance between Mars and terrestrial biota, a question having 
significant implications for the problem of contamination as a source of 
confusion. 
According to the authors (Levinthal et al., 1968, p. 145): 
Mission policy should be conservative, involving only initial probabilities with narrow 
intervals. The Mariner IV mission showed that a probability limit for accidental planetary 
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probability of growth and spreading 
probability of release 
impact by an unsterilized flyby of 3 X 10-5 or less does not preclude carrying out useful 
missions. . . . Initial policy should be limited to configurations involving flybys, orbiters 
and terminally heat sterilized landers and combinations of these which meet at least as 
stringent sterilization standards as presently recommended by COSPAR. 
Reynolds developed a relatively simple and basic mathematical model 
(Hall, 1968c, pp. 4-5). 
The probability of contaminating the planet is equal to the sum of all possible contaminating 
events, i.e., each evaluated by the probability of transfer to the planet (PT), the probability 
of release from the spacecraft ( P R ) ,  and the probability of growth and spread (Pc). 
The model is described by the following equation: 
probability of transfer 
sum of each of the possible contaminating events 
where 
i distinct, independent sources of contamination 
Hall believes that by summarizing the pertinent planetary quarantine 
relationships of the Schalkowsky and Cooley model discussed at 
COSPAR, the result might be a desirable expansion. 
Model for  Need to Define Contamination Trauth recognizes the con- 
siderable degree of uncertainty inherent in any program of planetary 
exploration which, in turn (Trauth, 1968, p. 135), 
. . . leads to possible uncertainty in the time period in which planetary quarantine is de- 
sirable, to possible uncertainty in the total number of missions to be launched in the 
vicinity of any given planet, and indeed, to possible uncertainty in the meaning of the 
word “contamination.” 
In order to make “possible the derivation of mission noncontamination 
requirements without a priori knowledge of either the time period in 
which planetary quarantine is to be observed or the total number of 
missions to be used in exploring the planet being quarantined” (Trauth, 
1968, p. 135). Trauth developed a model which permits several general 
observations concerning the need for precisely defining “contamination. ” 
Trauth designates the term P N . ,  as the minimum acceptable probabil- 
ity of not contaminating a planet during a specific time period or T. 
These two parameters and the word “contamination” are regarded as 
variables for any particular planet. The program objective, then, is seen 
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as (1 - ~ N . c . ) ,  i.e., the “probability that any planet deemed important 
for the study of extraterrestrial life, or precursors or remnants thereof, 
be contaminated during the next T years shall not exceed” (Trauth, 1968, 
p. 136) this value. 
By using n as the total number of missions, and n(T) as the total 
number of missions used to explore the planet during the time period, 
Trauth is able to state a simple model in which ~ N . c .  is expressed in 
terms of n(T) and i ) , ( n ( T ) ) ,  the highest contamination probability that 
can be accepted for the planet from any of the n(T) spacecraft: 
FN.c. = { ~ - P ~ [ T z ( T ) ] ) ~ ( ~ ’  (1) 
He assumes that contamination from one mission is independent of that 
from other missions. If Pg),  which represents the contamination proba- 
bility from the i t h  mission, satisfies the inequality Pg) Pc(n(T)) for 
all i = 1,2 ,  . . ., n(T), then PN.c. (n(T)), the probability that the planet 
in question will not be contaminated by n(T)  missions during the time 
period T, is said to satisfy the program objective, that is, PN.c.(~(T))  3 
Trauth writes that the Sagan-Coleman model was the first attempt at 
using an existing uncertainty in a quarantine requirements model. How- 
ever, this model, as well as those which evolved in the next few years 
(i.e., those developed by Schalkowsky, Cornell, and the model used in 
the 1966 COSPAR discussions) “did not resolve the problem of incorpor- 
ating the many forms of uncertainty into the derivation of mission re- 
quirements” (Trauth, 1968, p. 138). The COSPAR model is basically very 
similar to equation (l), except that an upper bound for the total number 
of missions is used in place of n (T) , inferring that an upper bound for Tis 
known. This implies, as Trauth shows, a priori knowledge about the time 
period T and the total number of missions. “The difficulty one can en- 
counter in this approach is that the more uncertainty there is, the higher 
the upper bound should be; while at the same time, the higher the upper 
bound becomes, the more stringent the mission requirements become” 
(Trauth, 1968, p. 138). Trauth goes on to present a model in which mission 
requirements can be derived without making any assumption of a priori 
knowledge concerning Tor n( T) . 
In developing his multistage decision model, Trauth retains terms 
similar to kc(n(T))  in equation (l), but in a somewhat different form 
because of the uncertainty about T and n( T). With N1 as the total number 
of missions launched in the vicinity of a specific planet, and if there are 
not more than N1 missions, then 
P N . C . -  
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This equation produces a requirement on the contamination probability, 
PI, for each of the missions, N 1 ,  so that P1 
That is, if no more than N1 missions are launched, and if PI f‘~ for each mission launched, 
then the probability that the planet is not contaminated during the desired time period, 
denoted PN.C. ,  satisfies the inequality PN c. 3 ~ ‘ N . c . ,  which, in essence, represents the attain- 
ment of the program objective. 
p ,  (Trauth, 1968, p. 139). 
Assuming that after M1 of the estimated N1 missions are launched it 
is determined that N 1  is incorrect, an estimate of Nz additional missions 
will be required rather than N1 -MI missions. However, each of the N z  
missions must meet a different contamination requirement than the one 
met by the first M1 mis$ions. Trauth determines this new requirement 
from the following: 
b N . C .  = (1 -pl)’l(l-pz) N z  (3) 
Thus, a requirement assumed to be attained on the initial M1 missions 
already launched is defined by P I ,  producing Pz,  which is the con- 
tamination probability for any of the remaining N z  missions: 
A 
Trauth points out that the only unknown in equation (3)  is Pz,  if it is 
assumed that ~ N . c . ,  N 1 ,  N z ,  and MI are given. Therefore, ?‘z can be 
derived when Ml < N1.  “If, then, Pz b z  for each of the remaining N Z  
missions and P l  s ?‘I for the M1 missions already launched, one again 
has PN.c. 2 P N . ~ . ;  implying the attainment of the program objective” 
(Trauth, 1968, p- 140). 
Carrying the logic further, Trauth writes that after Mz of the estimated 
additional Nz missions have been launched (Me < Nz)  and the estimate 
Nz is thought to be incorrect, it is estimated that N3 more missions will 
be required. The estimated total number of missions would then be M I +  
Me + Nz,  with M1 + M 2  already launched, and an estimated N3 additional 
missions needed. He then derives a new requirement on the contamina- 
tion probability, P3, for any of the remaining N3 missions from 
That is P3 6 P3. Trauth states that this is possible because and P ,  
are known from the solutions to equations (2) and (3), and that equation (4) 
can always be solved if 
Trauth then defines the following terms (Trauth, 1968, pp. 140-141 ): 
Ni 
N1 and Mz < Nz. 
the first estimate of the total number of missions to 
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be launched in the vicinity of the planet in question 
the number of these N1 missions launched prior to a 
reestimation of the total number of missions required 
the second estimate of the total number of missions 
to be launched in the vicinity of the planet in 
question 
the number of these M I +  N2 missions launched 
prior to a third estimate of the number of missions 
required 
( M j )  + N k  the kth estimate of the total number of missions to be launched in the vicinity of the planet in question 
Mj + M k  the number of these missions launched prior to the ( ) (k+ 1)st estimate of the number of missions 
required 
p k  the maximum acceptable probability of contamina- 
tion from any of the last N k  missions needed to ful- 
fill the kth estimate of the total number of missions 
required 
M1 
Mi + N2 
M 1 +  M2 
j= 1 
. 
The model is sequential, so that P I  can be obtained from equation 
(2). If P I ,  P 2 ,  . . ., l i k - 1  are known, one can get p k  by solving the 
following equation: 
Trauth represents the contamination probability for the planet from the 
i th  mission with PF’. Then, if 
for 
j - 1  
M , < i < M j  
s= 1 
and 
and 
for 
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s=1 
then the probability of not contaminating the planet during the time 
period wil l  satisfy the following inequality: PN.c. 3 PN.c.. This last rela- 
tionship represents the achievement of the program objective, assuming 
that the final estimate is the kth estimate of the number of missions 
required. 
Trauth is able to include the potential dependence of ~ N . c .  upon time 
in the model by making the assumption that ~ N . c .  may be changed only 
yhen the required number of missions is reestimated. He replaces 
PN.c. in equation (5) with the kth estimate of ~ N . c . ,  shown as The 
kth mission-oriented requirement, Pk, is then obtained from 
for k > 1. P I  is obtained from equation (2) as before. Trauth asserts 
that, in this form, the existence of a nonzero solution for Pk depends 
upon the magnitude of P(&.. That is, that there is a nonzero solution 
for pk if and only if the right-hand side of equation (6) is less than 1. 
If “classes” of missions are to be distinguished, e.g., sterilized vs 
unsterilized, then Nj is treated on a sum of numbers nij, i =  1,2 ,  . . . rj, 
where the breakdown into rj numbers indicates the distinctions. In order 
to take into account the possibility that the classes will change, Trauth 
has included the dependence of the index r upon the estimated numberj. 
Equation (6) is then replaced by equation (7): 
The highest acceptable probabihy of planetary contamination from any 
mission of the ith class after the j th  estimate of the total missions in that 
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r j  
class is Pi j ,  and M j =  C mi> The number of the nu estimated missions 
launched before the (j+ 1)st estimate of the total number of missions 
needed in each of the r j +  1 classes is designated mij. Using this method, 
Trauth replaces equation (2) with 
i =  1 
The author then states the following (Trauth, 1968, p. 142): 
Finally, to obtain the general model, it is observed that the requirements, Pi), appearing in 
equation (7) may be replaced by a posteriori estimates of the actual probability of contami- 
nation from m,j missions of the i‘h class launched as a result of thejth estimate. For example, 
after launching n u l  missions, i = 1, 2, . . ., rl, in the first stage, the probability that the 
planet in question is not contaminated from vehicles of the i‘h class is not (1 - P t l ) m i l ,  but 
rather ]II [l -&)I, where PI;) is the actual probability of contamination of the planet from 
the sth mission of the ith class as judged on the basis of the knowledge available after the 
missions have been launched. 
mll  
s= 1 
Trauth shows that the &) may differ from Pi1 because the means of 
achieving the requirement Pil may, during or after the time they are used, 
result in a mission contamination probability considerably less than that 
required, although there is no change in the concept of what is needed to 
contaminate the planet. Another difference is that there may be a change 
in thinking regarding what is required to contaminate a planet as a result 
of new evidence concerning the planet. Thus, as Trauth demonstrates, 
there is a possible dependence of a posteriori contamination probabilities 
upon time. Consequently, he uses P 8 )  ( t k )  to “denote the a posteriori 
probability of contamination from the sth of m i j  missions of the ith class, 
j th  stage, as judged at the time, t k ,  of the kth estimate” (Trauth, 1968, 
p. 143). 
On this basis, Trauth‘s general model takes the form 
fi (1 - PiL)  n i l =  pel) N.C. 7 
i= 1 
and for k > 1, (9) 
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Trauth concludes that the above model seems to provide a means of 
deriving mission noncontamination requirements from the program ob- 
jective with minimal a priori knowledge of the exploration program to 
which the program objective applies. He feels that mission requirements 
may be derived by 
1. Estimating the number of missions of each class to be flown 
2. Correcting for inaccuracies in estimates before all the previously 
estimated vehicles of a given class are launched 
Finally, Trauth states (Trauth, 1968, pp. 143-144): 
At no stage, save possibly the last decision stage, need one make a correct estimate. In 
fact. no estimate need be correct if the last estimate is too large. Hence; the general goal of 
providing a means of deriving mission non-contamination requirements from the Program 
Objective using a minimal amount of a priori knowledge about the exploration program, 
seems in theory, to have been achieved. It also provides for using any such knowledge 
available, as well as any knowledge gained during the course of exploration. 

COSPAR OBJECTIVES FOR PLANETARY 
QUARANTINE 
Both the 12th Plenary Session of COSPAR and the 10th International 
Space Science Symposium were held in Prague, May 11-24, 1969. 
COSPAR reaffirmed the basic objective for the planetary quarantine of 
Mars and other planets as a probability of no more than 1 X for 
contamination during the period of biological exploration. 
The period was assumed to be 20 years, extending through De- 
cember 31, 1988, and to include approximately 100 missions. It was 
stated that no nation should use up more than 15 percent of the total 
contamination risk during the initial 5 years of exploration. This was 
based on COSPAR Resolutions 26.5 and 26.7 (19@), the 1966 and 
1967 Reports of the Consultative Group on Potentially Harmful Effects 
of Space Experiments, and the work of the Panel on Standards for 
Space Probe Sterilization (whose title changed to the Panel on Planetary 
Quarantine). 
In order to achieve this objective, COSPAR recommended in its 
Decision No. 16 that members submit specified information not more 
than 3 months after launch, describing sterilization procedures and 
computations. It was suggested that the reports include at least the 
following (COSPAR Decision 16, 1969): 
1. The mathematical model used as a basis for computing the probability of contamination. 
2. The computations used in applying the model. 3. The estimated biological burden at 
launch and at encounter. 4. The probable composition (identification) of the biological . 
burden. 5. Methods used to decontaminate and/or sterilize the space flight hardware. 
6. Intended trajectory before and after midcourse correction. 7. Type of deflection used, 
bus or capsule. 8. Intended orbit parameters. 
It was also suggested that the probability that viable organisms trans- 
ferred to the planet’s surface would grow and spread should be carefully 
and conservatively established. 
.. In compliance with COSPAR Decision 16, R. W. Porter, the NAS 
representative to COSPAR, submitted a NASA report on the proba- 
bility of the U.S. Mariner 1969 mission’s contaminating Mars. The 
mission consisted of two identical spacecraft (Mariner 6 and Mariner 3, 
and, in line with the 3 x  constraint in COSPAR Resolution 26.5, 
, 
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“a probability of contamination Pc of 6.0 X was established as the 
limit not to be exceeded by both flights or 3 X for each launch” 
(Porter, 1969, p. 1). The report outlines the mission trajectory analyses 
and controls carried out by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to keep the 
probability within this limit. 
Reynolds (1969) reviews various aspects of the NASA Planetary 
Quarantine Program. He points out that parameters other than those 
set by COSPAR (1 X 10-3) for the probability of contaminating a planet 
during the period of exploration and by the SSB (1 X 10-3) for the proba- 
bility of growth of viable terrestrial organisms on Mars and (1x10-l)  
for random landings on the surface of Venus must be established for 
1971 and 1973 Mars missions. The proposed parameters for planetary 
quarantine are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9 Proposed Parameters for Planetary Quarantine 
(after Reynolds, 1969, p .  4). 
Planet PC p :  
Mars 
Surface 1 x 10-3 i x 10-3 
Atmosphere (Not Considered To Be of Concern) 
Venus 
Surface 
Atmosphere 
Jupiter 
Surface 
Atmosphere 
1 x 10-3 1 x 10-6 
1 x 10-3 1 x 10-4 
1 x 10-3 1 
1 x 10-3 1 
*For random landing points. 
During the 20-year period established for the biological exploration of 
Mars, there will be nine Mars opportunities, and, by a conservative esti- 
mate, 30 flybylorbiters and 70 landers. Reynolds believes that on the basis 
of the planetary quarantine models that will be in use during this period, 
the following constraints are indicated: a P,=  3 x for each flyby/ 
orbiter and Pc= 1.4 x for the 1971 
flight and 3.14 X lop5 for the 1973 flight. He also states that the U.S. posi- 
tion is that COSPAR should set only the value of Pc,  and that the model 
parameters should be established by the launching nation. 
for each lander, or P c = 3  x 
NASA ORGANIC CONSTITUENTS DESIGN CRITERIA 
The Space Science Board convened an ad hoc group of scientists on March 
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26,1%9, in response to a request from Orr Reynolds, Director of NASA’s 
Bioscience Program Office. The purpose was to (Favorite, 1969, p. 1) 
. . . consider the organic constituents design criteria for NASA’s Viking Program and 
methods whereby it would be possible to determine at any point in time the principal 
organic constituents that had been delivered to a planetary body, specifically Mars. 
The group agreed that the most significant obstacles to some of the 
biological experiments would probably be retroexhaust gases (primarily 
hydrazine) and reaction water. The group was also made aware of NASA’s 
policy for Viking (Mars) in regard to the soil samples used for organic 
analysis studies, Le., that samples should contain less than one part in 
10 million of organic material released from the space vehicle. This 
design criterion was considered acceptably conservative. It was noted 
that a mathematical model developed by Exotech, Inc., showed that within 
a 10-kilometer, 1 -sigma dispersion radius, this standard could be attained 
in a cylindrical soil sample 10 centimeters deep, with a 2.5 X lo4 kilo- 
gram organic constituent burden on the space vehicle. 
The essential problem in life detection experiments on the planet would 
be the question of whether the evidence obtained resulted from contami- 
nation delivered by a space vehicle or reflected processes indigenous 
to the planet. In view of this difficulty, it would be necessary to know 
which organic constituents had been delivered, when they were deposited, 
and the exact area of space vehicle impact. Thus, the group recommended 
the following: 
1. The storage of piece-part specifications of spacecraft destined for 
planetary objectives. Computer storage is envisioned as a desirable 
method to d o w  rapid retrieval. 
The storage of a reasonably sized sample of any organic compound 
where more than 25 kilograms of that compound are used in any 
single planetary-bound mission. Sealed storage in an inert gas is 
envisioned as a desirable method to preserve the organic sample. 
3. The length of storage be designed for a range of 15 to 20 years. 
4. The appropriate measures be taken to determine from other 
launching nations their methods of organic constituents inventory 
and to make preliminary arrangements for the exchange of such 
data, should the need arise. 
2. 
U.S. POLICY 
In reviewing U.S. policy toward planetary quarantine, Steg and Cornell 
that it should be done “in terms of the work and parameter 
which instigated this policy through the COSPAR agree- 
ments” (Steg and Cornell, 1%9, p. 514). They believe that it is particu- 
larly important to reassess the value given to the parameter v by Sagan 
and Coleman. This parameter refers to the probability (10-3) that one 
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viable micro-organism is aboard a landing capsule at the time it lands 
on the Martian surface. The authors believe that, “Apparently no 
previous attempt has been made to develop a model involving v which 
also takes cognizance of the type of biological risks foreseeable and 
which formulates conceptions of these risks in relative numerical terms.” 
(Steg and Cornell, 1969, p. 514). 
. . . which includes both expected losses from failures to collect data and from contami- 
nation to analyze the quarantine problem, (and) evidence is given which suggests that the 
current quarantine requirements may be too strict if their implementation forces a pro- 
gram delay. (They feel that) U.S. policy should be reexamined, keeping more fully in mind 
both the types and the relative sizes of the losses which might be encountered. 
Mission Loss Steg and Cornell conservatively assume that any sig- 
nificant contamination resulting from one mission will spread rapidly 
enough to adversely affect the following mission. That is, they are 
concerned with an information loss f ( k )  on mission k resulting from some 
experimental failure, and a contaminating loss g ( k )  . Table 10 shows 
mission loss where the authors assume that all evidence collected from 
Mars will be biased after the planet is contaminated. 
Table 10 Mission Loss (after Steg and Cornell, 1969, p .  515). 
Unbiased Data Biased or No Data 
No significant contamination 0’ f ( k Y  
Significant contamination g(k)3  f(k) + g ( k )  
, 
They index the outcomes of the missions by the integers in the upper 
right area of the cells, and assume that there is a constant probability 
for these outcomes over missions. The probability of that respective 
outcome is written as pi, with i = 1, 2, 3, or 4, the cell index. 
The parameter (pi) values for a single mission are calculated from the 
following, where C = significant contamination; C = no significant con- 
tamination; D = unbiased data; D = biased or no data: 
p1= P ( C ,  D) = P(DIC).P(C) = P ( D )  + ( E )  = P ( D )  (1 - P ( C ) )  
when P(C) is small, 
sinceP(D) =P(DIC).P(C) + P ( D l C )  * P ( C )  --I P(DIC) whenP(C) 
is small. 
p2 = P ( C ,  D) = (1 - P ( D )  ) * P ( C )  = (1 - P ( D )  ) - (1 - P ( C )  ) 
p3 = P ( C ,  D )  = P ( D  1 C)’  * P ( C )  
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p4 = P(C,  6) = (1 - P(D IC)) * P ( C )  
where 
P ( C )  P (viable organism aboard) P (release laboard) P (C Irelease, 
aboard), P (releasel aboard) = P(soft land) P(re1ease I soft 
land, aboard) + p (crash land) * P (release I crash, aboard). 
P (Dlsoft land) - P (soft land) 
P(DIC, soft land) * P (soft land) 
P ( D )  
P(DIC) 
Wherever possible, Steg and Cornell use the Sagan-Coleman values to 
assign numerical values to these probabilities. Thus, they use the proba- 
bility of significant Martian contamination following the release of a single 
organism as P(CJrelease, aboard) = but with the assumption that 
the contamination, if present, will spread rapidly between missions. They 
also use the Sagan-Coleman release probability P (release I aboard) = 
1 and P(crash)=O.l (when P (soft land)=0.9). P(D Isoft land) is accepted 
as 0.9 to show a good chance of successfully collecting data following a 
soft landing, and P (D IC. soft land)= to indicate the probable biased 
nature of data acquired on a contaminating mission. In addition, v = P 
(viable organism aboard), so that the result is p1= 0.81 (1 -v - 10-2), 
p2=0.19(1 - v *  10-2),p3=0.009-v. 10-2,andp4=0.991 - v -  10-2. 
In selecting informational loss functions, Steg and Cornell use three 
different forms: 
f i ( k )  = a  k 
= b 
f 3 ( k ) = C l k  - 
where a, b, and c are constants selected so that Zf=,f;:(k)=100, j=1, 
2, and 3. When N = 30, then a = 0.21505376, b = 3.33333333, and c = 
25.0313696 (Steg and Cornell, 1969, p. 516). 
These f ( k )  functions represent different possible forms of sequential data loss and are 
increasing, constant, and decreasing, or alternatively, their cumulatives are respectively 
concave, linear, and convex in k. (They) stress that the numerical values assigned the 
Ak) functions are dimensionless, with the choice of Zf=  &(k) = 100 arbitrary and indicat- 
ing only its value relative to the contamination loss g(k ) .  It is solely the relative size of 
the two losses which is of importance, and without considering their comparative size 
meaningful losses could not be assigned. 
Risk Values Steg and Cornell tentatively adopt a constant g(k) function 
with a size of 100; therefore, the loss resulting from contaminating 
- 
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Mars is independent of the particular mission in which it occurred. The 
authors can then arrive at a total risk by combining each of the possible 
losses by weighting them with the probability that it is incurred and 
summing over all such losses. Table 11 shows the values for the risk, 
with v = P (viable organism aboard) ranging from 1 to low6 and for 
delays of 0, 1, 3, and 6 missions. A delay is defined as “the number of 
missions that the start of the program must be postponed to achieve 
satisfactory reliability of all spacecraft components under sterilization 
methods required to obtain probability level v” (Steg and Cornell, 1969, 
p. 516). Two of the values, v =  1 under fi and v =  10-l for a one-mission 
delay, suggest that the lander program should be unconditionally de- 
layed. That is, there is too great a chance of contaminating the planet 
with the large v probability relative to the value of the information which 
might be obtained whenfi indicates that value. 
Table 11 Values for Risk (after Steg and Cornell, 1969, p. 516). 
v fl f 2  f 3  fl f 2  f 3  
No Delay One-Mission Delay 
1 59.819 56.444 50.689 58.577 57.694 69.459 
10-1 23.585 23.199 22.560 23.583 25.723 42.658 
10-2 19.464 19.425 19.360 19.620 22.107 39.618 
10-3 19.046 19.043 19.036 19.219 21.741 39.310 
10-4 19.005 19.004 19.004 19.179 21.704 39.279 
10-5 19.000 19.000 19.000 19.175 21.700 39.276 
10-6 19.000 19.000 19.000 19.174 21.700 39.275 
1 
10-1 
10-2 
10-3 
10-4 
10-5 
10 - 6  
Three-Mission Delay Six-Mission Delay 
56.581 60.233 83.809 
24.101 30.776 59.249 
20.455 27.472 56.483 
20.086 27.137 56.203 
20.049 27.104 56.175 
20.046 27.100 56.172 
20.045 27.100 56.172 
54.827 64.138 
26.187 38.376 
23.014 35.521 
22.694 35.232 
22.661 35.203 
22.658 35.200 
22.658 35.200 
92.901 
71.344 
68.944 
68.702 
68.677 
68.675 
68.675 
As an example, Steg and Cornell compare the v = lo-’ value for no 
delay value with the ~ = 1 0 - ~  three-mission delay value. If the design 
of a spacecraft is improved so that it has a lower level of contamination 
without its reliability being affected, then the delay with its lower risk 
should be accepted. “Six ‘no-delay’ entries admit smaller ‘delay’ risks 
of the next lower order of v ,  but the ‘no-delay’ risks are smallest for v s 
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10-3 under 5, v 
Cornell, 1969, p. 517). 
Cornell, 1969, p. 517) 
under f2, and v s 10-1 under f3” (Steg and 
The authors have also determined the risks in using the (Steg and 
. . . constant loss g(k)=1000, and the variable loss, depending on the contaminating 
mission B, which varies from 200 down to 100 with increasing B, making it more costly for 
a more prolonged period of contamination prior to manned landings. In the second case the 
results were like those already cited, but in the first case the “no-delay” risks were smallest 
only for v values of around one order of magnitude smaller. However, assuming 18 total 
lander missions on the basis of an average of three missions at each opportunity between 
1973 and 1984, the risks indicated, under the three forms off and of g previously considered, 
calling for a delay if the best achievable level is v > lO-l, but none if v 6 Values 
between lom2 and lo-’ gave varying results depending on the forms of the losses assumed. 
An alternative for viewing these results is to determine what constant 
g value would lead to identical risks for not delaying at the v =  10” level 
and for delaying one mission to attain a v* = lom-’ value. In Table 12, 
the authors provide the g values for each of the three f loss functions. 
(Steg and Cornell, 1969, pp. 517-518). 
Table 12 Constant g Losses Yielding Equal Risks Where the v* Level Requires a One- 
Mission Delay (after Steg and Cornell, 1969, p .  518). 
V V* fl f 2  f 3  
1 10-1 -56.392 -32.591 65.338 
10-1 10-2 - 48.652 59.037 739.511 
10-2 10-3 9.392 955.908 7473.121 
10-3 10-4 587.914 9922.717 74808.436 
10-4 10-5 6372.942 99590.616 748161.516 
10-5 10-6 64223.320 996269.582 7481692.310 
Since rather large values of g are thought to be inconsistent with the importance of obtaining 
data on Mars before manned landings, that is with Z:=lfi(k)= 100, this table indicates less 
risk for going forward with the lander program rather than delaying it, at least for a level 
v c underf3. If a two- or more-mission delay 
were required to attain v ,  these values can be made an order of magnitude larger or more. 
under f l ,  v c 10-3 under f., and v s 
Steg and Cornell regard their results as conservative because the 
probability of the release of organisms and the resulting significant 
contamination of the planet are likely to be much less than that which 
they have assumed. Using increasing f1 function, they agree with the 
value v (1.86 x lO-3) ,  when N=30 ,  in the Sagan-Coleman model, even 
with a one-mission delay. However, when there is a greater than three- 
mission delay, an fl loss function suggests a quarantine level of v =  
(Steg and Cornell, 1969, p. 518). 
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Under a constant fi or decreasing f3 function a value of u= 10-2 should suffice, in fact 
of u= lo-' in the latter case. A decreasing loss would seem most appropriate, since this 
corresponds to assigning larger losses to the failure to gain data early in the program than 
during later missions. Such a loss would require truncation of the last, more complex 
missions due to a lack of preliminary Martian data acquisition. Under this form of loss as 
given by f3, the current international level of u= 10-3 (Horowitz et al., 1%7), as well as 
the modified Sagan-Coleman value, assigns little weight to f relative to g. It would seem 
reasonable to weight these losses more equally. United States policy should be re-examined, 
it appears, with interest focused on the forms and relative sizes of data collection failure 
and contamination losses. 
COSPAR PLANETARY CONTAMINATION PROBABILITY 
In preparation for the 1970 COSPAR meeting in Leningrad, Exotech, 
Inc., provided some supporting material for NASA regarding the Re- 
evaluation of Planetary Quarantine Constraints. Material from the 
December 11, 1969, discussions of the SSB at Stanford University was 
also included. In regard to Mars missions, it was noted that there has 
been increasing interest in the desirability of computing a cumulative 
probability for planetary contamination and in the maintenance of a 
contamination log. It was recommended that a clear distinction be made 
between the evaluation of data from past missions and the establish- 
ment of requirements for future missions in terms of two parameters 
generally set by COSPAR: (1) the probability that Mars will be con- 
taminated during the quarantine period (Pc)  and (2) the estimated 
number of missions during that period. 
One issue raised in this report is (Exotech, Inc., Re-evaluation of 
PZanetary Quarantine Constraints, 1970, pp. 1-2) 
. . . whether the risk of planetary contamination inherent in past flight, as estimated by the 
cumulative value of PC in the contamination log, should not also influence the value of PC 
used to set requirements for future flights. The difficulty of such an approach derives from 
the considerable discrepancy between the precautions taken (and reported) by the U.S. 
and U.S.S.R. in implementing past flights. The untenable conclusion which might result 
is that precautionary measures by the US. would have to be increased because the U.S.S.R. 
has not in the past taken these constraints very seriously. I t  is therefore rather pointless to 
subtract from Pc= 10-3 the cumulative value of planetary contamination to date in order 
to arrive at a value of Pc for the future. 
An analysis of the data contained in the contamination log reveals that 
postflight contamination estimates are consistent with a risk level con- 
sidered acceptable when the quarantine standard is taken seriously. 
However, it is felt that when the constraint is not viewed seriously, there 
is no way of evaluating the probability that the flight contaminated the 
planet. On this basis, the report suggests that the value of PC equal to 
The application of the planetary contamination probability to the 
estimated number of missions is also reevaluated. In order to keep past 
be retained and used only for future missions. 
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and future flights separate, the reassessment of the number of missions 
for the quarantine period (1970-1988) is recommended. A total of 90 
missions by all nations is considered a conservative value for this 
period, but is an appropriate number for the contamination 
probability. 
In terms of the outer planet missions being planned by NASA, it is 
thought that quarantine standards should be established in a different 
manner than were those for the Mars missions. This position is based on 
the following considerations: 
1. It would be very difficult to obtain any kind of meaningful estimate 
of the number of such missions that might take place in the future, 
or of the period of biological exploration to be used in such an 
estimate. 
There is no knowledge at the moment that can provide a basis for 
estimating the probability of microbial growth on the outer planets. 
The report purposes that the constraints for missions to the outer 
planets be based on past experience with flyby missions to other planets, 
by formulating the standard in terms of the probability that one or more 
viable terrestrial organisms will be deposited on the planet as a result of 
the flight. One or more is defined as the risk level considered acceptable 
for the mission, without having to estimate the total number of missions 
to the planet, the acceptable probability of contamination over the entire 
program of such flights, or the probability of microbial growth on the 
outer planets. Two categories of precautions are considered: the ac- 
cidental impact of the entire spacecraft or a large part of it and ejecta 
sources. The constraint is stated in the form of a probability of microbial 
arrival on the outer planet, and a value on the order of 10-3 or is 
considered likely, although further analysis would be needed before 
arriving at a final standard. 
The 13th Plenary Meeting of COSPAR and the 11th International 
Space Science Symposium met in Leningrad May 20-29, 1970. The 
report of the Panel on Planetary Quarantine expressed concern over 
the U.S.S.R.’s failure to submit contamination reports on their probes in 
compliance with COSPAR Resolution 26.5 and other recommendations. 
It was felt that the absence of such information, particularly concerning 
future missions, jeopardized the efforts of the panel. 
The panel also suggested that research be initiated on possible aerosol 
propagation of organisms in simulated Venus environments and on the 
growth of organisms in clouds and on other planets, in terms of such 
questions as the possibility of floating populations (on Venus and Jupiter). 
Some of the problems of possible contamination of solar system objects 
other than Mars and Venus (e.g., Jupiter and its satellites) were also 
considered. 
2. 
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The panel recommended that, for the present, the same quarantine 
constraints used for Mars be applied to the Jovian planets, but that 
the multiplication of micro-organisms in simulated Jovian atmospheres 
continue to be studied. The panel considered the importance of extra- 
terrestrial bodies subjected to quarantine requirements in the fol- 
lowing order: Mars, Venus, and Jupiter first, then Saturn, Uranus, 
Neptune, the Galilean satellites of Jupiter, Titan, Triton, and the comets. 
The COSPAR planetary contamination model was also the subject 
of come criticism by the panel, in that the model did not assign errors 
of estimation to the terms of the equation. However, because it is a use- 
ful approximation, the model has provided the quarantine problem with 
a sound quantitative basis (Hedhn, 1970, p. 66). 
By establishing an arbitrary value representing the overall probability of contaminating a 
particular planet and equating this to a simple function which takes into account the 
various sources of contamination, it has become feasible to quantify and to reduce the 
principal contamination hazards on a systems basis. It is not trivial, however, to examine 
the consequences of using a model devoid of error terms and to protest the continued 
dependence on an equation which is mathematically incomplete. 
To improve the model, the panel prepared a working paper showing 
how the current equation might be misleading and proposing the inclusion 
of error terms to bring it up to date. 
The “Memorandum on Estimating Probability Parameters” (Hedhn, 
1970, p. 71) notes that an overall standard represents a number of 
individual properties that are estimates and, therefore, subject to error. 
In the past, this has not been sufficiently taken into account. Until now, 
the most adverse probability has been used for individual terms, and, 
thus, the overall probabilities have erred on the conservative side. The 
uncertainties of these individual parameters should be considered to 
produce more realistic overall probabilities. The basic assumption used 
in this analysis is that the uncertainties of estimates are Gaussian normal 
on a logarithmic scale. 
Probability Parameters Consider the following parameters with 
mnemonic subscripts,P(fi) probability of impact of a flyby i ,  ni a small 
number of viable organisms released at impact, and P ( g )  the probability 
of a micro-organism’s being able to grow. The probability of a planet’s 
being contaminated, P ( C i ) ,  is simplified as P(Ci)  = P ( f ; )  X ni X P ( g ) :  
Parameter Value Logarithm 
The estimates of these parameters are 
P ( f 9  0.001 - 3  
ni 10.0 1 
P (g) 0.01 -2 
~ 
This gives a P(Ci)  of 0.000, 1; log P(Ci)  = - 4. 
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The term ni is assumed to be small enough relative to P(fl) and P(g) 
to prevent nominal probabilities over 1.0 from appearing, 
Estimates of the uncertainties of the parameters take the form of 
standard deviations, sf, S n ,  sg, and sc on a logarithmic scale, but shown 
as positive numbers. Because flight paths can be accurately calculated, 
the uncertainty in P f i )  is generally small. If sf is taken to be 0.05, it is 
approximately equivalent to an estimate of Pcf:) as 0.001+0.00,11. 
With additional data, the estimate of ni may be fairly precise (half a log 
unit), so that sn=0.5. 
Since the estimate of P(g)  depends on a consensus regarding the 
chance of growth in an unknown habitat by any one of many species, 
it does not provide a clear-cut answer. If P(g) is estimated to be 0.01, 
it still contains a great deal of uncertainty because of the differences 
in opinion concerning the planetary conditions, organisms, and other 
factors. If this was meant to be an upper limit, then a more likely value 
of P(g) might be only 0.001, but it would not be considered as high as 
0.1 or as low as 0.000,Ol (Space Science Board, 1970, p. 72). 
- 
If the term “unlikely” means that we are prepared to say that we may be wrong in only a 
few percent of cases, we could relate this to the normal distribution. Thus, 2.3% of errors 
on the two extremes corresponds to two standard deviations. We might therefore amend 
P ( g )  to have an expected (Mean) value of 0.001, with 2 S.D. upper and lower limits of 0.1 
and O.OO0,l (Le. two powers of ten each way) giving so equal to 1 power of 10, = 1.0. 
If the parameters are amended, then the following results would be 
obtained in logarithms: 
Parameter Expected S 2s 
P ( X )  - 3  0.05 0.10 
n: 1 0.5 1 .o 
p (€9 - 3  1 .o 2.0 
By approaching parameters in this way, attention is drawn to the most 
uncertain ones and how to estimate them. Provided the standard 
deviations are independent, the overall uncertainty of combined probabil- 
ities can be shown by adding the variances. Thus, “log P(Ci) has an 
expected (mean) value of -5.0, while sc is obtained as the square root 
of sf” +s,“, which here comes to root 1(1.2525)= 1.192” (Sneath, 1970, p. 73). 
Two S.D. limits on log P(Ci) are (-5+2.384) and (-5-2.384). 
This provides upper, expected, and lower limits as shown. 
Limit logP(Ci) P(Ci) 
Upper 2 S.D. I -2.616 0.0024 
Expected - 5.0 0.000 ,o 1 
Lower 2 S.D. -7.384 0.000,000 ,041 
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Comparing this with the Pc estimated value (0.0001) above, it can be 
seen that by taking into consideration the uncertainties of the param- 
eters, the value could be as high as 0.0024 at the two S.D. confidence 
level, despite the fact that P ( g )  was assumed to be higher (0.01). 
It should be pointed out, however, that this example is not applicable 
to parameters with a probability close to 1 or to those that produce 
nominal probabilities close to or higher than 1, as with great numbers 
of viable organisms. 
Release of Viable Organisms The SSB submitted a report to COSPAR 
at the 1970 meeting concerning various aspects of the U.S. space science 
program. In regard to sterilization and quarantine, it was observed that 
the probability of growth (P,)  of viable terrestrial organisms (VTO’s) 
on Mars was studied further within the context of the data obtained from 
Mariner 6 and Mariner 7. The SSB concluded that there is no justifica- 
tion for changing Pg from the value of 1 X The problem of the release 
of viable organisms from the interior of a solid was also analyzed in terms 
of evidence supplied by The Boeing Corporation. Boeing had fired plastic 
pellets impregnated with viable spores at varying speeds against sterile 
targets and found that survival of the organisms varied inversely with the 
velocity of impact. They believe that the overall release probability 
( P r )  of VTO’s from a spacecraft’s interior cannot be set at less than 
1 X 10-3, and that encapsulated organisms must be killed prior to launch 
in order to reduce the Pr value. 
An ad hoc Review Group on the Review of Sterilization Parameter 
Probability of Growth (PC) met at Woods Hole, Massachusetts, July 
16-17, 1970, to review and discuss the parameter Pg and its role in the 
sterilization allocation model. Certain points or guidelines were de- 
veloped as a basis for reevaluating the parameter for the probability of 
growth (Porter, 1970, p. 1). 
The probability estimate of P, begins with the assumption that at least one viable terrestrial 
organism has been released to the planetary surface by any means; e.g., as a result of a 
crash landing or through eolian erosion. In accordance with the above definition, the 
parameter for probability of release has not been directly considered in this evaluation nor 
is it implicitly contained in the estimate of P,. 
Any attempt to quantitatively estimate the absolute value of the growth 
(contamination) probability was regarded as unrealistic. It was thought 
that the reevaluation of P ,  should be centered on the uncertainties in the 
estimates of each subparameter contributing to P g  which, together, 
could lead to the proliferation of infected microenvironments. On the 
basis of these points, the group adopted this procedure for the reevalua- 
tion of P,. 
1. Establish the minimum conditions that are necessary to define a 
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microenvironment (ME) which would support growth of the most 
hardy terrestrial organisms (HTO’s). 
2. Estimate the probability ( P m )  that such ME’S exist on the 
surface of Mars. 
3. Estimate the probability ( P h t o )  that an HTO capable of growing 
in the defined ME exists among the organisms present in and on 
spacecraft. 
Estimate the probability (Pt )  that such an HTO will be transported 
upon release to a ME and survive the trip. 
4. 
Many factors considered in previous P ,  estimates are implicitly contained 
within these parameters. 
Conditions for a ME minimally suitable for growth of an HTO were 
agreed upon, and the group outlined a two-phase effort in estimating 
the probabilities P,,, P h t o ,  and Pt : (1) estimate the probability num- 
bers on the basis of a 50-50 chance of their likelihood (even betting 
odds) and (2) reconsider the probability estimates on the basis of a 0.999 
confidence factor upper limit estimate; i.e., one-thousand-to-one betting 
odds that the probability, if it could be determined, would not be greater 
than the value given. The numbers listed below (Table 13) are averages of 
estimates given by individual members of the review group. 
Table 13 Estimates for  Growth of an HTO (after Porter, 1970). 
Even-Odds 0.999 Confidence Factor- 
Estimate Upper Limit Estimate 
1 x 10-2 
3 x 10-4 
1 x 10-3 
1 
1 x 10-2 
1 x 10-2 
There is a significant increase in the probability of growth with the 
requirements for a high level of confidence in each of the estimates. This 
result appears to be a function of the lack of evidence concerning con- 
ditions on the Martian surface and, therefore, the review group recom- 
mended that until more information about Mars is obtained, NASA 
should use the value of P, = 1 X for its spacecraft sterilization 
allocation model. It was also pointed out that this is a conservative 
value, and excess safety margins in canying out the quarantine require- 
ments should be avoided. 
New Contamination Allocations It was suggested at the 1970 COSPAR 
meeting that an estimate of 50 missions is more reasonable for flights to 
Mars through 1988 than the 100 unmanned flights previously considered. 
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In conjunction with the procedure to recover unused parts of the contami- 
nation allocations of completed flights, these factors affect the contamina- 
tion probability of individual missions. Consequently, in a report to 
NASA, Exotech, Inc., proposed new contamination allocations for 
future Mars flights within the context of these developments. The con- 
clusions of the report are summarized in Table 14. 
Table 14 New Contamination Alloca5ons for Fuzure Mars Flights (after Exotech, Inc., 
TRSR 70-42,1970, p .  8 ) .  
Previous New 
Requirement: Probability that mission will con- 
taminate Mars for 
a. Orbiter or flyby (e.g., 1971) 7.1 x 10-5 
b. Orbiter/lander mission (e.g., 1975) 3.14X 10-5 7.2 x 10-5 
3 x 10-5 
1 x 10-6 c. Direct lander mission - 
Basis- COSPAR Recommendations 
a. Probability that Mars will be contaminated 
b. Estimated number of missions during un- 100 50 
10-3 10-8 with credit 
before 1989 for past missions 
manned exploration 
The new values required estimates based on the probability of contam- 
ination by past flights, as well as the number and type of future flights. 
The report estimated that there would be 18 U.S. Mars missions between 
1970 and 1988, making a total of 22 since 1964. For the 22 missions, a 
value of 4.4 x was derived from a uniform allocation of the total 
probability of planetary contamination (1  X 10-3). A total allocation of 
about 4.4 X lo-*  was obtained for the 18 future missions by subtracting 
2x10-7 (the allocation already used) from the U.S. allocation of 
This value was then suballocated to individual missions through the 
4.4 x 10-4. 
use of the following formula: 
P,= NP(N) +N'P(N') 
where 
P, 
N 
P ( N )  
N' 
P (N') 
the total probability of contamination 
the number of lander vehicles 
the probability of contamination by each lander vehicle 
the number of nonlander vehicles 
the probability of contamination by each nonlander vehicle 
Equation (1) was then applied to future U.S. Mars flights by estimating 
values for N and N' based on the assumptions that there will be two or 
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more orbiter missions and four more orbiterpander missions and that the 
12 remaining missions will be direct landers. Thus, there would be 16 
lander vehicles ( N )  and six orbiting vehicles (N’) .  Equation (1) would 
then become 4.4 X lo+= 16 P ( N )  +6  P(N’ ) .  Considering the range of 
values of P ( N )  and P ( N ’ )  that satisfy the equation, a point allotting about 
97 percent of the total U.S. unused contamination allocation to the six 
orbiters and the remainder to the landers was selected as a feasible 
choice. This, in turn, produced allocations of contamination probabilities 
for future orbiters and landers as follows: orbiter mission== 7.1 x 
and lander missions= 1 X 10-6. The sum of these values would be allo- 
cated to a combined orbiter/lander mission. 
Nonlander Contamination Probabilities A report, Estimation of 
Planetary Contamination Probabilities by Non-Landing Vehicles, was 
prepared by Exotech, Inc., in 1970. The intent was to clarify the pro- 
cedures used to estimate the probabilities of potential sources of 
planetary contamination from nonlanding vehicles and to identify their 
analytical basis. 
P ( N ’ )  is designated as the overall constraint for the probability that a 
nonlander (flyby or orbiter) will accidentally contaminate a planet. Since 
it is far less than unity and since one source of contamination (Pi )  is 
assumed to independently result in planetary contamination, 
i 
P ( N ’ )  = Pi 
The probability Pi is conditional on the probability of source arrival, 
P ( A ) ,  i.e., the contamination source must reach the planet: 
On the assumption that the source does arrive, P ( C  / A )  is the probability 
that it will contaminate the planet. P ( A )  and P ( C  [ A )  differ in that the 
former refers to the contamination source as a whole, while the latter 
deals with contamination in regard to the organisms carried by the 
source. 
In order to establish an appropriate relationship for P ( C  I A) ,  the report 
defines the following terms: 
the number of viable micro-organisms contained in the source 
fore considering any events which will produce or deter 
the probability that any one of the n micro-organisms in the 
source will contaminate the planet 
n 
P ( n )  
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The contamination process is assumed to follow a binomial distribution 
Contamination by one organism in the source is independent of 
the other organisms in the source. 
n represents the number of repeated “trials” to contaminate the 
planet. 
P ( n )  represents the probability of contamination in any one 
“trial.” 
which, according to the report, implies the following: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
These, in turn, lead to 
P(C1A) = 1 - [l --P(n)]n (3) 
On the basis of equation (2), the following relationship is given: 
P i=P(A) ( l -  [l-P(n)]n) (4) 
The series expansion of equation (3) is examined, as well as the 
pertinent approximations, to facilitate estimation. Since [P(n)] 2 4 1, 
the following expansion can be used: 
n(n- l ) (n -2 )  [ ~ ( 4 1 3 -  . . . 
3! CP(n),I + 
n(n-1) 
2! P ( C ( A )  = n * P ( n )  - 
(5) 
When the population of organisms is assumed to be very large and 
P ( n )  4 1, a useful approximation can be obtained. If 
and since n % 1, with reference to the series expansion of equation (S), 
then n - 1 2  n; n-2 2 n; n-3 j= n, etc. 
For condition n - P ( n )  2 1  in equation (6),  
P ( C  [ A )  2 1 - 1/2! + 1/3! + 1/4! + . . . or P ( C [ A )  5 0.63. 
Therefore, 
1 > P(CIA) 3 0.63 (7) 
The P ( C ( A )  range does not differ greatly from unity and can be 
assumed to be great enough to make P(C I A )  -’I 1. Thus, the Pi estimate 
reduces to 
P i = P ( A ) ,  for n - P ( n )  31 (8 )  
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When condition (6) cannot be assumed, then, generally, n > 10, and 
the series expansion of (5) becomes 
But since the case is for n * P ( n )  4 1, which makes all of the terms in 
equation (9) successively smaller, then P ( C I A )  = n * P ( n )  and 
P i = P  ( A )  * n P (n),for n * P (n) 4 1 (10) 
P (A) and P (n) represent the probabilities of subevents which must 
take place in order for P (A) and P (n) to occur. The result is 
P1 (A) and P k  (n) are the individual subevents. 
The number of micro-organisms within the source is designated as n. 
Since not all of the organisms that are potentially in the source will 
contribute to it, 
where 
n ( o )  the potential source population 
P n ~  the probability that any one organism of the potential popula- 
tion will be transferred into the source 
The mean source population is thus defined by n. 
equations: 
The report summarizes these relationships in the following two 
(1) If n * P ( n ) a l  
P i = P ( A )  
The contamination sources are then classified as a large microbial 
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source (or large impactable source), PL, whose estimation refers to 
the evaluation of accidental impact of the source on the planet. This 
is further divided into (1) small microbial sources (PJ,  where the orga- 
nisms are embedded in the source material, and (2) free sources (PF), i.e., 
individual free organisms. 
The relationships used for the three categories are: 
Large microbial sources: 
Small microbial sources: 
Free microbial sources: 
The symbols for the subevents are designated by the following questions: 
Is source created? 
Does source impact planet? 
Does it survive source creation (ejection) process? 
Does it survive transport to planet? 
Does it survive entry through planet’s atmosphere? 
Is it released onto planet’s surface? 
Does it grow, spread, and lead to microbial proliferation 
on the planet? 
What is potential population? 
Will any one of potential population become a member 
of the source? 
The report concludes with a suggested sequence to be followed for 
estimating the probability of planetary contamination by nonlanders, 
where a particular source has an allocation of Pi: 
1. Estimate the probability of arrival P(A). If it is equal to or less than 
the allocation Pi, then no further work is needed, since the load 
can be assumed to be very large and the condition n * P ( n )  > 1 will 
be met. This also implies that knowledge of the load will not be 
necessary. 
If P ( A )  < P i ,  a basis exists for estimating the desired values of 
P ( n )  so as not to impose rigorous limits on the allowable n ( o ) .  
2. 
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3. Based on estimated values of P ( A )  and P ( n ) ,  the degree of 
bioassay and/or decontamination can be established to meet the 
allocation Pi for the specific source. Alternately, changes in 
mission design can be considered, e.g., trajectory biasing, so as 
to reduce P ( A )  and thereby obviate the need for bioassay and/or 
decontamination. 

SAFETY MARGINS 
Implementation of the upper bound constraint on the probability of 
planetary contamination involves an analysis of individual contamination 
sources and an estimation of individual parameters such as the mean 
number of organisms associated with a contamination source or the 
probability that they will be released onto the surface of the planet. How 
conservatively these parameters are estimated will affect the stringency 
of precautionary measures to be applied, e.g., the length of heat steri- 
lization cycles. Conversely, the safety margin or confidence level in the 
attainment of the upper bound probability that the source will con- 
taminate the planet is also determined by this process. Schalkowsky 
and Jacoby (1973, p. 14) reported the following: 
The 1970 COSPAR meeting focused on these safety margins in the implementation of 
Planetary Quarantine requirements. At this meeting, it was noted that the various param- 
eters used to determine the probability of contamination are random variables which 
must be estimated. As any estimation procedure has its associated errors, attention was 
focused on the effect of these errors on the implementation process. 
Schalkowsky and Jacoby describe a number of alternatives to the 
implementation of the COSPAR recommendations, with particular 
emphasis on their utility in attaining the desired minimization of exces- 
sive safety margins and on their effect on implementation procedures. 
They point out that any attempt to include the effect of uncertainties in 
the process by which parameters are estimated invariably leads to the 
problem of what confidence limits are to be used with the applied 
constraints. Constraints on individual sources of contamination are 
derived through a process of administrative suballocations from the 
overall constraint (P ,  c 10-3) that a planet will be contaminated during 
the period of biological exploration. Thus, the confidence value as- 
sociated with the constraint on the individual source of contamination 
would be related to the overall constraint. Within this context, it would 
appear that the desire of the COSPAR Panel on Planetary Quarantine 
to “defend the assumption that the overall chance of planetary con- 
tamination is in fact the value assigned’’ would make it necessary to 
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designate a confidence value, as well as the upper bound constraint. 
Schalkowsky and Jacoby do not consider this a practical undertaking 
in terms of either the credibility of the resultant constraints or their 
implementation. 
The selection of P, s 10-3 as an overall constraint is necessarily 
(Schalkowsky and Jacoby, 1973, p. 21) 
. . . quite arbitrary, and any value for P ,  less than unity would achieve the basic objective 
of leading to a systematic evaluation of all potential sources of planetary contamination. 
To superimpose on this arbitrary upper bound constraint another arbitrary confidence 
constraint would certainly not make the combined constraints any more credible. For, 
if the objective was to change the desired risk level, this could simply be done by modifying 
the value of Pc itself. 
The authors believe that the only justification for considering such 
an additional confidence constraint would be based on an effort to 
facilitate the implementation process. However, this is regarded as an 
unlikely possibility. 
The difficulty in estimating individual parameters is illustrated by 
the interpretation of the COSPAR probability constraint to represent 
an expected value that would require all parameters to be estimated at 
their mean (or median) values. Although this would be acceptable in 
an analytic sense, it would not be acceptable from a practical viewpoint. 
For example, when (Schalkowsky and Jacoby, 1973, p. 21) 
. . . experts are asked to make a subjective estimate of a single probability value, the 
uncertainties invariably lead them to conservative estimates. The best that can be accom- 
plished under these circumstances is to seek a range of estimates, bounded by conserva- 
tive and median values . . . . 
One of the most significant aspects of the estimation process is the 
relative uncertainty in the different parameters as shown by the spread 
between the median and upper bound values. This is particularly evident 
in the uncertainty in estimating the probability of microbial growth and 
proliferation on the planet, P G  , which significantly exceeds the uncer- 
tainty in all other parameters. Such considerations have led R. W. Porter 
to deveIop a method for increasing the degree of control to account for 
the uncertainties in estimation. His analysis requires the selection of a 
confidence constraint on the allocation and some estimate of the range 
of uncertainties in all the parameters in order to permit the computation 
of the differential degree of control, AC, to be attributed to the 
uncertainties. 
The relationships described above are formalized in the following 
equation: 
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where KA is the quantile of the normal distribution corresponding to 
the desired confidence C A ;  e.g., for ~ ~ ~ 0 . 9 9 ,  KA=2.33. Thus, the 
incremental control would be based on the degree of uncertainty in all 
the parameters as represented by their variances (af) and by the 
desired confidence in the attainment of the allocation ( K A ) .  However, 
a quantitative evaluation is not possible without some further knowledge 
of the variances (af) and associated standard derivations (ai). Since 
the greatest uncertainties are associated with the parameter Pc, probably 
equaling or exceeding the uncertainties in all other parameters of a 
particular contamination source, it is assumed that 
and 
then, 
or 
Equation (4) is, for all practical purposes, the basis of the approach 
taken by the SSB at Woods Hole in recommending the use of the con- 
servative (0.999 confidence) value of Pc, which would automatically 
achieve the desired increment in control. However, as Schalkowsky and 
Jacoby indicate, the difficulty with this approach is the associated sug- 
gestion that this conservatism not be duplicated in the estimation of the 
other parameters. 
These considerations have led to the formulation of confidence limits 
on individual parameters (K i )  which are related to the desired confidence 
in the allocation KA. Schalkowsky and Jacoby use the assumptions of 
equations (2) and (3) in equation (5): 
They are thus able to obtain a relationship between the confidence 
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constraint in the estimates of individual parameters and the desired 
confidence in meeting the allocation constraint, as a function of the 
uncertainty level in the process of estimating parameters. Then, 
Using equation (6) as a basis, they are able to show the relationship 
between the confidence limits C A  and ci. 
Confidence Limit on 
Allocation - C A  
Corresponding Confidence Limit 
on Individual Parameters - Ci 
0.999 0.95 
0.99 0.88 
0.95 0.80 
0.90 0.74 
0.84 0.70 
Schalkowsky and Jacoby suggest that “planetary quarantine analysis 
continue to be based on the upper bound constraints currently in use, 
as derived from the basic COSPAR recommendation that P ,  
and that “the addition of confidence limits at this level would not be 
useful and should therefore be avoided” (Schalkowsky and Jacoby, 
1973, p. 23). In addition, they believe that “safety margins should be 
treated at the level of individual parameter estimation, i.e., in arriving 
at values for the biological populations, attenuating events, conditional 
events and applied controls” (p. 23). They also distinguished between 
the estimation of the range of a parameter and the selection of a value 
within this range. The former is regarded as a technically based judgment 
which should be formalized in terms of the median (0.5 confidence) and 
conservative (0.99 confidence) values. But “the selection of a value 
within the above range is not a purely quantitative procedure. It can be 
guided by the use of a 0.85 confidence value, utilizing the relationships 
of the log-normal distribution” (p. 23). However, in addition to the quanti- 
tative aspects, this choice must reflect all other considerations affecting 
the conservatism of the estimation process. 
In a recent article in Science and Public Affairs, Horowitz (1971) 
restates his skepticism concerning planetary quarantine constraints for 
Mars and the sterilization requirement that there be at most one surviving 
micro-organism per 1,000 spacecraft. He points out the excessive cost of 
such a program and its effect on the reliability of the spacecraft. Horowitz 
claims that the assumption that Mars is a suitable habitat for the growth 
of terrestrial micro-organisms was defensible in 19M when the quarantine 
policy was adopted, but he states (Horowitz, 1971, p. 15): 
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I t  is now abundantly clear that terrestrial life could not grow in the Martian environment. 
In the view of many . . . the quarantine requirements are now obsolete and should be 
drastically revised, if not abandoned altogether. Despite the radical revisions that have 
been made in recent years in our knowledge of Mars, the spacecraft sterilization require- 
ments are virtually the same today as they were in 1964. They have become a seemingly 
permanent monument to a Mars that never existed. 
COSPAR convened its 14th Annual Plenary and 12th International 
Space Science Symposium in Seattle, Washington, from June 18 to 
July 2, 1971. The Panel on Planetary Quarantine held an open meeting 
on quarantine and sterilization issues for the first time. Carl Sagan 
emphasized the importance of knowing the biological burden of, and the 
quarantine procedures for [Soviet] Mars 2 and 3 ,  and the Panel urged 
the U.S.S.R. to provide data on these probes within the agreed time 
period after launch. Lawrence Hall presented the following information 
on Mariner 9: the prelaunch PC allocation was 7.1 X permissible 
bioburden at launch was 1.0 X lo5, measured bioburden was 3.1 X lo4, 
and, thus, the postlaunch estimate of PC was 3.4 X 
Horowitz and Cameron (1972) presented a paper at the Seattle meeting 
describing the microbial populations and soil conditions in the ice-free 
valleys of South Victoria Land, Antarctica. These regions are the 
coldest and driest deserts on Earth and are in some ways similar to the 
Martian environment. The authors suggest that the valleys are essen- 
tially abiotic areas in which the small microbial populations are main- 
tained by the fallout of cells blown from other locales. They believe that 
the implication is clear that there is only a negligible possibility that 
terrestrial micro-organisms can grow in the far more hostile environ- 
ment of Mars. 
Hoffman et al. (1972) describe the analysis approach and planetary 
quarantine model used in the Mariner Mars 1971 program, in which 
three major sources of possible contamination were identified: acciden- 
tal impact of the spacecraft, loose particles, and the gases used for 
altitude control and pressurization. They conclude that (Hoffman et al., 
1972, p. 21) 
Mission strategy, including aiming point biasing and orbit periapsis altitude selection, 
was developed to satisfy the probability allocations for accidental spacecraft impact. To 
ensure that permissible microbial burden levels would not be exceeded, extensive cleaning 
and facility personnel control programs were implemented. The analysis and microbio- 
logical assay results indicate that the planetary quarantine constraints for the orbiter 
mission [were] satisfied. 

PRESENT POLICIES FOR 
PLANETARY MISSIONS 
NASA policy regarding planetary quarantine was reviewed during 1971, 
and new guidelines and revisions were considered. The recommended 
changes in policy bear upon Mars, Venus, Mercury, and the outer planets, 
subject to the response of the SSB. 
The current probability of growth of terrestrial organisms for Mars 
proposed by the SSB is PG=3 X with 50 percent confidence and 
Pc=IO-~  with 99 percent confidence. The board advised NASA to 
adopt the conservative value ( P ~ = 1 0 - ~ ) ,  but since the standard has 
a large safety mar&, it was suggested that it not be duplicated in the 
parameters. Since NASA prefers to use a uniform approach to the control 
of safety margins, at least for operational purposes, it will use the 
moderate value for Pc. The new values reduce the required length 
of the heating cycle by one-half and alleviate concern for buried and 
mated surface contaminants. 
for its surface and 
for its atmosphere. However, the suggested view probabilities are 
P,=O (surface) and Pc= (atmosphere). A 1970 report by the SSB 
had recommended lower Pc values for Venus. 
In view of the certainty that a 700 K temperature is present over the 
entire surface of the planet, there is no chance of growth by terrestrial 
organisms, and only a slight possibility that they could grow on airborne 
particles near cloud tops. Thus, there was substantial reason to change 
the values and relay the constraints. Sterilization procedures will be 
unnecessary, and only the clean assembly methods required for quality 
control and decontamination before launch will be required. 
for the Moon and Mercury 
in their report to NASA. However, it is generally accepted that the value 
for the Moon is near zero. The parameter for Mercury is also considered 
to approach zero, in view of the planet’s very hot surface (500-550 K), 
possible lack of moisture, and thin atmosphere (5mb). Therefore, Mercury 
is no longer considered of biological interest and the previously imposed 
The Pc value for Venus is, at the present time, 
In 1970, the SSB designated a P G  of 1 X 
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The present policy regarding the outer planets is characterized by con- 
flicting recommendations for quarantine policy. The ad hoc committee 
convened by the SSB in 1970 to review COSPAR sterilization standards 
suggested a probability of 1 X that viable terrestrial organisms will 
be deposited by flybys on the surface of or in the atmosphere of the outer 
planets. In contrast, the COSPAR Planetary Quarantine Panel main- 
tained that the same parameters required for Mars should be used for the 
Jovian planets. In an attempt to formulate a common policy, NASA 
proposes to adopt the COSPAR constraint, which is compatible with 
procedures currently used to develop planetary quarantine standards 
for the planets and is consistent with present methods of quarantine 
analysis. 
In the past, all U S .  planetary missions have been designed for capsule 
deflection trajectories as a quarantine safety measure. However, it now 
appears that bus deflection trajectories can be used, while still complying 
with planetary quarantine constraints in missions that would not other- 
wise be successful. 
The orbital lifetime policy for Mars as suggested by COSPAR has, 
in the past, been that spacecraft shall not impact the planet prior to 
December 30, 1988 (the end of the period of biological interest). But 
this does not permit additional time to study the planet before it is con- 
taminated, if life is found during the period of biological exploration. 
Consequently, the proposed new policy assigns a probability of 0.95 
that an orbiting spacecraft will not impact Mars before December 30, 
2018. This should allow sufficient time for the detection and study of any 
possible life forms on the planets. 
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